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This dissertation looks at a corpus of recent Russian films that comments on the 
politicization of human life in contemporary Russia. The preoccupation of Russian culture with 
the relationship between political power and human life has been particularly acute since the 
beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term, characterized by a shift in the 
administration’s discursive practices, which now posited Russia as a stronghold of traditional 
values. The newly adopted rhetorical strategy was corroborated by a string of biopolitical 
initiatives, including tighter abortion restrictions, a ban on homosexual propaganda, the 
decriminalization of some cases of domestic violence, and the so-called Dima Yakovlev law, 
which prohibits the adoption of Russian orphans by U.S. citizens. The dissertation investigates the 
ways in which Russian arthouse cinema has conceptualized the recent changes in the Russian 
political landscape and focuses, in particular, on the modes of spectatorial address deployed by 
filmmakers to communicate their bio(political) concerns to the audiences. While the films explored 
in the dissertation are meant to serve as a critique of the increasingly fraught relationship between 
human life and political power in contemporary Russia, there might be, I argue, a certain degree 
of compatibility between the authoritarian practices of the state and the often monologically 
inclined cinematic statements produced by Russian filmmakers in recent years. The dissertation, 
however, does not make an overarching claim about the “complicity” of recent Russian cinema in 
the authoritarian project of the state. Organized as a series of case studies, it offers instead a number 
of potential approaches to conceptualizing the relationship between the two. Theoretically 
 v 
indebted to Giorgio Agamben’s work on biopolitics, the project brings into relief both the reach 
and the limits of his theoretical paradigm by staging an encounter between Agamben’s conceptual 
universe and contemporary Russian “biopolitical” cinema. I take issue, among other things, with 
Agamben’s reductive view of power as solely prohibitive and make room for an imperial narrative 
that is notoriously missing from Agamben’s account but remains, as I contend, key to 
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Introduction 
This dissertation project investigates the increasing interest of contemporary Russian 
filmmakers in the relationship between human life and political power. The project looks at a 
corpus of films (including work by Andrei Zviagintsev, Kirill Serebrennikov, and Aleksei 
Fedorchenko) that comments on the ways in which the state politicizes human life and makes it 
subject to control and regulation. The preoccupation of Russian culture with the fraught 
relationship between the state and the human body became particularly acute during Vladimir 
Putin’s third term, which marked a radical shift in the administration’s self-legitimation strategy 
that now revolved around the defense of traditional values. The dissertation examines the ways in 
which contemporary Russian arthouse cinema has conceptualized the recent changes in the 
Russian political landscape and tests the hypothesis that there may be a certain degree of 
compatibility between the increasingly authoritarian practices of the state and the often 
monologically inclined cinematic statements produced by Russian filmmakers in recent years. 
Organized as a series of case studies, the dissertation does not make an overarching claim about 
the “complicity” of recent Russian cinema in the authoritarian project of the state, offering instead 
a number of potential approaches to conceptualizing the relationship between the two. 
If in the two previous presidential elections, Vladimir Putin (in 2004) and Dmitrii 
Medvedev (in 2008) were able to secure their victories by flaunting Putin’s (and by extension, the 
party’s) ability to ward off a return to the chaos of the wild 1990s, the 2012 presidential bid, marred 
by a rapidly growing protest movement in the aftermath of compromised 2011 Duma elections, 
deployed a different legitimation strategy that emphasized Russia’s “unique” position as a 
stronghold of traditional values. Particularly emblematic of this shift in discourse was the response 
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of the state to the Pussy Riot performance at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on February 21, 
2012 (“Mother of God, Drive Putin Away!”), less than two weeks before the presidential elections. 
In his account of the affair, Mischa Gabowitsch points out that the intensity of the reaction to the 
Pussy Riot protest and the coverage of the case in state-controlled media suggest that the state had 
a particular interest in giving the affair special weight (177). He argues that the Putin 
administration used Pussy Riot’s “punk prayer” performance as an excuse to reformulate its self-
legitimation discourse around traditional values, and, more specifically, issues of gender norms 
and sexual morality (164). While the response of the state to the Pussy Riot performance 
crystallized the Putin regime’s new narrative strategy, the claim on human life as an object of state 
control and regulation was by no means purely rhetorical. The members of the protest group were 
evaluated by psychiatrists from the Kashchenko psychiatric hospital and were diagnosed with a 
range of “personality disorders”.1 The court charged Pussy Riot under Article 213 of the Criminal 
Code, which punishes premediated hooliganism “motivated by political, ideological, racial, 
nationalistic or religious hatred or animosity” by a deprivation of liberty for a term of up to seven 
years. Criminal Law 148.1 and Criminal Law 282 (that had been used in similar cases in the past), 
by comparison, carry a maximum sentence of one and four years respectively. In other words, the 
carefully orchestrated response of the state to the Pussy Riot performance was not simply an 
attempt to sell morality politics to the electorate; it was also designed to serve as a warning to the 
opponents of the state, a sinister reminder that the state had an arsenal of instruments at its disposal 
for producing docile bodies and had no scruples about making use of them. 
 
1 According to the psychiatrists’ report, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova’s disorder amounted to “an active life position ... 
and a tendency to express her opinions categorically”; Ekaterina Samutsevich suffered from “obstinacy, decisiveness 
and a tendency toward oppositional forms of behavior during conflicts, along with subjectivist and vigilant character 
traits”; Maria Alekhina showed signs of “demonstrative, overrated self-opinion” (qtd. in Bohm). 
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Some critics (see, for example, Makarychev and Medvedev) have argued that the year 2012 
marked a “biopolitical turn” in Russian politics. Although the Putin regime made demographic 
politics its priority already in the mid-2000s, it was after Putin’s reelection in 2012 that the state 
made the human body a key lever in its political manipulations. The 2012 “Dima Yakovlev Law” 
(a ban on the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens), the 2013 ban on homosexual 
propaganda, the mass scale anti-immigration campaign of 2013, and a whole array of other 
biopolitically charged changes in legislation and policy2 had tangible biopolitical consequences 
but also played an important role in consolidating the discourse of “us” vs. “them” promoted by 
the state, simultaneously exposing that the protection of “us” was merely a nominal purpose of 
these measures. As Sergei Medvedev shows, the protection of the constructed “us” made 
vulnerable not only those othered by the state (for example, members of the LGBTQ community 
and immigrants) but also those whom the state had pledged to protect (for example, Russian 
orphans who were prevented by the “Dima Yakovlev Law” from getting the expensive medical 
treatment that they needed and that was unavailable to them in Russia). More often than not, the 
“biopolitical turn” has, manifested itself primarily as a discursive strategy deployed by sovereign 
power for the purposes of self-legitimation. The state, for example, made recourse to biopolitical 
vocabulary in its attempt to legitimize its increasingly more aggressive foreign policy and, in 
particular, its military intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. As Medvedev 
argues, in 2014-15 the state-controlled media invoked the organicist concept of the state and 
portrayed the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and the Russian support for the Donbass 
 
2 For a detailed account of these changes, see Andrey Makarychev and Sergei Medvedev’s article “Biopolitics and 
Power in Putin’s Russia”; Sergei Medvedev’s piece “The State and the Human Body in Putin’s Russia”; and Andrey 
Makarychev and Alexandra Yatsyk’s article “Biopower and Geopolitics as Russia’s Neighborhood Strategies: 
Reconnecting People or Reaggregating Lands?” 
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separatists as “an organic, biological act of nature, the reclaiming of a lost body part (‘Donbas is 
the heart of Russia’), and the reuniting of the torn body of the nation” (5; emphasis in original). 
I conceive of my research project as theoretically indebted to Giorgio Agamben’s theory 
of biopolitics and his concept of the state of exception, the suspension of the juridical order in 
times of crisis that allows the state to violate broadly accepted conventions, laws, and practices 
and produce what Agamben terms homines sacri. The figure of homo sacer is reduced to “bare 
life,” a zone of indistinction between bíos (politically qualified life) and zoē (natural reproductive 
life). Homo sacer, Agamben contends, is outside both human and divine law—he can be killed but 
not sacrificed. In his most influential manuscript on the subject, Agamben refers to homo sacer as 
the protagonist of his book (Homo Sacer 8) and argues that the state of exception has become the 
rule of contemporary politics and rendered “virtually everyone homines sacri” (Homo Sacer 115). 
The films scrutinized in this dissertation similarly revolve around the figure of homo sacer. Often 
criticized for its universalizing impulse and political nihilism,3 Agamben’s work nonetheless 
provides a useful starting point for my analysis of the recent Russian cinematic conceptualizations 
of the relationship between human life and political power. Yet an encounter between Agamben’s 
conceptual universe and recent Russian cinema brings to relief both the reach and the limits of 
Agamben’s critical paradigm. A major goal of my project is to make room for an imperial narrative 
that is notoriously missing from Agamben’s account but remains, as I will argue, key to 
understanding the specificity of Russia’s biopolitical project that is tangled with the country’s 
imperial persistence. As Nancy Condee suggests in her essay “Imperial Ectoplasm,” in 1991 as in 
1917 “an empire had fallen, but the structural and thematic components remain” (emphasis in 
 
3 See, for example, Jacque Derrida’s The Beast and the Sovereign, Ernesto Laclau’s piece “Bare Life or Social 
Indeterminacy?”, Antonio Negri’s essay “Giorgio Agamben: The Discrete Taste of the Dialectic,” and Ewa Płonowska 
Ziarek’s article “Bare Life on Strike: Notes on the Biopolitics of Race and Gender.” 
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original). As evidenced by Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea 
in 2014, Russia has yet again managed to reconstitute itself as an empire. 
I also take issue with Agamben’s reduction of biopolitics into thanatopolitics4 and attempt 
to restore the positive dimension of biopolitics by reinstating Michel Foucault’s distinction 
between sovereign power (“the ancient right to take life or let live”) and disciplinary and 
biopower, two aspects of what Foucault defines as “a power to foster life or disallow it” (The 
History of Sexuality 138). Foucault’s work also provides a useful counterpoint to Agamben for my 
analysis of the cinematic medium itself as an apparatus. If we accept Agamben’s definition of an 
apparatus (dispositif), a term he borrows from Foucault and extends to refer to “literally anything 
that has the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, 
the behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings” (What Is an Apparatus? 14), then cinema 
itself must be considered a dangerously powerful apparatus of biopolitical capture. As Randall 
Halle points out, Agamben’s theorization of the apparatus, on one hand, opens up the restrictive 
equation of the cinematic apparatus to an ideological state apparatus that dominated Film Studies 
in the 1960s and is partially responsible for its current quiescent state, at least in Anglo-American 
Film Studies (46). On the other hand, as Halle shows, Agamben’s notion of apparatus, which omits 
the positive productive capacities that it had in Foucault’s account, reduces apparatus to “a 
structure of power, control, and regulation” that entraps living beings. In my discussion of the 
cinematic apparatus, I accept Halle’s invitation to view apparatus, via Jean-Louis Comolli,5 as “an 
 
4 For a discussion of the ways in which biopolitics collapses into thanatopolitics in Agamben’s account, see Thomas 
Lemke’s Biopolitik zur Einführung. 
5 In his considerations of the cinematic apparatus in Machines of the Visible, Comolli writes: 
 
[T]he cinema . . . functions with and in the set of apparatuses of representation at work in a society. 
There are not only the representations produced by the representative apparatuses as such (painting, 
theatre, cinema, etc.); there are also, participating in the movement of the whole, the systems of the 
delegation of power (political representation), the ceaseless working-up of social imaginaries 
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aspect of social reproduction” that as “a web of human activity” does not only control and regulate 
but “may just as well allow, or even more likely, liberate, ally, invent, open, envision, author, or 
strengthen the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings” (Halle 47). 
Many of the films scrutinized in this dissertation communicate their biopolitical concerns 
to the viewers by addressing them from a position of authority, often opting for a didactic and/or 
manipulative mode(s) of spectatorial address. Drawing on Nikolaj Lübecker’s discussion of what 
he terms the feel-bad film, I argue that there may be political value to this approach. Feel-bad 
films, Lübecker contends, help us raise ethical and political questions and “de-frame”6 visual 
culture (81). Although Lübecker writes that feel-bad films target the body of the spectator in an 
attempt to reach her intellect (5), he largely circumvents considerations of affect. I too generally 
avoid (with some rare exceptions) discussing potential affective responses for my interest lies 
elsewhere. Without losing sight of the inherently collective nature of filmmaking, I probe the 
relationship between “authorship” and “authority,” a question to which Mikhail Bakhtin, among 
others, persistently returned and was ultimately unable to resolve in his writing. Even in his 
analysis of Fedor Dostoevsky’s polyphonic novels, Bakhtin still acknowledged the “creative 
 
(historical, ideological representations) and a large part, even, of the modes of relational behaviour 
(balances of power, confrontations, manoeuvres of seduction, strategies of defense, marking of 
differences or affiliations). On the other hand, but at the same time, the hypothesis would be that a 
society is only such in that it is driven by representation. If the social machine manufactures 
representations, it also manufactures itself from representations— the latter at once as means, matter 
and condition of sociality. 
Thus the historical variation of cinematic techniques, their appearance-disappearance, their phases 
of convergence, their periods of dominance and decline seem to me to depend not on a rational-
linear order of technological perfectibility nor an autonomous instance of scientific “progress,” but 
much rather on the offsettings, adjustments, arrangements carried out by a social configuration in 
order to represent itself, that is, at once to grasp itself, identify itself and itself produce itself in its 
representation. (qtd. in Halle 35-36) 
6 Lübecker draws here on Judith Butler’s discussion of “norms” and “frames” in Frames of War.  Norms determine 
the frames, but repetition of particular forms of framing helps produce the norms (Lübecker 81). The task of visual 
culture, according to Butler, is to “de-frame”: “To learn to see the frame that blinds us is no easy matter. And if there 
is a critical role for visual culture […] it is precisely to thematise the forcible frame, the one that conducts the 
dehumanizing norm, that restricts what is perceivable and, indeed, what can be” (Butler 110-1). 
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activity of the really existing author, […], “the author’s ‘plan’ or ‘design’ for the novel, and of his 
‘ultimate semantic authority’” (Coates 89-90). While I do see film spectatorship as dynamic, and 
meaning as negotiated anew in each individual encounter between the spectator and the cinematic 
object, my analysis focuses primarily on the other dimension of this process—the interpretive 
possibilities (that exist as potentialities that may or may not be realized) created by the 
constellation of specific narrative, formal, and stylistic choices. 
While Bakhtin’s thought, as Malcolm Jones points out, is at times characterized by a 
recourse to binary oppositions, his view that all utterances are in the final analysis double-voiced 
presupposes that monologic and dialogic are not absolute categories, not an either-or opposition, 
but rather represent “different degrees of double-voicedness” (23). The chapters that follow present 
individual case studies meant to illuminate the ways in which contemporary Russian filmmakers 
conceptualize the relationship between human life and political power as well as the different ways 
in which these filmmakers thematize and negotiate their own position of authority. What these 
studies ultimately bring to relief is the interplay of both vertical and horizontal gestures that 
characterize power relations at large—both inside and outside the movie theater. 
Chapter One focuses on two of the most explicitly political Russian films in recent years, 
Andrei Zviagintsev’s 2014 film Leviathan (Leviafan) and Kirill Serebrennikov’s 2016 drama The 
Student (Uchenik). Both films explore the triangular relationship between the individual, the state, 
and the church and are explicitly critical of the rapport between the Putin administration and the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Drawing on Sergei Prozorov’s conceptualization of the post-
communist condition as post-historical, I argue that both Serebrennikov and Zviagintsev view the 
state’s newly articulated rhetorical strategy as a “chimerical” attempt to reintroduce ideological 
content into the political sphere. As Prozorov shows, “given the nullity of the historical process, 
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any […] hegemonic project is immediately revealed to be a chimera that invites us to Agamben’s 
‘camp,’ in which bare life itself is abducted by power as the instrument of its bio- or thanato-
political rationalities” (The Ethics 169). I contend, however, that the model of power presented by 
Zviagintsev is better aligned with Agamben’s negative view of power as the power “to taboo, 
exclude, and annihilate” (Chow 132), whereas the conception of power articulated by 
Serebrennikov resembles Foucauldian approach to power as dispersed across social networks. 
Finally, I discuss the push and pull between the vertical and horizontal gestures in the two films’ 
modes of spectatorial address and conclude that the two films’ attempts at monological unity are 
inherently driven by a dialogic impulse as they posit themselves as responses to the unidirectional 
discourse of the state-church duo that refuses to be part of an open-ended dialogue. 
A cautionary word about the balance from one chapter to the next: This initial chapter is 
considerably more substantial than the chapters that follow for I use it as an opportunity to lay the 
theoretical groundwork for the entire dissertation. I discuss here the distinctions between 
Foucauldian and Agambenian conceptions of biopolitics, introduce the reader to Prozorov’s 
theorization of the post-Soviet condition, and delineate the key characteristics of Lübecker’s “feel-
bad films.” These concepts feature prominently in my argument on the Leviathan-Student dyad, 
and for this reason I have chosen to elaborate on them in detail in this chapter. They recur, however, 
throughout the dissertation and inform the readings that I offer in Chapters Two and Three. 
Chapter Two explores the convergence of biopolitical and imperial narratives in 
Mamuliia’s 2010 film Another Sky (Drugoe nebo) and Kott’s 2014 drama The Test (Ispytanie), 
focusing, in particular, on their limited use of dialogue. While Mamuliia’s and Kott’s silencing 
strategies may be interpreted as a replication of an imperial logic that deprives its Other of logos, 
I argue that the silencing of characters is at least attempted as a liberating gesture, as a way of 
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freeing the characters from the constraints of language in general and the language of the 
oppressor, in particular. I conclude, however, that both Kott and Mamuliia—despite the striking 
differences in their approaches to the use of film language—fall in the final analysis into the same 
trap as Agamben himself, who refuses to address the “otherness” of bare life. As Malini Schueller 
points out in her critique of Agamben’s theory: “We might all be ‘virtually’ homines sacri, but 
only some of us are marked to be in the permanent state of exception” (243). The reticence of both 
Mamuliia’s and Kott’s films, including their refusal to ground events in a specific time and place, 
subsumes imperial and biopolitical narratives within the pursuit of larger metaphysical questions 
and discourages attempts to ponder who and why is more likely to find themselves deprived of a 
voice and reduced to bare life. 
Chapter Three investigates the work of Ivan Tverdovskii and Aleksei Fedorchenko, whose 
cinematic efforts share an interest, among other things, in the discursive and institutional practices 
of othering and a preoccupation with the workings of visual apparatuses. In their attempts to de-
frame visual culture, both filmmakers have experimented with the hybridization of documentary 
and fiction film forms and conceptualizing otherness in an “abstracted” form, thus bringing into 
relief the ways in which visual culture partakes in the construction of otherness and simultaneously 
distancing themselves from such practices. I take a somewhat different approach in this chapter 
than in the previous two and analyze a larger body of work by each filmmaker. I look at 
Tverdovskii’s early short The Holy Groove (Sviataia kanavka), and his two feature films, 
Corrections Class (Klass korrektsii) and Zoology (Zoologiia); as for Fedorchenko, I discuss his 
2002 short David (David), his 2005 mockumentary First on the Moon (Pervye na lune), and his 
2018 drama Anna’s War (Voina Anny). I argue that both filmmakers attempt renegotiations of the 
caesura between zoē and bíos (hyperbolized in Agamben’s account). I contend however, that in 
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Tverdovskii’s cinematic worlds, power is dispersed across a multiplicity of networks (which form 
in Tverdovskii’s pessimistic and somewhat anti-Foucauldian view an inescapable web). 
Fedorchenko’s films, characterized by a postmodernist playfulness, in turn thematize power’s 
attempts to establish total control, but continuously return to the sites where “bare life” escapes it, 
thus destabilizing the caesura posited by Agamben between power and the powerlessness of bare 
life. I conclude the chapter by looking in some detail at Anna’s War, in which Fedorchenko departs 
from his signature playful directorial approach and opts instead for a more clearly articulated 
authorial stance. 
In a brief final chapter, I offer a hypothesis derived from the conclusions of the individual 
chapters. I posit the recent predilection of Russian filmmakers for explicitly political and often 
monologically inclined cinematic statements as a logical response to the discursive practices 
(widely and mistakenly, as Mark Lipovetsky points out, interpreted as postmodernist 
(“Psevdomorfoza”)) used by the state to introduce a new “chimerical” ideological content. 
11 
1.0 The Church, State, and the Body: Inflections of Religious Power in Andrei 
Zviagintsev’s Leviathan and Kirill Serebrennikov’s The Student 
The growing protest movement that threatened to mar Vladimir Putin’s bid for re-election 
in 2012 required the President to articulate a new legitimation strategy and strengthen the ties 
between the state and the Russian Orthodox Church. In late 2011, the Patriarch was granted official 
residence in the Kremlin, which the church had lost back in 1917. Patriarch Kirill reciprocated by 
calling Putin’s presidency a “miracle of God,” corroborating his claim by saying that “as a 
patriarch” he “must only tell the truth, not paying attention to the political situation or propaganda” 
(qtd. in Bryanski). As irony would have it, earlier that year the truth-telling Kirill was reluctant to 
support Putin, made comments “vaguely supportive of the protesters’ demands” and fell into line 
only after Kremlin-controlled media began to publish pieces criticizing Kirill for lavish material 
possessions (Coyer). The narrative that the ROC was recruited to ratify was that Putin was the 
champion of Christian values abandoned by a hostile West that is on a mission to weaken Russia 
and impose on it its degenerate values. 
Recent Russian arthouse cinema has responded to the growing rapprochement between the 
Putin administration and the Russian Orthodox Church with a number of films that offer biting 
critiques of the coalition: among these are Kirill Serebrennikov’s The Student (2016), Lera 
Surkova’s Pagans (Iazychniki) (2017), Andrei Zviagintsev’s Leviathan (2014) and Loveless 
(Neliubov') (2017), and Ivan Tverdovskii’s Zoology (2016).7 While all of these films to a certain 
7 For a discussion of the depictions of Orthodox Christianity in Russian cinema of the early post-Soviet period, see 
Jolyon Mitchell’s essay “Portraying Religion and Peace in Russian Film” and Mark Le Fanu’s chapters on Russia in 
his 2019 book Believing in Film: Christianity and Classic European Cinema: “Russia: Tarkovsky, Eisenstein and 
Christianity” and “Russia Again: Millennial Faith and Nihilism.” 
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extent implicate institutionalized religion in the increasingly authoritarian practices of the Putin 
administration, this chapter focuses on Zviaginstev’s Leviathan and Serebrennikov’s The Student, 
two films in which the relationship between the state, the church, and human life takes center stage. 
In both Leviathan and The Student, the church plays a key role in the state project of 
producing docile bodies. The two filmmakers, however, present in their cinematic worlds two very 
different models of power: crudely sketched, Zviagintsev’s conception, I argue, is best aligned 
with the Agambenian model, while Serebrennikov’s is better captured by the Foucauldian 
approach. What faces Leviathan’s protagonist is sovereign power, which Zviagintsev (as well as 
Agamben) understands predominantly in negative terms, as a power “to taboo, exclude, and 
annihilate” (Chow 132). While Zviagintsev suggests that his characters are not simply reduced to 
homines sacri by the state but are themselves implicated in their fate; the binary between the 
“dominators” and the “dominated” in this model ultimately remains intact. Serebrennikov’s 
investigation of power, by contrast, is based on the assumption that power permeates the social 
body (a view aligned with Foucault’s theorization of power relations) and thus leaves room for 
resistance and confrontation in places where Agamben and, so it would seem, Zviagintsev see 
none. 
Sergei Prozorov’s theorization of the postcommunist condition provides a useful point of 
departure for my analysis. Drawing on Agamben’s conception of the “end of history,”8 Prozorov 
argues that the demise of the USSR did not simply expose the unsustainability of one historical 
project among others but brought to relief the contingency of the historical dimension as such 
 
8 Prozorov juxtaposes Agamben’s reconstruction of the Hegelo-Kojèvian problematic of the end of history to Francis 
Fukuyama’s “triumphalist liberalism, for which it is precisely the liberal (universal-homogenous) state that fulfills the 
historical dialectic” (The Ethics 29; emphasis in original). See Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man and 
his “Reflections on the End of History Five Years Later” published in History and Theory. Agamben’s ruminations 
on the “end of history” are to be found in his “Notes on Politics” (pp. 109-19) in Means Without End. 
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(“The Management” 38). The early post-Soviet period of Russian history was, as Prozorov puts it, 
“a time of trials”: “[T]his period condenses a multiplicity of times, uniting in a single decade all 
that might have happened, all possibilities of Russia’s political development, and suspending them 
at the very moment when a single model of the future looked set to become irreversible” (The 
Ethics 46; emphasis in original). 9 In an attempt to explain why Putinism triumphed over its 
adversaries across the ideological spectrum in the 2000s, Prozorov suggests that despite Putin’s 
efforts to position himself as a positive alternative to the “chaos” of the previous decade, the Putin 
regime did not offer “any positive ideological hegemony, but rather invoked a promise of 
stabilization devoid of substantive content” (“The Management” 41). The Putin regime can thus 
be discussed in terms of “absolute conservatism”: 
While liberal conservatism attempts to conserve what is not yet created and left 
conservatism strives to conserve what no longer exists, the Putin presidency simply 
conserves what there is, that is, the ruins of the Soviet order. As this remnant of 
Soviet socialism is neither liberal nor socialist, and indeed escapes any positive 
predicate, we may speak of Putin’s reign of pure synchrony and structure in terms 
of absolute conservatism, which […] has dispensed with the substantive object of 
conservation and instead articulates itself as pure form or style. (The Ethics 73, 
emphasis in original) 
While Prozorov’s discussion accounts for the first two terms of Putin’s presidency, 
Zviagintsev’s 2014 drama Leviathan and Serebrennikov’s 2016 film The Student comment on its 
 
9 According to Prozorov, the options that were tried out but failed to reach the hegemonic status to which they aspired 
include the following: “General Alexander Lebed’s military-style right-wing conservatism, Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s 
carnivalesque street populism, Yevgeni Primakov’s bureaucratic ‘centrism,’ Gennady Zyuganov’s communist 
revanchism with a nationalist flair, Anatoly Chubais’s technocratic market liberalism” (The Ethics 46). 
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more recent installment, i.e. Putin’s third term, during which, as some critics have argued, the 
regime became increasingly ideologized. Melik Kaylan, for example, wrote the following in his 
2014 piece “Kremlin Values: Putin’s Strategic Conservatism”: “Putin has changed, or at least 
changed his game over time, and now espouses a discernible, exportable, full-fledged ‘-ism’ […]. 
That ‘-ism’ is conservatism, or at least conservatism of a particular stripe” (10).10 Putin’s 
conservatism that did not, according to Prozorov, have a substantive object of conservation during 
the first two terms of Putin’s presidency, appears to have articulated during Putin’s third term what 
it is that it strives to conserve: faith, family, and tradition. While Zviagintsev’s Leviathan and 
Serebrennikov’s The Student offer explicit critiques of the alliance between the Putin 
administration and the Russian Orthodox Church, I do not presume the two filmmakers’ 
unqualified agreement with the thesis about the recent ideologization of the Putin administration. 
In fact, the question that drives my inquiry is whether, in the cinematic imaginations of these two 
filmmakers, the Russian state-church duo’s defense of traditional values qualifies as a successful 
attempt to introduce new positive ideological content (however problematic) into the 
postcommunist experience. To put it bluntly, has the Putin presidency, in Zviagintsev’s and 
Serebrennikov’s individual arguments, recommenced the flow of history? An obvious but an 
incomplete answer—in both cases—is “no.” The first part of my chapter is dedicated to a pursuit 
of more nuanced answers to this question. 
While in the following two sections of this chapter I focus on the ways in which these two 
filmmakers articulate the relationship between the church, the state, and human life on the level of 
 
10 Similar arguments have been made, among others, by Andrey Makarychev and Aleksandra Yatsyk (“A New Russian 
Conservatism: Domestic Roots and Repercussions for Europe”), Luke March (“Nationalism for Export? The Domestic 
and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New ‘Russian Idea’”), and Owen Matthews (“Putin to Russia: We Will Bury 
Ourselves”). 
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content, in the concluding part I discuss the narrative strategies chosen by Zviaginstev and 
Serebrennikov to address these issues. Both films call attention to the instrumental role that the 
church has played in shaping and perpetuating political narratives. One could argue, however, that 
both films, with their tightly controlled narratives, resort to similar narrative practices as the Putin 
administration itself as they make their own claims to moral authority and thus replicate the logic 
of the narrative practices that they seek to critique. I examine Zviaginstev’s and Serebrennikov’s 
narrative strategies through the concepts of Bakhtinian polyphony and Lübecker’s feel-bad film 
and show that there is a push and pull between horizontal and vertical gestures in the two films. 
1.1 Leviathan, Bespredel, and the End of History 
Leviathan, Zviagintsev’s fourth feature film and his most explicitly political film to date, 
is set in a small town by the Barents Sea.11 The film’s protagonist Kolia lives in a spacious ancestral 
home on the foreshore with his family—his second wife Lilia and his son Roma from the previous 
marriage. Kolia is being evicted from his house by the corrupt local mayor Vadim and he has 
recruited Dima, an old army friend and now a prominent Moscow lawyer, to help him win the 
legal fight. Dima, however, proves helpless in the face of corrupt authorities and is brutally beaten 
up by the mayor’s henchmen. Before fleeing back to Moscow, Dima sleeps with Kolia’s wife Lilia, 
who shortly thereafter goes missing and is eventually found dead. A defeated Kolia is thrown into 
jail for 15 years for the murder of his wife—a murder that he did not commit. Incited or perhaps 
 
11 Most of the film was shot in Kirovsk and the village of Teriberka in the Murmansk region, with some additional 
photography done in the nearby towns of Monchegorsk and Olenegorsk. 
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mandated by the “Vladyka,” the local bishop, the mayor Vadim has Kolia’s house demolished and 
builds in its stead a golden-domed church. 
About half-way through, the film is punctuated with the following sequence. Lieutenant-
colonel of the Russian Traffic Control, referred to as Stepanych by his friends, is at the wheel of a 
well-worn police truck. The radio is playing the anthem of the Russian criminal world, Mikhail 
Krug’s shanson12 song “Vladimirskii tsentral.” The song’s first-person protagonist, an inmate of 
the notorious Vladimir Central prison, recounts the hardships of prison life and romanticizes in the 
process the criminal world. The camera lingers on three miniature icons attached to the dashboard 
of the car. A few inches away from the icons are three more stickers of a similar shape and size; 





The scene captures the myriad issues and contradictions that characterize contemporary 
Russia and that appear to be at the very heart of Zviagintsev’s inquiry into its plight: the alliance 
between the Putin regime and the Russian Orthodox Church, the commodification of religious 
 
12 For a discussion of shanson in the context of contemporary Russian culture and politics, see Anastasiia Gordiienko, 
“The Paradoxical Role of the Shanson in Putin’s Russia,” The Soviet and Post-Soviet Review 45.3: 342-384. 
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values, the death-grip of patriarchy, the proximity of the state-church duo to the criminal world 
and what Prozorov aptly describes as a “brutal indistinction between law and crime, authority and 
violence, government and gang” (“The Management” 33). 
In his analysis of the early postcommunist condition, Prozorov writes: “If there is a single 
term that can sum up the description of the experience of early postcommunism in everyday life, 
it must be bespredel” (The Ethics 150). The concept emerged in the Soviet Union of the late 1980s 
in the world of organized crime and the prison camp system. As Vadim Volkov points out, in 
criminal slang, the word was used to denote a violation of norms related to the use of force. Despite 
its aggressive facade, Volkov writes, the criminal code restricted violence as much as it authorized 
it. To commit bespredel meant to exceed the code-sanctioned level of violence (81). The concept 
“escaped” the criminal underworld during the perestroika era and has since been part of everyday 
vocabulary.13 The exact meaning of the word bespredel, as Prozorov points out, changes 
depending on its enunciative context: “[B]espredel may refer to the utter disrespect for traditional 
authorities, the acceptability of physical violence in the resolution of conflicts, the politicians’ 
disregard for public opinion, the radical reversal of moral values, the disappearance of ethical 
standards in professional practices, the domination of private entrepreneurship by criminal 
protection rackets, and so forth (“The Management” 38). What remains consistent across the 
different contexts of usage is the core meaning of a violation of norms. It should be noted, however, 
that even though the word bespredel is sometimes translated as “lawlessness,” the word is not 
equivalent to “bezzakonie” (literally, “without-law-ness”), as its origins in the criminal world 
 
13 The term bespredel has been used in discussions of post-Soviet cultural production. See, for example, Eliot 
Borenstein, “Overkill: Bespredel and Gratuitous Violence” in Overkill: Sex and Violence in Contemporary Russian 
Culture (pp. 195-224) and Beumers and Lipovetsky, “Violence in Soviet and Post-Soviet Culture” in Performing 
Violence (pp. 47-67). 
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intimate. As Prozorov emphasizes in his investigation of the postcommunist condition, bespredel 
does not designate illegality per se but rather “an inaccordance of acts with the tacit and informal 
norms that may well be themselves illegal” (“The Management” 37). 
Zviagintsev intimates early in the film that the world presented to us is plagued by 
bespredel. About six and a half minutes into the film, its protagonist Kolia is pulled over by the 
traffic police. The viewer familiar with the workings of the traffic police in Russia is likely to brace 
herself at this point for the following scenario. The police officer will incriminate Kolia with a 
(possibly imaginary) violation and encourage him to deal with the situation on the spot, that is 
avoid paying the fine through official channels and having the violation registered on his record 
by paying the fine directly to the officer.14 The initial exchange between Kolia and the police 
officer supports our expectations. When asked to present his license and registration, Kolia 
defiantly asks the officer if he is trying to meet his “quota,” implying that the officer had no reason 
to pull him over and did so simply in order to pin on him an imaginary violation and extort a bribe. 
Zviagintsev, however, is only teasing the spectator. The police officer, we will find out, is Kolia’s 
friend Pasha, and the tense interaction between the two was just two friends joking around. What 
follows, however, confirms that our apprehensions were not entirely ungrounded. Pasha relays to 
Kolia a ‘request’ from his boss Stepanych—the latter wants Kolia, a car mechanic by profession, 
to repair his truck; the payment he offers is a bottle of vodka. Both the request and the suggested 
form of payment visibly upset Kolia—as he drives off, he reveals to his friend Dima that this is 
not the first time that Stepanych has asked him to fix his “rust bucket.” In an attempt to explain 
 
14 Prozorov points out that the acts of offering and accepting a bribe in and of themselves do not amount to bespredel; 
it is only when the police officer demands an amount greater than the official fine and threatens the driver with 
additional charges that “we leave the domain of illicit regularity and enter the zone of bespredel, where no rules apply” 
(“The Management” 37-8). 
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why Stepanych would not buy a new car, Dima suggests that he might be an honest cop. “And a 
generous one, too,” Kolia retorts. The two have a good laugh. 
It is not Stepanych’s abuse of power per se that constitutes bespredel here but the 
inapplicability of any particular set of norms. Stepanych and Kolia, we will find out, are friends 
but Stepanych asks both as a friend and as an authority figure.15 The fact that he offers to pay with 
a bottle of vodka muddles things even further: is he asking for a favor or a paid service? Because 
of the unclear nature of the request from a friend/authority figure, Kolia cannot demand a proper 
payment nor refuse him. The simultaneous applicability of two incompatible sets of norms means 
that no rules apply. 
That the phrase “honest cop” is perceived by the characters as a joke, an oxymoron, that 
those who are supposed to protect the law are the most likely to violate it, speaks to the larger issue 
at stake here—the impossibility of distinguishing between seemingly incompatible categories, a 
cross-contamination of opposites. In the film’s opening shots Zviagintsev visually refers us to 
Genesis [Figures 2 and 3]: “And God said, ‘Let the water under the sky be gathered to one place, 
and let dry ground appear.’ / God called the dry ground ‘land,’ and the gathered waters he called 
‘seas.’ And God saw that it was good” (Genesis 1: 9-10). In Zviagintsev’s creation, like in Genesis, 
the separation of the sea from the land is followed by the appearance of light. The light is man-
made, however; it emanates from the flashing lamp of a lighthouse in the distance. Before man 
appears on screen, we see further effects of human activity: a disintegrating dock and rotting hulks 
of abandoned boats. 
 
 
15 Notably, Kolia resorts to the same strategy in one of his early conversations with Dima. When the latter refuses to 
let Kolia read the documents incriminating the mayor, fearing that Kolia might “fly off the handle,” Kolia pulls rank 








Creation in Zviagintsev’s universe is thus contaminated with destruction and decay; 
friendship with betrayal; love with violence. Dima sleeps with his best friend’s wife Lilia and flees 
town, abandoning both his friend and his lawyer’s duties shortly after he is threatened by the 
mayor. Kolia and Lilia’s family friends Anzhela and Pasha, Zviagintsev intimates, testify against 
Kolia in court when the latter is charged with the murder of his wife. When Kolia smacks his son 
on the head, he claims he does so “lovingly” (“Да ладно… Я так. Любя.”) When Anzhela’s son 
points his toy gun at Lilia, he explains his desire to “kill” her by the fact that she is pretty. Hurt by 
the betrayal of the woman he loves, Kolia “repays” Lilia first by beating her up and then raping 
her in the house basement. 
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Law and authority in Leviathan are similarly indistinguishable from violence and crime. 
The mayor Vadim uses the corrupt justice system to hound Kolia out of his house. The 
“prosecution” resorts to physical force to defeat Kolia’s lawyer. To put Kolia back in his place, 
Vadim frames Kolia for the murder of his wife. Whether or not Lilia’s death was the work of 
Vadim’s henchmen is not entirely clear, but Zviagintsev strategically leaves that option open. 
Notably, Dima’s defense strategy is far from legal as well. He arrives from Moscow with a thick 
folder full of dirt on the mayor; his plan is to blackmail the opponent into offering Kolia a more 
substantial settlement. 
In his analysis of the postcommunist condition, Prozorov points out that it is the 
simultaneous contamination of opposites (akin to the one presented to us in Leviathan) that 
perpetuates the condition of bespredel and forestalls the articulation of a new teleological 
dimension in the post-historical time: 
[T]he undecidability of the postcommunist condition is not exhausted by the trauma 
of the sudden demise of the order that laid its own claim to the teleological end of 
history, but is rather contained in the aporetic coexistence of radically 
heterogeneous elements that disables any meaningful vision of the postcommunist 
order and guarantees the perpetuation of the condition of bespredel. [...] Jacques 
Derrida famously described this experience of undecidability in a series of quasi-
transcendental concepts (trace, différance, supplement, pharmakon, hymen, gift, 
autoimmunity, etc.) that all point to the same condition of a non-dialectical 
coexistence (or in Deleuze’s terminology, a disjunctive synthesis) of the most 
disparate: poison and cure, lack and excess, presence and absence, the sacred and 
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the profane, damnation and salvation, destruction and creation, violence and law. 
(The Ethics 157-8) 
In a televised speech delivered on February 3, 2000, then acting president of Russia 
Vladimir Putin declared: “Without the legal system and the dictatorship of law, freedom turns into 
bespredel” (qtd. in Volkov 82). Does Leviathan, set during Putin’s third term and insistent on 
exposing the ever-thriving bespredel, make the argument that the Putin administration never 
fulfilled its promise of establishing a “dictatorship of the law”? Does Zviagintsev expose as hollow 
Putin’s claim that he brought stability to Russia after the chaos of the 1990s? As Prozorov shows, 
the “dictatorship of the law” that Putin presented rhetorically as a solution to the condition of 
bespredel was not an alternative to it but precisely what guaranteed its perpetuation: 
[T]he uncanny slogan of Putin’s first term, ‘dictatorship of the law,’ […] 
supplements the ‘proper’ (legal) power of the law with its very opposite 
(‘dictatorship’) that reveals that the former has been rendered inoperative and 
requires the facilitating force of the latter to maintain the semblance of the existence 
of the law. […] Putin’s slogan of the ‘dictatorship of the law’ unwittingly reveals 
what Agamben considers to be the arcanum imperii of modern politics […]: the 
law cannot rule, that is, it has no access and no relation to life that it takes as its 
object, and, to establish this access, it must produce its own opposite (anomie, state 
of exception or ‘dictatorship’) in the guise of its application. (The Ethics 202-3; 
emphasis in original) 
Leviathan’s verdict is unambiguous: the state of exception continues to be the norm and 
Russia’s citizens, deprived of a political existence, are essentially what Agamben terms homines 
sacri, beings abandoned by the law and hence at every instant exposed to death (Homo Sacer 183). 
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The film’s protagonist Kolia is a textbook example of homo sacer. In a key early scene, the mayor 
shows up at Kolia’s house drunk, essentially committing the crime of trespassing, and, among 
other insults, refers to Kolia and his lot as insects drowning in their own excrement who have never 
had and never will have any rights [“Вот вы все насекомые никак не хотите по-хорошему, 
поэтому тонете в говне”; “У тебя никогда никаких прав не было, нет и не будет!”]. Later in 
the film, in a clear nod to Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment, the mayor will describe Kolia and 
his kin as “вши” [“lice”] and “твари” [“creatures”]. Deprived of access to the political, abandoned 
by the law, Kolia is reduced to bare life—what remains after bíos is separated from zoē: he can be 
killed with impunity by the state, terminated as an insect, as a louse. 
While Kolia is not killed, Zviagintsev suggests at several points in the film that it would 
not be an entirely impossible outcome. The viewers do not get to find out what exactly is in Dima’s 
folder full of dirt on the mayor, but when Kolia gets access to it, he cries out in outrage: “У него 
руки по локоть в крови” [“He is up to his elbows in blood.”] Unsure at first, we learn how literally 
we should interpret this statement when the mayor stages a brutal beating of Dima and points a 
gun at him (eventually firing several shots into the ground). While Zviagintsev does not disclose 
the exact cause of Lilia’s death, he plants a suspicion that it may have been the work of the mayor’s 
henchmen. A final and more subtle hint that we should not put murder past the mayor and his 
“team” comes towards the end of Leviathan. When Kolia is wrongly convicted of the murder of 
his wife, the film brings to its culmination its ongoing dialogue with Aleksei Balabanov’s 2007 
crime thriller Cargo 200, in which the character played by the same actor as Kolia (Aleksei 
Serebriakov) who is also convicted of a crime he did not commit, is shot in prison by a guard in 
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an act of blatant bespredel.16 When the camera captures Zviagintsev’s protagonist behind bars 
during the second courtroom sequence [Figure 4], a viewer familiar with Balabanov’s work will 
remember a similar shot of Serebriakov’s character from Cargo 200 [Figure 5] and wonder 








16 Serebriakov’s character in Cargo 200 is sentenced to death, which has led some critics to interpret the killing as his 
execution (see, for example, Anthony Anemone’s discussion of the film in The Contemporary Russian Cinema Reader 
and Jeremi Szaniawski’s review of the film in Senses of Cinema). This “execution,” however, is carried out too 
summarily to be considered an official fulfillment of the death sentence: Aleksei is summoned to see a visitor and is 
shot abruptly as he is walking down the hallway. 
17 Zviagintsev’s insinuations, paired with his refusal to make the mayor explicitly guilty of murder, may be construed 
as a subtle reference to the mysterious deaths, disappearances, and attacks of Putin’s critics and political opponents. 
Among Putin’s most prominent alleged victims are Anna Politkovskaya, Alexander Litvinenko, Boris Berezovsky, 
and Boris Nemtsov. For an account of what some consider to be the resurgence of political murder in Russia, see Amy 
Knight’s Orders to Kill: The Putin Regime and Political Murder. 
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Kolia and his family’s plight—to be abandoned by the law—is not unique. During the first 
courtroom sequence in which the judge reads “in supersonic-speed monotone” (Gessen, “Russia”) 
the court’s decision to take away Kolia’s property, the camera cuts to a shot of a distressed couple 
in the hallway who, we may surmise, have had an equally unpleasant encounter with the justice 
system as the film’s protagonist. In Zviagintsev’s universe, uncanny in its resemblance to 
contemporary Russia, no one is protected by the law. Even the lawyer Dima, who insists that he 
believes in facts only, seems to have known all along that law cannot rule: why else would he 
choose blackmail as his defense strategy? Critic Lidiia Maslova catches Dima’s “bluff” early on; 
in her review of the film for the Kommersant she points out that the ardent materialist Dima refers 
to the mayor (jokingly, though there is a grain of truth to every joke in Zviagintsev’s cinematic 
universe) as if the latter were a demon: “С такими—только постом и молитвой” [“Fasting and 
prayer are the only remedies against his kind.”] 
Neither Dima, nor Zviagintsev, of course, believe that fasting and prayer would be a more 
efficient remedy against bespredel. The church in Leviathan emerges as an accomplice to the state 
and plays a key role in producing homines sacri. There is an almost explicit suggestion that it is 
the affluent bishop who incites the mayor to use violence in his dealings with Kolia and his lawyer. 
The bishop tells Vadim in a tête-à-tête that all power is from God, and that where there is power, 
there is strength, and encourages the mayor to use the “strength” given to him by God to resolve 
the issues he is facing. [“Всякая власть от Бога. Где власть, там сила. Если ты власть, на своем 
участке ответственности, решай местные вопросы сам, своей силой.”] The word “сила” that 
the bishop uses could mean a more abstract “might” but is more commonly used to denote physical 
force. The mayor heeds the advice and has Dima brutally beaten up. (For those who are inclined 
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to conclude that Lilia’s death is the work of Vadim’s henchmen as well, the implications of the 
bishop’s sanction to use “сила” become even more harrowing). 
The bishop uses the word “сила” for the second time in a sermon that he delivers in the 
newly-built church in one of the film’s closing sequences. The bishop quotes Prince Aleksander 
Nevsky: “Не в силе Бог, а в правде.” [“God is not in strength but in truth.”] The Bishop’s reversal 
of his earlier (behind-closed-doors) claim about God’s relationship to power and “strength” 
exposes as hypocritical the entire sermon focused, ironically, on matters of truth. The duplicity of 
the bishop’s preaching becomes even more pronounced in the subtle yet unmistakable reference 
to the Pussy Riot “punk prayer”: “Когда люди уничтожают кресты, разрубают иконы, 
надругаются над распятием, кощунственно называют беснование молебном; когда люди 
пытаются уверить, что они делают это из благих мыслей и намерений, то это ложь, которая 
выдается за правду.” [“When people destroy crosses, break icons, defile the Crucifix, and 
blaspheme by calling demonic rites a prayer; when people try to convince others that they do this 
out of good intentions, they are passing off lies as the truth.”] The irony is hard to miss: the sight 
of an excavator tearing through Kolia’s house is too fresh in the spectator’s memory for the “good 
intentions” (construction of the church) to make up for the act of destruction. 
The big “reveal” towards the end of the film—the construction of the church on what used 
to be Kolia’s land—provides the key to Zviagintsev’s argument about the workings of the Putin 
regime in its new, post-Pussy Riot, guise, and its alliance with the church. If in the film’s opening 
sequences Zviagintsev shows us images of mutually contaminated creation and decay, the shots of 
the newly-built church posit destruction and construction as consecutive rather than overlapping 
categories. There is a clear boundary between the two: the destruction of Kolia’s house (shown in 
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its process) must be completed before the church is constructed (notably, we see only the result, 
not the construction process itself). 
Bakhtin’s carnival may, perhaps surprisingly, serve as a useful interpretive framework 
here. The main limitation of the carnival paradigm is its dependence on boundaries. Consider, for 
example, Bakhtin’s concept of “pregnant death”: Bakhtin sees the generative potential of death 
precisely in the transitory moment; to put in crude terms, it is only after death that a body can be 
recycled as fertilizer. Even those categories and opposites that to a certain extent merge within 
carnival are reinstated once the temporarily authorized and spatially limited transgression is over. 
The boundary in Bakhtinian carnival guarantees a return to order. The question is, does the 
construction of the church at the end of the film suggest that the Putin regime has overcome the 
whirlwind of contamination characteristic of bespredel and recommenced the flow of history? 
Should Putin’s defense of “traditional values” and the resultant coalition with the Russian 
Orthodox Church be considered an attempt to introduce new positive ideological content (however 
problematic) into the postcommunist experience? 
Prozorov points out that if history ends abruptly (not because of the disappearance of time 
after the exhaustion of the Master-Slave dialectic) then it may, in principle, recommence. Any 
such recommencement, he argues, would have to take the form of terror, the violent attempt of the 
Master to reclaim his privileged position and reproduce the original “fight to the death” that would 
force the Slave to resume work (The Ethics 17-18). The same logic applies to the condition of 
bespredel: 
The benefit of the post-historical condition of postcommunism is that it makes 
manifestly clear the absence of any way out of bespredel that would be a way back 
into the security of confinement within a hegemonic historical narrative. More 
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precisely, given the nullity of the historical process, any such hegemonic project is 
immediately revealed to be a chimera that invites us to Agamben’s ‘camp,’ in which 
bare life itself is abducted by power as the instrument of its bio- or thanato-political 
rationalities. (The Ethics 168-169; emphasis in original) 
The newly-built church in Leviathan is precisely such a chimera. It seems to be no 
coincidence that Zviagintsev entrusted his CGI team with the task of “constructing” the church. 
Zviagintsev, who has repeatedly said in interviews that he sees “things on film rather than on 
digital” (Rizov) and resisted shooting his films in digital until he began his work on Loveless 
(2017), is known for his reluctance to use computer-generated images. According to Dmitrii 
Tokoiakov, Zviagintsev’s visual effects supervisor, the director goes to great lengths to minimize 
the use of computer graphics and when he does resort to CGI, he scrupulously researches the object 
in question and insists that the generated image be indistinguishable from the “real” one, that it 
becomes “invisible” (Orlov). The church in Leviathan [Figure 6], however, is anything but 
invisible. It is disproportionately large and, more importantly, lacks detail and contrast—compared 
to its surroundings, it does not have the same range of tones and levels of brightness. To put it in 






Tokoiakov has admitted in interviews that he has been asked multiple times to explain why 
the church looks like a pencil drawing. This is how he has responded to this question: “Она 
[церковь] действительно выглядит как инопланетный корабль на фоне этого пейзажа, 
потому что все остальные дома были построены очень давно, и давно не ремонтировались” 
(Luchko). [“It [the church] does indeed look like an alien ship in this landscape because all of the 
other houses there were built a long time ago and have not been renovated for a while.”] At the 
risk of being speculative, I would argue that a scrupulous filmmaker like Zviagintsev would not 
accept a fake-looking church from his CGI team unless it was meant to look less than real. 
The vacuity of the ideological content propagated by the state-church duo manifests itself 
in a number of ways: in the spectral appearance of the church on the outside, in the blatantly 
hypocritical sermon delivered by the bishop, as well as in the emphatically bare white ceiling that 
the camera captures inside the church. During the bishop’s sermon, the mayor’s little son, bored 
by the oration, directs his gaze towards the dome. Instead of an icon of Christ Pantocrator that 
often occupies the space of the dome in Eastern Orthodox churches, we see a microphone hanging 
from an unadorned Christ-less ceiling that brings to relief, among other things, the theatrical nature 
of the bishop’s address. 
The absence of Christ is a recurrent motif throughout Leviathan. At the end of the tête-à-
tête between the mayor and the bishop in the latter’s office, for example, the camera slowly tracks 
in towards the three statuettes on the bureau: Christ in the center; and a figurine of Prince Vladimir 
on each side (in his religious attire and with a cross on the left and in his secular attire on the right). 
[Figure 7] In the preceding shot featuring the conversation between the mayor and the bishop, the 
interlocutors are sitting opposite each other (the mayor on the left and the bishop on the right), but 
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there is a vacant chair at the head of the table, a glaring absence in the center of the composition . 
[Figure 8] A superimposition of the three figurines onto this shot and an inversion of the image—
in Zviagintsev’s God-forsaken worlds things are often inverted18—render the image legible. The 
following triad of pairings emerges as a result: an empty chair and Christ; the mayor and Prince 
Vladimir in his secular attire; the bishop and Prince Vladimir in his religious attire.19 The bishop 
and the mayor alike appear as stand-ins, albeit for a different Vladimir, not the ruler of Kievan 
Rus’ who converted it to Christianity in 988, but the Vladimir, whose hollowed-out Christianity is 






18 In her chapter on Zviagintsev in A Companion to Russian Cinema, Nancy Condee argues that inversion is one of 
the three hallmark techniques of the director’s visual and narrative style (the other two are effacement and 
indeterminacy). See Condee, “Knowledge (Imperfective): Andrei Zviagintsev and Contemporary Cinema.”    





That we are still in the domain of bespredel and mutually contaminated opposites is confirmed by 
Zviagintsev in the film’s closing sequences that return us to the very beginning, the site of the 
separation of the land and water and the decaying boats on the shoreline. 
The Putin administration’s “biopolitical turn” emerges in Zviagintsev’s conception as part 
of this chimerical constellation as well. In Agamben’s engagement with Foucault’s 
conceptualization of biopolitics, he challenges Foucault’s claim that power acquires a biopolitical 
dimension at the threshold of modernity, when “the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced 
by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault, The History of Sexuality 
138). In his revision of Foucault’s argument, Agamben claims that we cannot really distinguish 
between sovereign power and biopower because the Western political tradition has been 
biopolitical since its very inception. He writes: “[T]he inclusion of bare life in the political realm 
constitutes the original—if concealed—nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the 
production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power” (Homo Sacer 6; 
emphasis in original). As several critics have pointed out, however, in Agamben’s articulation, 
biopolitics emerges in its reverse form—thanatopolitics—and is devoid of a positive productive 
component that it had in Foucault’s conception. For Foucault, as Mark Kelly puts it, “In contrast 
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to the ‘biopolitics’ of biopower, sovereign power is ‘thanatopolitics’ […]: the former controls 
people through the use of life, through caring for people’s organic wellbeing, while the latter uses 
death, or exposure to the risk of death, to keep people in line” (4). 
While Zviagintsev’s negative conception of power is in alignment with Agamben’s 
theorization of sovereign power, it is Foucault’s distinction between sovereign and biopower that 
brings to relief its specific dimensions. If in its rhetorical practice, the Putin administration has 
emphasized its role in protecting and fostering (some forms of) life, in Zviagintsev’s rendition 
power is devoid of a positive productive dimension—it is exercised primarily as a “subtraction 
mechanism” (The History of Sexuality 136). In other words, what faces Zviagintsev’s protagonist 
is not biopower (the power “to foster life or disallow it to the point of death) but sovereign power 
(the power “to take life or let live”) (Foucault, The History of Sexuality 138; emphasis in original). 
Foucault’s definition of sovereign power as characterized by “a right of seizure: of things, 
time, bodies, and ultimately life itself” (The History of Sexuality 136) is a most fitting description 
for the relationship between Leviathan’s protagonist Kolia and the state authorities. The nuances 
of the politics of seizure in Zviagintsev’s film are best captured by Nancy Condee in her 
unpublished essay “Balaclavas and Incense: Remarks on Russian Cultural Politics,” in which she 
explores the affinities between the seizure of Kolia’s house in Leviathan, the “seizure” of the 
Cathedral of Christ the Savior by Pussy Riot in 2012, and the state seizure of the Yalta Film Studio 
in 2014. “At its most speculative,” as she puts it, her argument is that “[t]o be a citizen of today’s 
Russia is increasingly to be called upon to embrace a higher patriotic and spiritual path whereby 
the body, the dwelling, and the homeland are rendered up to the dual custodianship of the state and 
the official church for better uses than are available to citizens of the Federation.” In Leviathan, 
Condee contends, Zviagintsev enacts a reversal of a powerful cliché: “If the Orthodox Church 
 33 
today often rails against the ‘secular assault’ upon the sacred (such was the Church’s charge against 
Pussy Riot, for example), then here, in Zviagintsev’s reversal, the official church stages an assault 
upon the private aspirations of secular life” (“Balaclavas and Incense”). 
That Zviagintsev is interested in the workings of sovereign power is clear from the film’s 
title, which is an allusion, among other things, to Thomas Hobbes’ political treatise on sovereignty. 
In his dialogue with Hobbes, Zviagintsev appears to side with Hobbesian critics who have shown 
that the civil order cannot be a protection against the state of nature for the simple reason that the 
latter is neither spatially nor temporally external to it. This is how Giorgio Agamben, for example, 
deconstructs Hobbes’ argument: 
[I]n Hobbes the state of nature survives in the person of the sovereign, who is the 
only one to preserve its natural ius contra omnes [ES: law against all]. Sovereignty 
thus presents itself as an incorporation of the state of nature in society, or, if one 
prefers, as a state of indistinction between nature and culture, between violence and 
law, and this very indistinction constitutes specifically sovereign violence. […] 
Hobbes, after all, was perfectly aware […] that the state of nature did not 
necessarily have to be conceived as a real epoch, but rather could be understood as 
a principle internal to the State revealed in the moment in which the State is 
considered “as if it were dissolved.” (Homo Sacer 35-6). 
Further in Homo Sacer, Agamben writes: “[I]n Hobbes the foundation of sovereign power 
is not to be sought in the subjects’ free renunciation of their natural right but in the sovereign’s 
preservation of his natural right to do anything to anyone, which now appears as the right to 
punish” (Homo Sacer 106). Zviagintsev, at least at first glance, would appear to be in agreement; 
it is, after all, the abuse of the right to punish by sovereign power that becomes the final straw in 
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Kolia’s undoing. An extended encounter between Zviagintsev and Agamben, however, reveals 
discrepancies between their conceptualizations of the relationship between human life and political 
power and offers a more nuanced understanding of Zviagintsev’s ruminations in Leviathan on the 
triangular relationship between the individual, the state, and the church in contemporary Russia 
and beyond. 
The most immediate implication of Zviagintsev’s allusion to Hobbesian treatise in the film 
title is that it extends the reach of the filmmaker’s argument beyond contemporary Russia. What 
is at work here is Zviagintsev’s tried-and-true strategy of balancing the culturally specific with the 
universally relevant. With its references to Pussy Riot, use of Putin’s portraits in the mise-en-
scene, and verbatim reproductions of real-life sermons from YouTube (Timofeev), Leviathan is 
Zviagintsev’s most explicit commentary on the state of affairs in contemporary Russia. Yet 
Zviagintsev locates the roots of the contemporary Russian condition in the late Soviet Union. The 
filmmaker establishes a lineage between the late Soviet period, Putin’s Russia of the early 2000s, 
and the contemporary moment through an extended dialogue with Balabanov’s Cargo 200. While 
Balabanov’s thriller, set in the summer of 1984, offers a dire portrait of the Soviet Union shortly 
before its demise, it simultaneously, as Anthony Anemone, among others, has pointed out, 
“suggests an essential continuity with the post-Soviet present” (“Cargo” 87). Cargo 200 is set in 
a fictitious Leninsk; Leviathan in turn features a statue of Lenin in front of the compromised 
courthouse, suggesting that “the film’s ‘leviathan’—a mammoth whale skeleton stranded on the 
shore—implicates both the contemporary Russian state and the skeletal remains of the Soviet 
state” (Condee, “Balaclavas and Incense”). 
As Frederick White demonstrates, however, Cargo 200 is a forceful relocation of William 
Faulkner’s controversial novel Sanctuary (1931) to the Stagnation-era Soviet Union. Zviagintsev’s 
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Leviathan is similarly based on an American source. The film was inspired by a news item 
featuring Marvin Heemeyer, auto-shop owner from Granby, Colorado, who was put out of 
business in 2001 by the decision of the local zoning commission to build a cement factory on his 
doorstep and retaliated by building a “killdozer” and demolishing the Granby town hall, the former 
mayor’s house, and several other buildings. As Zviagintsev has suggested in interviews, Leviathan 
has another inspiration source: Heinrich von Kleist’s 1810 novella “Michael Kohlhaas.” Kleist’s 
novella in turn is based on a 16th century story of Hans Kohlhase, a German merchant who, 
wronged by a Saxon nobleman and unable to find justice through recourse to legal procedures, 
decided to settle the matter through criminal means and launched a full-blown feud with the entire 
state of Saxony. The changes that Balabanov and Zviagintsev introduce to their source material in 
the process of cultural translation are illuminating,20 but so are the continuities between the texts. 
What remains consistent in Faulkner’s novel set in 1931 in Mississippi, Balabanov’s crime thriller 
set in the Soviet Union in 1984, Kleist’s novella based on a 16th century story of a German 
merchant, the Colorado “killdozer” rampage story of the early 2000s, and Zviagintsev’s drama set 
in Russia in the 2010s alike, is the failure of the legal system, the non-equivalence of law and 
justice. 
While it may appear that Zviagintsev targets specifically the corruption of the juridico-
political system in contemporary Russia, the film’s inspiration sources suggest that Zviagintsev 
does not consider the Russian case to be unique; the filmmaker is suspect of law as such. That the 
 
20 If in Faulkner’s novel, for example, the villain is a Memphis racketeer, in Balabanov’s rendition of The Sanctuary, 
the psychopathic rapist, torturer, and murderer is a representative of the state, militiaman Captain Zhurov. As Condee 
points out, Balabanov’s films set out to remind us that we are all cunning and cruel animals (The Imperial Trace 236), 
yet bespredel appears to be a localized phenomenon, rooted in the Soviet Union of the 1980s. In his engagement with 
the source material, Zviagintsev insists on foreclosing the possibility of rebellion/vengeance that constitutes an 
important element of the stories that inspired the film. I will discuss the importance of this omission further in the 
chapter. 
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mayor in Leviathan bends the law however he pleases is only part of the problem; the fact that 
Kolia’s lawyer proves to be a suspect figure as well sheds additional light on the issue. Dima’s 
integrity is, of course, called into question when we find out that he slept with Kolia’s wife during 
past visits and does not hesitate to resume the affair this time, despite the changed circumstances. 
There is, however, far more substantial incriminating evidence, as Condee suggests—evidence 
that goes beyond his personal flaws and illuminates Zviagintsev’s mistrust of Dima as Lawyer: 
[T]he Mayor, the film’s most cartoonish figure […] is a mere intermediary in the 
more significant […] battle between Bishop and Lawyer (both, in the end, negative 
figures). Narrative details, such as the Bishop’s and the Lawyer’s unslaked craving 
for water, bring these two characters into alignment as false prophecy and secular 
knowledge, as a corrupt spiritual leader and an atheist, as co-opted ‘truth’ and 
worldly ‘facts’ – that is to say, non-truth and non-facts. (“Knowledge 
(Imperfective)” 566). 
Zviagintsev’s mistrust of law points to another affinity of his conception of power with that 
of Agamben, who established an opposition between law and justice already in one of his earlier 
texts, The Idea of Prose,21 and elaborated on the subject in his later work. In Remnants of 
Auschwitz, for example, Agamben writes: “As jurists well know, law is not directed toward the 
establishment of justice. Nor is it directed toward the verification of truth. Law is solely directed 
toward judgment, independent of truth and justice” (18). As Connal Parsley points out, “Agamben 
eschews the determination of a discrete entity called ‘law’ – rejecting, also, the classical 
presumption that law (howsoever derived) could structure an ethical […] ‘good life’” (119). 
 
21 See section titled “The Idea of Justice” (pp. 79-80) in Part II of The Idea of Prose. 
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Zviagintsev’s visually inverted allusion to Michelangelo’s Creation of Adam [Figures 9 
and 10] offers some additional insights into the filmmaker’s skepticism about law. In a godless 
world, which in Zviagintsev’s cinematic universe is, as Condee shows, often inverted 
(“Knowledge (Imperfective)”), Dima (Law) takes the place of God while adulterous Lilia (Lilith) 








One may be tempted to conclude that Zviagintsev advocates here for a return to true 
Christianity. Some have cited as evidence for this conclusion the distinctions between the corrupt 
affluent Bishop and the humble local priest, Father Vasilii. Graffy, for example, writes that the 
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“explicit and sustained contrast” of the two characters showcases the insurmountable distance 
between official religion and true faith (“Leviathan” 317). The contrasts between the bishop and 
the priest are, no doubt, meaningful, but so are the affinities between the two. Just like the Bishop 
in his conversation with the mayor Vadim, the local priest asks Kolia if he takes communion and 
goes to confession. More importantly, both the priest’s and the bishop’s religions in the end carry 
the same ideological inflection: obedience and humility in the face of a greater power. In a 
particularly illuminating moment, Father Vasilii, in an attempt to console a defeated Kolia, tells 
him the story of Job, the biblical prophet who, like Kolia, loses his property and family. Job insists 
that he does not deserve this punishment for he has not sinned and wants God to explain this 
predicament to him. The priest then skips straight to the conclusion of the story, in which God 
restores and increases Job’s prosperity after the latter stops questioning God. In his retelling of the 
story, Father Vasilii makes an emphasis on Job’s pride and the fact that once he resigns to his fate, 
God rewards Job for his suffering. Notably, this is the passage that Father Vasilii chooses to quote 
from the Book of Job: 
Can you pull in Leviathan with a fishhook  
or tie down its tongue with a rope? 
Can you put a cord through its nose? 
or pierce its jaw with a hook? 
(Job 41: 1-2) 
In her analysis of the film, Condee captures the irony of the priest’s choice of passage: 
“God’s message to Job (and the priest’s message to Kolia) might equally serve as the corrupt 
mayor’s threat: ‘If you lay a hand on it, you will remember the struggle and never do it again’ (Job 
40: 8)” (“Knowledge (Imperfective)” 571). The mayor, the bishop, Father Vasilii, and God alike 
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are all complicit in the same project—producing homines sacri, those who are deprived of bíos 
and forced into obedience. 
The contrast between the dynamic hand of God and the passive hand of Adam in 
Michelangelo’s iconic image is traditionally interpreted as evidence of the fact that God has not 
yet bestowed Adam with the spark of life (see, for example, Barolsky 21). An alternative 
interpretation, however, attributes Adam’s lackadaisical pose to his reluctance to reach out to the 
divine. One way or another, the fact that Adam’s arm is outstretched but his hand is not touching 
God’s hand implies some degree of agency on Adam’s part in his encounter with God. In 
Zviagintsev’s rendition of the image, Dima (the stand-in for Law) clasps Lilia’s hand in his but 
the frame above [Figure 9] is deceptive. Lilia quickly pulls her hand away. 
While Zviagintsev’s film on one hand persists in presenting Kolia and his family as 
helpless in their uneven match-up with sovereign power, its corrupt juridico-political system and 
religious institutions, Leviathan simultaneously implicates the “victims” in their own plight. This 
brings us back to Agamben’s contention that “the foundation of sovereign power is to be sought 
not in the subjects’ free renunciation of their natural right but in the sovereign’s preservation of 
his natural right to do anything to anyone” (Homo Sacer 106). For Zviagintsev, it appears, the 
subjects’ voluntary renunciation of their rights is an equally problematic part of the equation. 
While the filmmaker’s argument about law’s fundamental disjuncture from truth and 
justice is universal in its reach, Zviagintsev’s decision to foreclose any possibility of Kolia 
rebelling against the system seems to pertain specifically to the Russian context. Unlike Michael 
Kolhhaas (and his real-life prototype) or Marvin Heemeyer, Kolia, who sneers at Father Vasilii’s 
retelling of the story of Job, ironically ends up doing exactly what the priest advises him to do—
he resigns to his fate. Despite his threats earlier in the film to burn down the ‘palace’ that he 
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presumes the mayor will build on his land, Kolia puts up no fight at all at the end of the film—he 
drinks himself to oblivion and, when charged with his wife’s murder, simply bursts into tears. 
When the prosecutor asks him if he has anything to say in response to the charges, Kolia does not 
say a word; he covers his face with his hand and sobs uncontrollably. If in the news story that 
inspired Zviagintsev’s film, Marvin Heemeyer uses a “killdozer” to destroy the town hall and the 
mayor’s house in an act of revenge, in Leviathan it is Kolia’s, not the mayor’s house, that is torn 
down by an excavator. As Condee points out in “Balaclavas and Incense,” Leviathan’s final 
sequences bear an uncanny resemblance to the scenario conjured by a member of the Pussy Riot, 
Maria Alekhina, in her closing trial statement: “If an excavator drives up to their door and these 
people are told that they have to evacuate the premises because, sorry, we are razing your house 
and building a residence for a bureaucrat, these people will humbly collect their things, pack their 
bags, and go out into the street.”22 
The fact that Kolia does not say anything when the prosecutor “grants” him a voice may 
seem like a minor detail (it would be naïve to presume that Kolia’s words could have any real 
weight in this scenario), yet Zviagintsev is attuned to discursive politics throughout the film. 
Language emerges here as a site of power contestation. When the mayor uses the informal version 
of “you” (“ты” instead of the formal “вы”) to address Dima, the latter points out that the mayor is 
the second public official to address him informally (read: disrespect him) in one day. Dima’s 
attempt to gain an equal footing here fails as the mayor persists in using the familiar form. Notably, 
when Dima attempts to set up a meeting with the mayor, the latter advises Dima to come to his 
constituent office hours, reminding him of the limitations (clearly not only temporal) on the 
possibility of a dialogue with “power.” 
 
22 Condee quotes from Masha Gessen, Words Will Break Cement: The Passion of Pussy Riot, 212. 
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Zviagintsev eloquently expresses the same idea in two sequences that are almost identical 
in terms of composition and camerawork—the first courtroom sequence in which a judge speed-
reads the court’s decision to evict Kolia from his property and the sequence featuring the sermon 
that the bishop delivers in the newly-built church. In both cases, the camera slowly tracks toward 
the front of the room, gradually leaving the “audience” members outside the frame and closing in 
on the person addressing the room—the judge and the bishop respectively—and the two figures 















The cinematic parallelism between the two sequences illustrates what Masha Gessen has 
called a merging of “the state and the church into one mechanism of persecution” (“Vladimir 
Putin’s Absence”). Notably, authoritative discourse emerges as one of the weapons in the arsenal 
of the state-church duo. Both sequences feature speech acts—the legal verdict and the sermon—
that are inherently monologic in the Bakhtinian sense of the word. They presuppose a passive 
recipient and hence no response. 
The bishop’s hypocritical sermon, with its appeal to fight “enemies of faith and the 
Fatherland” and its claims to truth and moral authority, is the centerpiece of Zviagintsev’s critique 
of the Putin administration’s narrative games and the role of the ROC in shaping the official 
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narrative. As Denys Kondyuk suggests, almost all of the words of the sermon could be reversed 
and work as judgment on everyone involved in the construction of the church built on lies and 
violence. Zviagintsev himself said in an interview that he would sign his own name under the 
sermon: “[Э]та проповедь — средоточие мысли о правде и истине, под каждым ее словом я 
готов подписаться” (Timofeev). This is somewhat ironic. Leviathan is an indictment of sovereign 
power, i.e. power exercised vertically (as well as of those who patiently submit to it thus preserving 
the vertical of power). Zviagintsev, who begins his film with an allusion to Genesis, appears to be 
vying for a spot in the long line of distinguished Russian authors, including Dostoevsky and 
Tolstoy, who—as David Bethea has pointed out—“have long operated under the conviction that 
they are writing, not one more book, but versions, each in its way sacred, of the Book (Bible)” 
(164). With his own claim to moral authority and a tightly controlled narrative, Zviagintsev 
maintains a god-like control over his creation and appears to create a vertical power relationship 
with his viewers. Whether the irony is intentional and to what extent Zviagintsev’s cinematic 
“speech act” is indeed monological will be among the key questions addressed in the concluding 
section of this chapter. In the next section, however, I turn my attention to Kirill Serebrennikov’s 
The Student, a drama that is often cited along Leviathan as one of the few explicitly political films 
in contemporary Russian cinema and “another cinematic attack on the Russian Orthodox Church” 
(Hoad). 
1.2 Cutting Off the King’s Head: Dispersed Power in The Student 
Kirill Serebrennikov’s 2016 drama The Student tells the story of a troubled high school 
student Venia and his abrupt religious awakening. Nothing bodes disaster at first. The film opens 
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with a sequence in which Venia’s overworked single mother finds out that her son has been 
skipping swimming lessons. The class, he claims, “offends his religious sensibilities.” Venia’s 
mother seems to be just as surprised as we are—the excuse has to be at least somewhat convincing, 
she implores. Yet Venia is not joking. Driven by his newly-developed religious ardor, Venia 
proceeds to disrupt one class after another and unnerve his mother, classmates, and teachers alike 
by pointing out their ungodly ways to them and corroborating his judgments with quotations of 
select passages from the Bible (which, as the film progresses, begin to sound more and more 
ominous). His preaching quickly takes effect. The schoolteachers indulge the boy and decide that 
the phrasing “appropriate swimwear” in the school statutes could only mean “one-piece bathing 
suits.” After the ban on revealing swimming suits, the students who at first wore casual and colorful 
clothing to school gradually switch to wearing uniforms: white tops and dark bottoms. In an effort 
to pacify the troubled student, the school principal even goes as far as to propose that students are 
taught creationism alongside evolutionary theory in biology classes. The liberally-inclined biology 
teacher, Elena Krasnova, however, refuses to entertain the idea. The only person to challenge 
Venia and his quickly spreading religious ideas, Krasnova arms herself with a Bible to beat the 
teenager at his own game and counter his quotations of misogynist, homophobic, and antisemitic 
passages from the Bible with her own selections from the same text. Weary of Krasnova’s attempts 
to question his ‘teachings,’ Venia recruits his ‘disciple,’ a disabled boy Grisha, to kill her. Both 
intimidated by and sexually attracted to Venia, Grisha initially pretends to go along with the plan 
but, when he ultimately refuses to carry it out, Venia murders him by hitting him on the head with 
a rock. Back at school, Venia gets Krasnova fired by falsely accusing her of having touched him 
inappropriately. In the film’s closing sequences, Serebrennikov breaks the spectatorial contract he 
has established with the spectator by ending his seemingly anti-religious film with a miracle. On 
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her way out of the school, Krasnova has a vision of the deceased Grisha and, in a desperate act of 
protest, nails her shoes to the floor and cries out: “I am not leaving here because I belong here. 
And you don’t!” 
Serebrennikov’s film is an adaptation of his own theatrical production staged at the Gogol 
Center in Moscow in 2014. Unlike his film called simply Ученик (The Student), the Gogol Center 
production was titled М/ученик (a play on words, a combination of the similar sounding “ученик,” 
i.e. “student”, and “мученик,” i.e. “martyr”). Both the film and the theatrical production are based 
on a 2012 play Martyr by a German playwright Marius von Mayenburg. Asked in an interview 
about his choice of a German play as the basis for his work, Serebrennikov said that it captures the 
reality of life in Russia today: “[В] Германии это такая притча о некой абстракции, мол: ‘что 
будет, если что-то такое случится?’. А у нас это уже происходит: вон все эти мальчики уже 
громят выставки” (Liubakova). [“In Germany this is a parable about an abstract reality, as in, 
let’s imagine a world where this sort of thing happens. And here [in Russia] this is already 
happening: think of those boys raiding exhibits.”]23 
It is indeed remarkable how few changes Serebrennikov made to his source material,24 
particularly in light of the fact that the film quickly acquired the reputation of a political manifesto 
in Russia. Critic Mikhail Trofimenkov, for example, compares the experience of going to see The 
Student in the theater to participating in an unsanctioned protest rally, and Anton Dolin argues that 
Serebrennikov’s drama is the most political Russian film of the post-Soviet period (“‘Uchenik’”). 
 
23 Serebrennikov is referring here to the “work” of the Orthodox group “God’s will,” led by Dmitrii Tsorionov, known 
by the nickname Dmitrii Enteo. On August 14, 2015, Enteo and his fellow Orthodox actionists smashed several 
sculptures by Soviet artist Vadim Sidur that were on display at the Manege Art Center at the time. 
24 Some critics have found these changes insufficient. Otto Boele, for example, writes: “The Russification of von 
Mayenburg’s play is not entirely convincing, though. One wonders, for example, if a Russian biology teacher would 
openly defend homosexuality in the classroom as a ‘natural phenomenon,’ or instruct students on safe-sex practices 
by having them put condoms on carrots. Krasnova seems implausibly liberal for a Russian school, even if she happens 
to be teaching in Kaliningrad, the most western part of the Russian Federation.” 
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The Student puts its cards on the table from the very beginning. The phrase Venia uses to 
explain why he has been skipping swimming class—“уроки плавания оскорбляют мои 
религиозные чувства” [“the swimming class offends my religious sensibilities”]—immediately 
rings an alarming bell. On June 11, 2013, following the scandalous trial of Pussy Riot, the Russian 
State Duma passed a new redaction of Article 148 of the Criminal Code, which declared a federal 
crime any “public act expressing manifest disrespect for society and carried out with the goal of 
insulting the feelings of religious believers.” In The Student, the protagonist with delicate religious 
sensibilities is presented in the most unsympathetic of lights—as a power-hungry, hypocritical, 
and violent sociopath. Whether or not the film is actually anti-religious, it could easily be construed 
as such—film scholar Mark Le Fanu, for example, calls it “fiercely anti-Christian” (212). The 
Student, however, treads on sensitive ground not only in terms of what can be interpreted as its 
anti-religious message, but its portrayal of homosexuality as well. Featuring a gay teenager as one 
of its few likeable characters and a biology teacher, who tells her students that homosexuality is a 
natural variation of human sexuality, could be made to look as a violation of the notorious 2013 
“gay propaganda” law. 
In August 2017 Serebrennikov was put under house arrest for the alleged embezzlement of 
68 million rubles donated by the state to subsidize his theater productions. The filmmaker was 
released from house arrest in April 2019, after nearly 20 months in detention, but (at the time of 
writing) still faces trial. Some critics believe that the Russian Orthodox Church may have played 
a role in Serebrennikov’s arrest on what most consider to be trumped-up charges. It was allegedly 
Metropolitan Tikhon, rumored to be Putin’s personal confessor, who, outraged by the overt anti-
clericalism of The Student, asked Putin to launch a complaint against its director (Fanu 218). If we 
are, however, to remember the lessons of the Pussy Riot trial, in which the prosecution refused to 
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discuss the group’s performance in political terms and framed it as an anti-religious offense, we 
might surmise that the reasons for Serebrennikov’s “fall from grace”25 went beyond his anti-
clericalist views. 
Whether or not Serebrennikov’s 2016 film had something to do with the filmmaker’s arrest, 
The Student does not shy away from making bold political claims. Critic Anton Dolin has put 
together a comprehensive list of the film’s targets, of which religious fundamentalism is only one: 
“‘Ученик’ — фильм прежде всего о фанатизме и ‘оскорблении чувств верующих,’ 
но еще — о современной системе образования, об антисемитизме, о гомосексуализме, 
о лицемерии, обо всех формах тоталитаризма” (“‘Uchenik’”). [“The Student is a film first and 
foremost about religious fanaticism and ‘offending religious sensibilities,’ but it is also about the 
contemporary education system, antisemitism, homosexuality, hypocrisy, and all forms of 
totalitarianism.”] In one of the film’s most heavy-handed moments, the biology teacher spells out 
the film’s political agenda: 
Это что такое—уважение к религии? Это есть один пастырь, да? А мы все 
овцы? Он сидит наверху, а мы все внизу, да? Это кто его выбрал? Нет, его как 
раз-таки никто не выбирал. Слушайте, это прекрасная мысль! Прекрасная 
мысль, когда есть отец, который за всеми присматривает, но эта мысль 
прекрасна, когда мы дети, пока мы не выросли. Отец, который все видит, 
который бесконтрольно карает, который иррационален и жесток… Вы что, не 
понимаете, что это все тоталитарная диктатура?! 
 
25 As Joshua Yaffa points out, Serebrennikov was temporarily allied with the state during Putin’s second presidential 
term and Medvedev’s reign when the Kremlin dallied with contemporary art. Fostering the avant-garde at the time 
was part of a “stage-managed social modernization” project and was meant to send different messages to different 
audiences: for the West, it was an invitation to get involved, for Russia’s intelligentsia and artists, it was a call for 
collaboration (Between Two Fires). 
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[What is that, respect for religion? One person is the shepherd, right? And everyone 
else sheep? He’s sitting up there, and we’re all down here, right? Who elected him? 
That’s the thing, no one elected him. Listen, that’s a nice thought! A nice thought 
that there’s a father looking after all of us. A nice thought as long as we’re children 
and don’t grow up. A father who sees everything, who punishes uncontrollably, 
who is irrational and cruel… Don’t you get it—it’s a totalitarian dictatorship!] 
Notably, Serebrennikov does not deviate here from von Mayenburg’s play; every single 
word of Krasnova’s monologue is taken directly from the original. Framed in the shot with 
Krasnova, however, is an out-of-focus portrait of Putin [Figure 15], which adds a legible second 





Judging by this sequence alone, one could conclude that Serebrennikov’s views on power 
are in many ways compatible with those of Zviagintsev. In the scenario conjured by Krasnova (and 
 
26 The context renders particularly provocative Krasnova’s claim that the shepherd up above was not really elected by 
anyone. In an op-ed piece written for The New York Times, Michael Khodarkovsky summarized the widespread 
opinion about election practices in contemporary Russia: “[T]here have been no fair elections in decades.” 
Serebrennikov appears to share Khodarkovsky’s view. 
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contextualized by the portrait on the wall), power has a strictly vertical orientation, with a 
sovereign who occupies a god-like position up above and his obedient subjects down below who 
unquestioningly submit to the sovereign and thus play an essential role in buttressing the vertical 
power structure. There is, however, what may at first glance appear to be an inner contradiction 
(which Serebrennikov inherits from von Mayenburg) in the model of power presented by Krasnova 
—the shepherd/father ‘up there’ is simultaneously punishing, caring, and all-seeing. 
If we recall Foucault’s definition of sovereign power as a subtracting mechanism, as power 
characterized by “a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself” (The History 
of Sexuality 136), several passages from the monologue cited above will appear incompatible with 
it. Besides the fact that the stand-in for a sovereign in this case is “looking after all of us,” which 
adds a positive dimension incompatible with the subtractive operations of sovereign power, this 
figure is also all-seeing, a characteristic alien to the concept of predominantly absent and 
intermittent sovereign power. Zygmunt Bauman’s explication of the mechanisms of sovereign 
power in the Middle Ages (sustained by feudal social relations) brings into relief the episodic (vs. 
all-seeing) and negative, subtracting (vs. caring) nature of sovereign power: 
In [a feudal] society, surplus product was typically extracted from the producers, 
so to speak, in leaps and bounds; say, once or several times during the annual cycle 
of the essentially agricultural production, in the form of rent, or tax, or a levy, or a 
tribute, or a tithe. The one function of power was to force the producer to part, of 
will or of fear, or of both, with a fraction of his product. Once he had done that, he 
could be (and should be, if the production was to continue) left to his own resources. 
It was largely irrelevant for the circulation of surplus how he went about his daily 
business, how he administered and deployed his bodily and spiritual powers. […] 
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[T]he customs and habits which ruled the daily life of the food suppliers were no 
concern of power. (31-2) 
The concept of sovereign power is thus inadequate or rather insufficient for capturing the 
nuances of the view of power presented by Krasnova in the film’s most powerful monologue. 
Sovereign power (the punishing father)27 is supplemented here with disciplinary power (the all-
seeing father)28 and biopower (the caring shepherd). Two additional points in Foucault’s 
theorization of these three modes of power need to be addressed before I can proceed to show how 
power manifests itself in Serebrennikov’s film: (1) the correlation of sovereign, disciplinary, and 
biopower in Foucault’s theorization, and (2) the relation between religious power (specifically, 
pastoral power) and governmentality in his account. 
In his first engagement with the concept of biopolitics, in the first volume of The History 
of Sexuality, Foucault posits disciplinary power and biopower as modes of power that supplant 
sovereign power. He writes, “the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to 
foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (138). This new power over life manifested itself in 
two different forms: disciplinary power that emerged in the seventeenth century and biopower that 
formed in the eighteenth century (139, 141). Disciplinary power focuses on the body as a machine 
(139); it corrects deviant behavior through examination, observation and surveillance. “An 
anatomo-politics of the human body” (139), disciplinary power “increases the power of the body 
(in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)” 
(Discipline and Punish 138). Unlike sovereign power and disciplinary power which target 
 
27 Agamben’s view of sovereign power as characterized by the right to punish (Homo Sacer 106) is particularly fitting 
here. 
28 According to Foucault, panopticism is the “general principle of a […] ‘political anatomy’ whose object and end are 
not the relations of sovereignty but the relations of discipline” (Discipline and Punish 208). 
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individuals, biopower operates on populations and consists in the “calculated management of life” 
(The History of Sexuality 140) through quantification and regulation of biological processes, such 
as birth and mortality rates, life expectancy and longevity, and propagation (139). 
While in The History of Sexuality Foucault presents us with a chronological view of the 
transformations of power and suggests that sovereign power disappears with the advent of 
disciplinary and, somewhat later, biopower, he clarifies and modifies his conception in his later 
work. In a lecture delivered at the Collège de France on March 17, 1976, Foucault emphasizes that 
biopower does not replace disciplinary power but integrates itself into it: “This technology of 
power does not exclude the former, does not exclude disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail 
into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, 
embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques” (Society 242). This combination of 
disciplinary and biopower in turn does not supplant bur rather supplements sovereign power: “I 
wouldn’t say exactly that sovereignty’s old right—to take life or let live—was replaced, but it was 
complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, 
permeate it. This is the right, or rather precisely the opposite right. It is the power to ‘make’ live 
and ‘let’ die” (241). 
In Foucault’s later work, his interest in biopolitics (and, to a great extent, sovereign and 
disciplinary power) was subsumed under his examination of governmentality. By linking within 
the term governmentality the terms governing (gouverner) and modes of thought (mentalité), 
Foucault emphasizes, as Thomas Lemke points out, that it is impossible to analyze technologies 
of power without examining their underlying political rationality (“Foucault” 50). Foucault’s 
definition of government as the “conduct of conduct” reveals another important aspect of the 
concept of governmentality: its inclusion of both techniques of management by the state and 
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administration and modes of “governing the self” (Lemke, “Foucault” 50). Governmentality, as 
Foucault himself puts it, “is the encounter between the technologies of domination of others and 
those of the self” (“Technologies of the Self” 225). 
Foucault traces the origins of present-day practices of governmentality to the shepherd-
and-flock type of organization of pastoral power in Christianity. The three specific characteristics 
of pastoral power (that then gave rise to modern-state governmentality) bring into relief the 
continuities between the concepts of biopower and governmentality: 1. “the shepherd’s power is 
not exercised over a territory” but over a flock, i.e. population; 2. “pastoral power is fundamentally 
a beneficent power”; 3. “pastoral power is an individualizing power.” In his clarification of the 
third feature, Foucault writes that the shepherd must look after all and each member of the flock, 
which will become “the great problem […] of the techniques of power deployed in the technologies 
of population” (Security 125-28). 
What emerges from Foucault’s discussion of the different techniques of power is that they 
are coexistent, correlated, and mutually implicated in one another. What is ultimately at stake in 
Foucault’s shift of focus from sovereign power onto disciplinary and biopower and the following 
reframing of the latter in terms of governmentality is an attempt to “cut off the King’s head” 
(Power/Knowledge 121), to decentralize power, to “abandon the model of Leviathan, that model 
of an artificial man who is at once an automaton, a fabricated man, but also a unitary man who 
contains all real individuals, whose body is made up of citizens but whose soul is sovereignty. We 
have to study power outside the model of Leviathan, outside the field delineated by juridical 
sovereignty and the institution of the State” (Society 34). Foucault’s approach to power, in other 
words, deconstructs the binary structure of power relations, with the “dominators” on one side and 
the “dominated” on the other (Power/Knowledge 142). In Foucault’s analysis “power is co-
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extensive with the social body” (Power/Knowledge 142) and should be studied in the multiplicity 
of its forms: “rather than asking ourselves what the sovereign looks like from on high,” (Society 
28) we should analyze power as something that circulates. 
Foucault’s theorization of technologies of power provides a useful framework for an 
analysis of the workings of power in Serebrennikov’s The Student, which examines both the 
macro- and the microphysics of power and, as I will argue in the pages that follow, takes as its 
premise the assumption that power is not exercised from the top down but permeates the social 
body. 
Serebrennikov’s investigation of power in The Student begins, to borrow Foucault’s 
expression, by cutting off the king’s head. Despite the looming presence of Putin’s portrait in the 
school principal’s office, there is no tangible evidence of the workings of centralized authority in 
the film. Putin’s portrait certainly “enhances” Krasnova’s monologue in one of the concluding 
sequences, but Vladislav Opel'iants’s cinematography suggests things are not as clear-cut as they 
may seem. Krasnova and Putin are compositionally presented as opponents: Krasnova in the 
foreground occupies the left half of the screen; the right half features a wall with the portrait of 
Putin on it but it is small, relegated to the background and out of focus. [see Figure 15 above] This 
portrait makes an appearance in all of the sequences in the principal’s office but it is even less 
prominent in these episodes and could be seen as simply another piece in the collection of pseudo-
patriotic paraphernalia (crowned by an upside-down Russian flag) housed in the principal’s office. 






The school functions here as a microcosm of Russian society at large, and the fact that the 
school principal is not a particularly influential figure serves as further evidence that there is no 
leviathan here. While the principal plays a role in some of the key developments in the film (for 
example, the ban on bikinis) and tries to present herself as firm in several moments, she does not 
make any consequential decisions on her own. Her modus operandi is to follow the path of least 
resistance. The rest of the teaching staff seems equally unauthoritative. Venia successfully disrupts 
one lesson after another but he is not an exception. The choice of a school as the setting of the 
microcosm appears crucial for Serebrennikov’s argument precisely because, as a key disciplinary 
institution, the school cultivates a respect for and requires obedience to authority but often proves 
to be a site where authority is negotiated. The first school sequence, notably, begins with the 
teacher’s interdiction that is violated in the same breath as it is spoken; the students jump into the 
pool seconds after the gym teacher commands: “No jumping into the pool!” 
While the principal and the rest of the teaching staff have trouble maintaining authority, 
Venia proves to be successful in usurping it. The second swimming pool sequence [Figure 17], the 
one after Venia’s intervention, is in dramatic contrast with the first one [Figure 18] and serves as 
a measure of Venia’s success. The female students are no longer wearing bikinis. The colorful 
 55 
bathing suits of the first pool sequence give way to solemn black and dark blue swimming attire. 
The lively soundscape of the first sequence featuring laughter, fragments of conversations, and the 
sound of splashing water is replaced with an ominous music track. Most importantly, in the first 
pool sequence the students jump into the water despite the teacher’s instructions not to, while in 
the second the swimmers wait for the teacher’s permission to jump in. After a single whistle, they 
dive in, each into their own lane. This sequence is shot from a high angle—we are positioned 









One of the few and hence all the more conspicuous differences between von Mayenburg’s 
original and Serebrennikov’s adaptation of it is how the other students respond to Benny’s/Venia’s 
stunts. Serebrennikov, who has changed no more than a dozen of von Mayenburg’s original lines, 
altered Georg’s/Grisha’s remark from “The girls hate you for it” (where “it” stands for the new 
swimming suit policy) to “They hate you. Because you don’t want to be friends with them and all 
that.” [“Так вообще-то они тебя ненавидят. Потому что ты там с ними не дружишь, там 
всякое такое.”] “They” in the latter case refers to all of Venia’s peers. If in von Mayenburg’s play, 
the protagonist’s disruption of the history lesson with a sermon about the superfluity of 
industrialization ends with the teacher’s comment: “The rest of you don’t have to look so scared”; 
in Serebrennikov’s film it wins the provocateur, who ends his sermon by making a sign of the 
cross to the class, a round of applause. In Serebrennikov’s adaptation, Venia is admired, rather 
than despised, by his peers. The question is, what motivated these changes in Serebrennikov’s 
cultural translation of von Mayenburg’s play? An answer to this question requires a sundering of 
the film’s narrative structure—a separation of the two superimposed levels of the narrative: the 
specific characters and storylines and the macro-dimension that they inform (the school as a 
microcosm of Russia). 
In her preamble to an interview with Serebrennikov, Emily Buder aptly summarizes the 
conflict of the film: “Kirill Serebrennikov’s […] The Student finds its characters on either side of 
an ideological crevasse that might as well be the size of his motherland.” On one side of this 
crevasse is Venia; on the other—Krasnova. The latter is a representative of secular liberalism, the 
former, upon a hasty examination, may be considered a stand-in for religious traditional values. A 
somewhat closer scrutiny, however, reveals that Venia represents not religious values per se but 
rhetorical recourse to religious discourse for the purposes of usurping and wielding power. 
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The film begins with Venia’s declaration of his newly-found religiosity,29 which prevents 
him from participating in swimming lessons. In an attempt to placate the teenager with delicate 
religious sensibilities, the school requires female students to wear one-piece bathing suits to 
swimming class. The new policy, however, has no effect on Venia; he still refuses to participate 
in the class. Venia’s hypocrisy is brought into even sharper relief by the fact that, despite refusing 
to undress for swimming lessons, he has no scruples about getting naked to disrupt Krasnova’s sex 
education class. Any remaining doubts about the “authenticity” of the protagonist’s religious 
convictions are dissipated when Venia begins to violate one holy commandment after another: he 
is disrespectful towards his mother; he repeatedly takes God’s name in vain; he bears false witness 
when he accuses Krasnova of touching him inappropriately; and, finally, he kills. 
Venia’s religious practice essentially comes down to quoting lengthy passages from the 
Bible in order to get people to do what he wants them to do. As the film progresses, it becomes 
more and more clear that recourse to religious discourse serves to satisfy the protagonist’s 
megalomaniac tendencies. We get our first clue when, after the introduction of mandatory one-
piece bathing suits for female students, he comes to observe the swimming class—he goes up the 
stairs and watches his newly-disciplined classmates swim, each in their own lane, from above; the 
smirk on his face an indicator of the perverse pleasure he experiences from manipulating others. 
Venia’s delusions of grandeur reach comedic proportions in the sequence in which 
Serebrennikov offers his own rendition of the incessantly reproduced fragment of the near-
 
29 The fact that we will not find out what exactly brought Venia to God could be seen as Serebrennikov’s commentary 
on the recent (re)turn to religious traditional values in Russian political discourse and an attempt to present this turn 
as unmotivated and as a rupture. Cf. Lera Surkova’s 2017 drama Pagans, in which religion reemerges after a long 
absence. The plot of Surkova’s film is driven by the return to the family of a long estranged devout grandmother, who 
takes it upon herself to convert her relatives to Christianity. The family members (with the exception of her rebellious 
granddaughter) prove amenable. 
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touching hands from Michelangelo’s Creation of Adam. In Serebrennikov’s take on the image 
[Figure 19], Venia (who is standing up) extends his arm to Grisha (who is sitting on the floor); 
after a brief pause, Grisha extends his arm in return; Venia clasps Grisha’s hand into his and pulls 
Grisha off the floor. What is important here is the set-up: after Venia, his mother, and Grisha eat 
dinner, Venia invites his guest into his room, and, out of nowhere, pounces on Grisha and beats 
him up. Venia accompanies the attack by an extended quotation from the gospel of Luke: “Do not 
fear those who kill the body, and after that have nothing more that they can do. But I will warn 
you whom to fear: fear him who, after he has killed, has authority to cast into hell.” He concludes 
with the following remark: “Ты будешь вонять в могиле, если не одумаешься и не возьмёшь 
руку, которую протягивает тебе господь.” [“You’ll stink in your grave unless you get your act 
together and take the Lord’s hand.”] And it is, of course, at this point that the wannabe messiah 










The Creation of Adam sequence is by far not the only one where Venia uses religious 
discourse as a justification for violence. His attempt to persuade Grisha to kill the biology teacher 
(who, he assumes, is Jewish) relies on manipulating his “disciple” with a selection of carefully 
chosen quotations from the Bible: “For there are many who are insubordinate, empty talkers and 
deceivers, especially those of the circumcision party. They must be silenced, since they are 
upsetting whole families by teaching for shameful gain what they ought not to teach” (Titus 1:10-
11; emphasis added). When Grisha fails to “deliver,” Venia first quotes a line from Matthew: 
“Whoever is not with me is against me, and whoever does not gather with me scatters (Matthew 
12:30),” then asks Grisha to read a passage from Hebrews: “Indeed, under the law almost 
everything is purified with blood, and without the shedding of blood there is no forgiveness of 
sins” (Hebrews 9:22). While Grisha is reading, Venia hits his ‘disciple’ on the head with a rock. 
If we look exclusively at the macro-dimension (where the school is a microcosm of Russia), 
we may conclude that Serebrennikov posits that the sudden rhetorical shift to religious and 
traditional values is motivated by political reasons. Religious discourse, he suggests, can be used 
to define the “enemy” and recast political enemies as enemies of the faith (which in turn facilitates 
their exclusion from the political domain—cf. Krasnova’s getting fired as a result of Venia’s 
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narrative manipulations). Another intended effect of a narrative shaped around religious values is 
disciplinary; its purpose, to use Serebrennikov’s own metaphor, is to make sure that everyone stays 
in their own “lane.” While Serebrennikov, like Zviagintsev, showcases the vacuity of the 
ideological content propagated by the Putin administration, he also suggests that the post-Soviet 
condition (characterized by an ideological vacuum) may be one of the reasons why it has taken 
root or at least has not met substantial resistance from the populace. (While it is not definitively 
clear why Venia’s classmates and most of the teaching stuff go along with Venia’s propositions, 
we may surmise it is because they do not have any clearly defined values of their own.) In both 
Serebrennikov’s and Zviagintsev’s arguments, the newly-found religiosity that has been molded 
into a new “-ism” is, to use Prozorov’s metaphor, a chimera that threatens us with Agamben’s 
camp. Yet what distinguishes Serebrennikov’s argument, from that of Zviagintsev is his 
articulation of the specific ways in which recourse to religious discourse for political purposes 
produces homines sacri. 
Zviagintsev’s film focuses on a story in which the protagonist and his family’s interests are 
in direct conflict with those of the authorities. The mayor captures the mechanism of producing 
homines sacri: “Вот вы все насекомые. Никак не хотите по-хорошему.” [“You’re all insects. 
You always have to make things difficult.”] While every individual is virtually homo sacer, 
excluded from the political domain and deprived of bíos, it is only when one attempts to forcefully 
reclaim their bíos (when one is “being difficult”) that one actually becomes exposed to death. The 
Agambenian term is, admittedly, both useful and misleading here. For Agamben, homines sacri, 
those who are “at every instant exposed to death” (Homo Sacer 183), are products of sovereign 
power. Yet Foucault’s distinction between sovereign and biopower (between “the right to take life 
or let live” and “a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (The History of Sexuality 
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183) allows us to offer a more nuanced reading of both Zviagintsev’s and Serebrennikov’s 
arguments. 
The model of power presented to us by Zviagintsev is sovereign, in the Foucauldian sense 
that it is exercised when someone dares to rise up against it (The History of Sexuality 135). Venia’s 
failed attempt to “eliminate” Krasnova as well as his murder of Grisha (framed in terms of 
“whoever is not with me is against me”) might be read in such terms, too, but only hesitantly: the 
narrative structure of Serebrennikov’s film prevents any attempt to construct a monstrous 
“leviathan.” The fact that Venia (whom we have tentatively designated as a stand-in for politically 
motivated recourse to traditional values) is a student in the school/microcosm of Russia makes it, 
in the ultimate analysis, impossible to equate him with the state, the Russian Orthodox Church,30 
or any other authoritative institution. No matter what exactly this character is a stand-in for, there 
will always remain the sheer fact that what takes place at the end of the film is the murder of one 
high school student by another; more specifically (and these are relevant specifics here), the 
murder of a gay student by a homophobic one. Grisha’s death, in this framework, does not come 
about as a result of the sovereign’s right to take life. What is at work here, on one hand, is a power 
that by making a claim—through recourse to religious discourse—to foster a particular kind of 
life, thereby disallows life that is not included within that category; in other words, it inevitably 
exposes those who are not covered by its protection (even if this protection essentially comes down 
to a rhetorical claim) to the risk of death. Serebrennikov is, no doubt, alluding to the fact that the 
 
30 Father Vsevolod, “a well-fed, gold-clad priest” (Boele), who teaches a class on the foundations of Orthodox culture 
at Venia’s school, is a more suitable candidate for this role. The fact that he teaches his class in the gym could be seen 
as Serebrennikov’s critique of the law signed by Putin in 2013 that made religious education mandatory for all schools 
in the country. It could also be read as a commentary on the increasing influence of the church in Russia’s socio-
political affairs. Irrespective of the scale, the message communicated by the decision to have the priest teach at the 
gym is more than legible: the church does not belong here. 
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2013 propaganda law essentially legalized discrimination and violence against the LGBTQ 
community in Russia.31 
On the other hand, however, the doubling of The Student’s narrative structure (where Venia 
could be said to represent a specific political stance but also inevitably remains an ordinary high 
school student) has further political implications: it dismantles the binary opposition between the 
dominators and the dominated and presents power as something that is constantly negotiated 
between the participants of a given situation. In every single sequence in the film featuring an 
interaction between two or more characters, there is a push and pull, a continuous working out of 
the terms of the relationship. Venia may seem like a particularly successful manipulator, but if we 
look at specific moments, his presumed dominance easily crumbles. He beats up Grisha but is 
himself beaten up twice—by his mother and his classmate Tkacheva; it may appear that he has his 
mother and Grisha eat out of his hand but in both cases, this impression is at least in part an illusion 
that Venia’s mother and Grisha create so as not to lose the person who is dear to them. There is no 
single moment in the film where Grisha is shown to have any genuine interest in Venia’s preaching 
or seriously considers killing the biology teacher. He, too, manipulates Venia (in an attempt to get 
him to like him) by pretending that he is willing to “eliminate” Krasnova for him. 
Opel'iants’s cinematography serves as a crucial vehicle for communicating the fluctuations 
in power dynamics between the characters. Shot for the most part on a handheld camera, the film 
prioritizes long uninterrupted takes. In the press notes, Serebrennikov, a little disingenuously, as 
Leslie Felperin points out, attributes his preference for long takes to laziness. Felperin offers the 
following explanation: “The fact that Serebrennikov recently mounted a stage adaptation of Lars 
 
31 According to a Human Rights Watch report “License to Harm” published in 2014, the anti-gay propaganda law 
passed by the Russian State Duma in 2013, led to increasing amounts of harassment and violent hate crimes against 
members of the LGBTQ community in Russia. 
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von Trier’s Dogme 95 film The Idiots would suggest the long-take strategy has more to do with 
aesthetics and realism rather than expediency.” I would also argue that Serebrennikov’s use of the 
long take, assisted by blocking and the movement of the camera that follows whoever is the 
“agent” in each specific moment, captures how power is negotiated in a given situation in real 
time. The narrative structure and the cinematography of The Student posit that power permeates 
the social body. Serebrennikov’s argument on the workings of power is thus aligned with 
Foucault’s view that power: 
is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands of some, and it is never 
appropriated in the way that wealth or a commodity can be appropriated. Power 
functions. Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply 
circulate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise 
this power. They are never the inert or consenting targets of power; they are always 
its relays. In other words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to 
them. (Society 29) 
I would assert—if somewhat reductively—that Serebrennikov’s stance is potentially more 
optimistic because a dispersed view of power presupposes a multiplicity of points of resistance. 
Zviagintsev, who presents his protagonist as helpless in the face of sovereign power, offers, it 
seems, a more pessimistic take on the matter. There is, however, a difference between the view of 
resistance presented in a given cultural object and the potential for resistance produced by that 
cultural object. I shall address this issue in the concluding section of this chapter, in which I explore 
the narrative strategies of these two, each in its own way, didactic and monologically inclined 
films. 
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1.3 Authoritarian Fictions? 
In articulating their anti-clerical statements, both Zviagintsev and Serebrennikov offer 
disruptions to forms of discourse that Bakhtin would call authoritative. In Leviathan, for example, 
the tracking movement of the camera, used both in the first court sequence and the sequence 
featuring the bishop’s sermon in the film’s conclusion, slowly pushes the audience out from the 
shot, drawing parallels between the sermon and the legal verdict and exposing them both as 
discourse that is unidirectional and peremptory. Moreover, the events leading up to the bishop’s 
sermon in the conclusion of the film destabilize and undermine the authority of the words uttered 
by the bishop. Examples, as I have discussed above, include the bishop’s hypocritical claim about 
God’s relationship to “сила” (“strength”) and his critique of those who justify destruction with 
“good intentions,” which applies to the bishop and his affiliates more than anyone else. 
Serebrennikov’s study of religious fundamentalism similarly contextualizes authoritative 
discourse (thus double-voicing it, in Bakhtin’s terms) to disrupt its coercive potential. A key 
strategy used by Serebrennikov for these purposes is accompanying each of Venia’s quotations 
from the Bible with an on-screen reference to the chapter and verse from which the would-be 
messiah is quoting. The on-screen “footnotes” highlight Venia’s selective recourse to the Holy 
Writ, visualize the fraught process of taking things out of context, and bring to relief the 
incongruence between the words and the situation to which Venia, usually as a result of a literal 
(mis-)reading, applies passages from the scripture. The fact that Venia violates several of the ten 
commandments further increases his distance from the authoritative discourse to which he lays 
claim. It is not, however, so much Venia’s authority that the film challenges; the fact that the often 
bloodthirsty passages that the protagonist quotes are indeed from the Bible (as the on-screen 
annotations insist), as well as the fact that Krasnova and Venia draw opposite conclusions from it, 
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target the authority of the scripture itself and, by a logical extension, all forms of authoritative 
discourse. 
The question that interests me, however, is whether the two films that stage elaborate 
attacks on authoritative discursive practices can themselves be considered authoritative in their 
forms of spectatorial address? Both Leviathan and The Student, often referred to as a “parable” 
and a “political manifesto” respectively, have lessons to teach us. Can we thereby conclude that 
they produce forms of what Susan Suleiman terms “authoritarian fiction” and thus engage in the 
same discursive practices that they seek to critique? Or would reading them in such a fashion be 
an “authoritarian” gesture in its own right? It is to these questions that I direct my attention in this 
section. 
Serebrennikov’s The Student, a film that explicitly thematizes education, propounds the 
view that there are right and wrong lessons one could teach and learn. A class on the foundations 
of Orthodox culture, in Serebrennikov’s view, does not belong in the school curriculum (the 
filmmaker visually suggests its non-belonging by the fact that Father Vsevolod teaches it in the 
school gym). Equally unwelcome are creationist theories in biology classes and history lessons 
that present Stalin as a “a blessing for the state” [“государственное благо”].32 Serebrennikov, 
however, does not only take issue with the things that should not be taught in schools; what seems 
to be equally problematic in his view is the general lack of direction in school education. The all-
pervasive apathy is part of the reason why Venia is so successful in disrupting the life of the school: 
 
32 This is the view allegedly held by Olga Vasil'eva (see Surnacheva), who was appointed Minister of Education and 
Science of the Russian Federation in 2016 and currently occupies the position of the Minister of Education of the 
Russian Federation (the Ministry of Education and Science was split into two separate entities in 2018). In The Student, 
released prior to Vasil'eva’s appointment, the history teacher assigns an essay on Stalin as “an effective manager.” 
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neither the teaching staff (with the exception of Krasnova), nor the students seem to have strong 
opinions about anything. 
What drives the narrative forward is the conflict between the only two opinionated 
characters, Venia and the biology teacher Krasnova. In Susan Suleiman’s discussion of what she 
calls “authoritarian fictions” (of which roman à thèse is an exemplary representative), she writes: 
“In the roman à thèse, the trait that determines all the rest is the manifest intention to communicate 
an unambiguous, virtually exhortative message” (243). One of the two classical narrative 
structures of the roman à thèse is confrontation,33 that is a struggle between two opponents who 
are not on the same moral or ethical plane—in the roman à thèse the narrative clearly privileges 
one adversary and their set of values over the other (102). Serebrennikov’s film is structured 
precisely as the kind of confrontation described by Suleiman and does privilege one of the 
characters (Krasnova) over the other, albeit begrudgingly. In his review of the film, Iurii 
Gladil'shchikov praises Serebrennikov’s film for its polyphonic orchestration of voices but laments 
that this polyphony disappears in the last third of the film when we find out that the film’s 
protagonist is “клинический идиот, скотина, а заодно бытовой антисемит, а вовсе не борец с 
окружающим маразмом” [“certifiably insane, an animal, as well as a common anti-Semite, and 
not at all a fighter against all-pervasive idiocy”]. While Venia is indeed completely discredited, 
his liberally inclined opponent Krasnova, who initially sounds like the voice of reason, is presented 
as the single but by no means unquestionable or unproblematic alternative.34 In fact, Krasnova’s 
 
33 The second one is apprenticeship (see Chapters 2 and 3 in Suleiman’s Authoritarian Fictions). 
34 In von Mayenburg’s original, the biology teacher, who immerses herself into the study of the Bible to beat her 
opponent, reaches levels of zealotry that equal those of her adversary. In Serebrennikov’s adaptation, Krasnova is 
slowly becoming more and more unsettled, yet she is not dismissed altogether. 
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protest action at the end of the film, in which she nails her shoes to the floor,35 is only made possible 
by a forceful adjustment of her worldview. A convinced atheist and rationalist, Krasnova, who has 
conceded defeat and is on her way out of the school, has a vision of the recently murdered Grisha, 
a vision that makes her turn around and stage her protest action. 
Serebrennikov introduces some of the more radical changes to von Mayenburg’s play in 
this scene. In the original, Georg [Grisha] is wounded but not dead; he comes back to the school, 
concussed and unable to explain what exactly has happened, leading one of his classmates to 
conclude: “He just says confused stuff, and that Ms. Roth [Krasnova] is involved.” While there is 
some degree of hope in the original play that Georg might recover and that Benny [Venia] might 
be brought to justice, Serebrennikov kills Grisha off and makes him “return” only in Krasnova’s 
vision. Grisha’s “return” in the concluding sequences of The Student has important political 
implications as it rescues him from the fate of a homo sacer (who may be killed with impunity but 
not sacrificed) as it reframes his murder (for which Venia will most likely not be punished) as a 
sacrifice and Grisha himself as a martyr. In their theorization of sacrifice, Marcel Mauss and Henri 
Hubert write that sacrifice, which may be used for a variety of different purposes, always follows 
the same procedure: “This procedure consists in establishing a means of communication between 
the sacred and the profane worlds through the mediation of a victim, that is, of a thing that in the 
course of the ceremony is destroyed” (97). Grisha, who reappears in Krasnova’s vision in the 
 
35 Krasnova’s protest has reminded some critics of Petr Pavlensky’s 2013 action titled “Fixation,” in which he nailed 
his scrotum to Red Square (see, for example, Crane). Even though it was most likely von Mayenburg’s original (in 
which the biology teacher nails her feet to the floor) rather than Pavlensky’s performance that inspired Serebrennikov’s 
narrative choice, the filmmaker embraced the comparisons between Krasnova’s and Pavlensky’s protest actions. See, 
for example, Serebennikov’s remarks at the Kinotavr press-conference (“Kirill Serebrennikov: ‘Ekstremizm – ot 
pofigizma’”). 
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liminal space of the staircase, emerges in the conclusion of Serebrennikov’s film precisely as such 
a mediating victim but not as a homo sacer. The vision inspires Krasnova to continue fighting. 
I would argue (at the risk of being speculative) that the changes introduced by 
Serebrennikov in these concluding scenes could be read as facilitating a statement about the 
political potential of art. It is, after all, the “magic” of the cinematic medium that brings Grisha 
back and reframes the murder as a sacrifice for a political cause. This moment in the film marks a 
sudden change in the terms of the spectatorial contract, which draws, by virtue of its precipitance, 
the spectator’s attention to the workings of the medium. If there is an exhortative message that the 
film is trying to deliver, it is, as I have argued in the previous section, a message about the non-
static circulating nature of power relations. In the film’s concluding sequences, Serebrennikov 
suggests that art has the capacity to disrupt and challenge relations of power and may play a role 
in creating spaces for resistance. 
Yet Serebrennikov, in one and the same gesture, expresses and tempers his optimism about 
the political efficacy of artistic interventions. Krasnova’s act of protest motivated by Grisha’s 
“return” looks less than formidable. The scene is shot in another long take: the handheld camera 
follows the biology teacher into one of the classrooms and “watches” her nail her shoes to the 
floor. All alone in the room, she keeps repeating “I am not going anywhere” but her voice grows 
quieter every time she says it until she bursts into tears. Il'ia Demutskii’s ominous score in the 
meantime grows louder. 
The ways in which the film’s long takes engage the audience capture the key principle of 
Serebrennikov’s spectatorial address in The Student. In John Rhodes’s analysis of the long take in 
Haneke’s films, he points out that long takes, which for Bazin epitomized the freedom of neorealist 
cinema, are to some degree coercive in nature: “[T]he freedom that Bazin relishes in neorealist 
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cinema (and in the cinema of Welles and Renoir) is actually a coercion to discern, to judge, to 
interpret. But spectators are free, so the argument goes, to make up their own minds. Nonetheless, 
the luxury of this freedom (a luxury produced by cinematic space and time) has value only insofar 
as it forces the activity of discernment” (19). In Haneke’s work, Rhodes suggests, the long take 
challenges the spectator because the plenitude of the real contained in the shot does not allow the 
viewer to make out what is important (20). In his use of the long take Serebrennikov uses a 
different strategy. His minimalist and formalist use of the mise-en-scene—this is where his 
experience as a theater director shows its most conspicuous traces—limits the plenitude of the real, 
encouraging the spectator to discern, but carefully guiding this process of discerning. As I have 
shown in the previous section, the film’s long takes want us to see the mobility and dispersed 
nature of power relations. It thus, paradoxically, coerces us into seeing that we can, in fact, 
negotiate our freedom. 
The film’s inconclusive ending enters us into the feel-bad mode as it refuses to provide a 
catharsis to the worn-out spectator. The long take of Krasnova’s protest cuts to a shot of two police 
officers covering up Grisha’s body. Will Krasnova’s protest bring about any meaningful change? 
Will Venia be punished? Probably not. Yet what the feel-bad ending ultimately wants us to 
“discern” is consistent with the film’s agenda: it is up to us to decide what happens (both within 
and outside the realm of this cinematic universe). Serebrennikov, however, delivers this message 
with a degree of self-irony and an understanding that cinema’s ability to coerce (into freedom or 
otherwise) is limited. As the police are struggling to prevent the wind from blowing the tarp off of 
Grisha’s body, we see a young man jogging down the pier. He could not care less about the 
murder—he does not bother to look. We are, as Serebrennikov is well aware, free to choose what 
we do and do not want to see. 
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If Serebrennikov’s film ends with a crime and a question—will there be a punishment? —
Zviagintsev’s Leviathan offers a closed-off narrative: it is not clear whether there was a crime but 
there were a trial and a punishment;36 the (most likely) innocent protagonist was sent to jail for 
fifteen years after being convicted of the murder of his wife. The fact that the film ends just how 
it started (as is often the case in Zviagintsev’s films) adds to the sense of finality. In the film’s 
opening and concluding sequences alike, we see the site of the separation of the land from the sea, 
crashing waves, and the rotting hulks of abandoned boats. In his discussion of the feel-bad film, 
Lübecker quotes Aristotle’s dictum “the end is everything” (2). Unlike many Hollywood films that 
either diffuse negative emotions at the end of the film or contain them within a fully closed-off 
narrative, feel-bad films do not let the spectator off the hook and force them to stay with the 
negative emotions (2-3). There is an implicit value judgment in Lübecker’s position. His 
discussion of feel-bad films revolves around the ways in which an unpleasant viewing experience 
that feel-bad films create raises political and ethical questions. The much less unpleasant 
Hollywood films then presumably do not have the capacity to ask equally challenging questions.37 
Following Lübecker’s logic, one might conclude that the closed-off narrative of Zviagintsev’s 
Leviathan reifies the film’s pessimistic ending, in which the protagonist submits to his fate without 
offering the least resistance. Asked about the ending, Zviagintsev said in an interview: “I want to 
see what my hero is made of, test his mettle” (Levchin). The test results are disheartening: the 
 
36 Both Zviagintsev and Serebrennikov are in dialogue with Dostoevsky. The Student’s protagonist is a Raskolnikov-
like figure who considers himself superior to all others (and hence above moral law). Leviathan includes explicit 
references to Crime and Punishment and Brothers Karamazov and challenges Dostoevsky’s point of view (expressed 
in several of his works) that one needs to embrace suffering. As Randall Havas suggests, in Dostoevsky’s view, 
suffering is “an expression of a specifically Christian goal of selflessness, what Kierkegaard calls a self-annihilation 
before God” (166). 
37 For example, in his discussion of Brian de Palma’s 1989 film Casualties of War, “a film with Hollywood stars, a 
causal narrative, closure and a redemptive ending,” Lübecker argues that the film lets the spectator off the hook by 
tempering its critique of the military system with the conclusion that, after all is said and done, this system does deliver 
justice (45). 
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protagonist proves helpless in the face of brutal sovereign power. The state of exception has 
become the norm, and that’s that (hence the closed-off narrative—there is nothing we can do about 
it). 
This caricature of an analysis brings to relief two fallacies: 1. The idea that the view of 
politics presented in a given cultural object equals the politics of that cultural object; 2. The belief 
that there is a guaranteed correspondence between specific formal choices and a particular political 
stance. Filmmaker Yvonne Rainer names a couple of such problematic correlations: “disjunction 
equals alert viewer equals critique of patriarchy and narrative coherence equals passive viewer 
equals status quo” (qtd. in Phelan, 178). Paradoxically, what makes Zviagintsev’s Leviathan a feel-
bad film is that it does not have any of the formal characteristics of a feel-bad film. 
The defining characteristic of the feel-bad experience, according to Lübecker, is this: “the 
film produces a spectatorial desire, but then blocks its satisfaction; it creates, and then deadlocks, 
our desire for catharsis” (2; emphasis in original). In her analysis of Zviagintsev’s film, Olga Kim 
briefly invokes Lübecker’s category and suggests that Leviathan does precisely that—it blocks the 
satisfaction of the spectatorial desire that it has created: “The viewers are doomed to leave the 
theater with no sense of relief, but rather with a renewed sense of angst and urgency” (46). While 
I am in agreement with Kim’s conclusion, formally, the film does not qualify for the feel-bad 
category. While Lübecker admits that there is no ready-made recipe for a feel-bad film, feel-bad 
films use the capacities of the cinematic medium to “get on the nerves of the spectator” (2). Among 
the strategies used by feel-bad filmmakers are the following: assaulting the sensorial apparatus of 
the spectator (by making sounds too loud, images too blurry, close-ups too close, editing too 
jagged, etc.); producing a form of affective disturbance through moral or narrative indeterminacy; 
refusing to provide narrative closure; leaving unexplained or breaking the terms of the spectatorial 
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contract (for example, by abruptly switching to a different genre or confusing reality and fiction 
without relinquishing the claim to reality). Lübecker also notes that feel-bad films “sit somewhere 
between establishing a fictional universe and deliberately wanting to get on the nerves of the 
spectator” (2). Zviagintsev’s Leviathan, with its beautiful cinematography and a coherent and 
closed-off narrative, does not use any of the above strategies to irritate the spectator. Neither the 
sound, nor the images are designed to stage an assault on our senses. There are no narrative gaps 
(with the exception of the cause of Lilia’s death, to which I will return) or any unexplained changes 
in the mode of spectatorial address. If some feel-bad films challenge the spectator by refusing to 
take a definitive moral stance on a problematic action, Leviathan has its values straight and does 
not hesitate to qualify things as right or wrong, true or false, fair or unfair. Zviagintsev wants us to 
get fully immersed in the fictional universe he has created, wants us to empathize with the film’s 
protagonist and appreciate the monstrosity of the injustice that he has suffered. In other words, 
Leviathan confronts the spectator by refusing to confront us directly; it creates an overwhelming 
spectatorial desire for the protagonist to take vengeance (which it then frustratingly refuses to 
satisfy) precisely because it uses conventional cinematic language and narrative strategies. Even 
the sense of finality produced by the film’s closed-off narrative only exacerbates the feelings of 
angst and urgency with which we are “doomed to leave the theater.” Any sense of indefiniteness 
would leave the spectator hopeful (maybe Lilia isn’t really dead? maybe they won’t demolish the 
house? maybe Kolia won’t have to go to jail?) and less likely to leave the theater motivated to take 
on the world. The extreme pessimism of the outlook on power presented by Zviagintsev in the film 
is a crucial element of the film’s feel-bad strategy: Zviagintsev lays it on thick to elicit a stronger 
emotional response. Leviathan and The Student are thus (at least in some ways) engaged in the 
same project: coercing the spectator into freedom. 
 73 
Yet there is a fallacy underlying this conclusion as well: the assumption (that has informed 
much of my discussion) that Leviathan is a political film or, rather, that it is primarily or 
exclusively a political film. As Condee points out: “We – Western scholars, Russian critics – may 
want it to be a political film rather than a religious film; Zviagintsev has a different view” 
(“Knowledge (Imperfective)” 566). While my interest in the film lies mainly with its political 
aspects, reading it as a predominantly political film is in itself an authoritarian procedure that 
imagines Leviathan as inherently monologic and obscures some of the more dialogic aspects of 
the film’s spectatorial address. While Zviagintsev may indeed privilege the religious message over 
the political one, one of the key aspects of the film’s relationship with its audience is that it allows 
us to read it either as a religious or a political film. 
The film’s title refers us to two key texts: Hobbes’s Leviathan and the biblical story of 
Job.38 In my discussion of the film’s political agenda I focused on the former and briefly invoked 
the latter as evidence for Zviagintsev’s anti-clerical view that religion (in its institutionalized 
forms) demands obedience in the face of a greater power. If we switch the interpretive lens, 
however, we may conclude that Zviagintsev’s interest in the story of Job lies elsewhere. In her 
analysis of the story of Job, Victoria Silver writes: “Job asks for his predicament to be made 
intelligible to him, to have the coherence of his world and his faith restored by some explanation, 
to have the deity interpret itself to him. […] God gives no answer as such to Job’s question but 
aggravates Job’s sense of disorderly creation with a litany of its curiosities […] and monstrosities” 
 
38 While in many ways monologically inclined, Zviagintsev’s film can be read as polyphonic if we interpret Bakhtin’s 
polyphony, via Julia Kristeva and Tzvetan Todorov, as intertextuality. See Kristeva’s “Word, Dialogue and Novel” in 
Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (pp. 64-91) and Todorov’s Mikhail Bakhtin: The 
Dialogic Principle. 
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(164). Leviathan, Silver concludes, is thus a figure for the “world’s fundamental intransigence—
its resistance to explanation” (164). 
If we privilege the religious reading of the film, Zviagintsev’s “leviathan” appears to be 
precisely such a figure. The film’s ending in this case then does not (and does not have the capacity 
to) provide a closure. As Condee writes in her discussion of the film: “[A]s an artifact of human 
creation, the film itself does not perform for us a knowledge of whether the very suffering it depicts 
finds redemption in a world to which it has only tenuous access” (“Knowledge (Imperfective)” 
572). 
The fact that Zviagintsev refuses to provide an explanation for Lilia’s death leaving us 
wondering what exactly happened (was it a suicide? accident? murder? and if she was indeed 
murdered, then who did it?) can on one hand serve as further evidence that the film’s “leviathan” 
is to be understood as a figure of the world’s fundamental intransigence. To fill in this narrative 
gap would equal an attempt to answer the question that torments the biblical Job, Kolia, and the 
viewer alike, and that both God and Zviagintsev leave unanswered: what is the cause and value of 
human suffering? On the other hand, the filmmaker leaves the spectator an opportunity to choose 
the explanation that best suits their understanding of the film as a whole. The following evidence 
is purely anecdotal but nonetheless informative: in random conversations with people about the 
film, I have noticed that many viewers believe they know for certain what happened to Lilia—
some say she committed suicide, some believe she was murdered by Vadim’s henchmen, others, 
that it was Kolia who killed her (in cases when there was a longer temporal gap between the 
viewing of the film and the conversation, many were convinced that they saw it happen on screen). 
This unreliable survey brings to relief the inherently dialogic nature of the relationship between 
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film and the spectator as well as the chameleonic nature of Zviagintsev’s film. He may want it to 
be a religious film, but we are given the option to decide otherwise. 
For Bakhtin, Dostoevsky’s work was the exemplar of polyphonic writing—it incorporated 
a multiplicity of heterogeneous voices and positions, which were not subsumed under the voice of 
the author. As critics have pointed out, however, “Bakhtin’s passion for the horizontally cast 
dialogic word comes at the expense of Dostoevsky’s more vertical gestures” (Emerson 132). In 
Zviagintsev’s and Serebrennikov’s films, as I have tried to show, there is a similar push and pull 
between vertical and horizontal gestures. If there is a tendency towards the monological in both 
Leviathan and The Student, it is akin to the one that Yurii Kariakin detects in Dostoevsky’s oeuvre: 
in his crucial scenes, there is always a silent “finger pointing at the truth” (qtd. in Emerson 130). 
As Jones reasons, however, Bakhtin’s recourse to binary oppositions and his privileging of the 
dialogic over the monologic do not survive careful scrutiny because in accordance with Bakhtin’s 
own principle that all utterances are ultimately double-voiced, “it should be possible to establish a 
scale of different degrees of double-voicedness” (23). While Zviagintsev’s Leviathan and 
Serebrennikov’s The Student are indeed inclined to “affirm absolute truths, absolute values,” as 
authoritarian fictions do (Suleiman 10), their attempts at monologic unity are driven by inherently 
dialogic ambitions. If these attempts resemble the language of the state-church duo that has taken 
upon itself the role of moral authority, it is precisely because they are meant to serve as a response 
to discourse that refuses to be part of an open-ended dialogue. 
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2.0 Russia’s Quiet Other: Dmitrii Mamuliia’s Another Sky and Aleksandr Kott’s The Test 
Dmitrii Mamuliia’s 2010 film Another Sky and Aleksandr Kott’s 2014 drama The Test at 
first glance have little in common. The former is set in contemporary Moscow; the latter in north-
eastern Kazakhstan of the Stalinist period.39 While Kott’s film with its stunning geometrically 
accurate shots and interplay of bright colors is empathically formalist, Mamuliia’s “restrained” 
visual style tends towards that of the documentary film. What these two very different films share, 
however, is their focus on Russia’s Others. Kott’s film tells the story of a Kazakh girl Dina and 
her father Tolgat, who fall victims to the first Soviet bomb test, conducted at the Semipalatinsk 
Nuclear Test Site on August 29, 1949. In Another Sky, Mamuliia’s protagonists, Ali and his nine-
year-old son, are immigrants who come to Moscow from one of the Central Asian republics in 
hopes of finding Ali’s estranged wife. Both Mamuliia’s and Kott’s characters are homines sacri, 
bearers of bare life who dwell in the zone of indistinction between bíos and zoē. Included only by 
virtue of being excluded, they are outside both divine and secular law—they can be killed but not 
sacrificed (Agamben, Homo Sacer 73). But unlike in Agamben’s conceptual universe, which is 
notoriously resistant to engagement with imperial and colonial histories in a theorization of the 
state of exception,40 Mamuliia’s and Kott’s films, with their focus on Russia’s Others, seem to 
 
39 Neither film explicitly states its location. Mamuliia avoids all geographically grounded shots. That we are in 
Moscow is revealed only to the attentive eye and ear: one may recognize Moscow’s Kiev Train Station or catch a 
muffled station announcement about a train arriving in Moscow. In Kott’s film, it is the plot that leads the spectator 
to believe that the characters are near Semipalatinsk. 
40 For a critique of Agamben’s refusal to engage imperial and colonial histories, see Malini Johar Schueller’s article 
“Decolonizing Global Theories Today,” Sheila Nair’s essay “Sovereignty, Security, and the Exception,” and Thomas 
Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat’s intervention in Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the 
Postcolonial World. 
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point to the indispensability of the imperial context for understanding both the Soviet and the post-
Soviet biopolitical projects. 
In this chapter, I investigate the convergence of imperial and biopolitical narratives in 
Mamuliia’s and Kott’s films, focusing, in particular, on their limited use of dialogue: here, Russia’s 
Others either do not speak at all (The Test) or speak very little (Another Sky). While Mamuliia’s 
and Kott’s silencing strategies may, on one hand, be interpreted as a replication of an imperial 
logic that deprives its Other of logos, I argue that the silencing of characters in the two films is at 
least attempted as a liberating gesture. Language, after all, as Agamben argues, is “the most ancient 
of apparatuses – one in which thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let 
himself be captured, probably without realizing the consequences that he was about to face” (What 
Is an Apparatus? 14). Neither film is without its problems, however. At first glance, Mamuliia’s 
strategy seems less ideologically problematic than Kott’s; if the former questions language as such, 
including the language of cinema, the latter is reluctant to do so and inadvertently aligns itself with 
the empire. The reticence of both films (including although not limited to their refusal to ground 
events in a specific time and place) subsumes imperial and biopolitical narratives within the pursuit 
of larger metaphysical questions and discourages attempts to ponder who it is that is more likely 
to be reduced to bare life and be abandoned by the law. 
2.1 Mamuliia’s and Kott’s Homines Sacri 
Mamuliia’s Another Sky begins in the steppe: Ali, the film’s protagonist, is struggling with 
the disease and death of his sheep herd. Together with his son, Ali leaves the steppe for Moscow, 
where they become migrant wage workers. While the film will never return to the steppe, the 
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images of sick and dying sheep remain with the spectator throughout the film, connecting the 
numerous instances of illness and death into one single thread. Almost immediately after their 
arrival in Moscow, Ali is dragged (like an animal, by the scruff of his jacket) by a police officer to 
a sanitation shower. No questions are asked. As Edward Said points out, the Oriental is always 
already guilty: “The crime was that the Oriental was an Oriental” (39). Stripped and disinfected, 
Ali is reduced to bare life—not natural life per se, but what remains after bios is separated from 
zoē. Without clothes, the thin yet strong shield that holds in place the distinction between the 
private and the public, Ali becomes one body among the numerous others at the sanitation shower, 
those belonging to other immigrants and homeless people. Mamuliia “rhymes” the sanitation 
shower scenes (there will be another one towards the end of the film) with the sequence in which 
the television, playing in the background in Ali’s room, broadcasts the spreading swine flu and 
stresses the importance of disinfection procedures. Disinfection is required to protect the “healthy” 
from the “sick.” Mamuliia reminds us, however, that health and disease function in today’s world 
as biopolitical categories. Subtly yet noticeably, Mamuliia suggests that to be an immigrant and to 
be homeless is equated by the contemporary “anthropological machine” with being “sick” and in 
need of sanitation measures. 
The bodies of the dying sheep in the steppe and the bodies in the sanitation shower re-float 
in the spectator’s memory when Ali goes to a hospital to check if his wife’s name has been listed 
in the hospital intake list. He walks down the long hallways, peeking into the rooms and looking 
at the patients’ grotesque ailing bodies, sprawled across the beds. The doors to the rooms are open, 
allowing Ali (and us) to catch a glimpse of what is supposed to remain private. The camera follows 
Ali from room to room, catching only fragments of the bodies, reminding us of Ali’s (and by 
extension, our) violation of the privacy with respect to those to whom the bodies belong. 
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Fragmented and violated by our gaze, the bodies do not amount to a whole; deprived of identity, 
they are reduced to bare life. 
The trip to the hospital yields no results, and Ali continues his search in a brothel where 
the body (notably, the immigrant body) becomes a commodity par excellence. The prostitutes are 
shot from the neck down, as “headless” anonymous bodies that are “chosen like items off of a 
menu” (Draskoczy). If the fragmented naked bodies in the brothel episode “rhyme” with those in 
the sanitation shower and the hospital, the next body that Ali encounters brings back the images 
of the dying sheep from the film’s opening. Driving home late at night, Ali slows down to avoid 
hitting a drunk man and instead runs over a dog. One life saved, another one ended. Ali gets out 
of the car for a few seconds to look at the dead dog, then drives away. 
The relief, however, is only temporary. Ali soon finds out that his son was killed in a 
sawmill accident where the boy had been working. Although meaningful for Ali, his son’s body is 





Like the dead dog that Ali had left lying on the street, his son’s body has been left lying in 
the morgue by those indifferent to it. Mamuliia persistently equates the boy’s life with animal life. 
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At the train station in Moscow Ali carries his sleeping son over the shoulder just like he carried 
the dead sheep in the film’s opening shots. The contemporary “anthropological machine,” in 
Mamuliia’s argument, equates immigrants, animals, the homeless, and the sick. Killed with 
impunity as homo sacer, Ali’s son is abandoned by the law. In one of the film’s grimmest moments, 
the sawmill foreman puts a “price tag” on the boy’s body when he pays Ali for the death of his 
son: “Here’s some money.  No one is to blame.  It just happened.” Ali does not say a word in 
response. 
Kott’s Test at first presents itself to be a coming-of-age drama with a Kazakh girl Dina as 
its protagonist. Living with her father Tolgat, the girl cannot choose between two suitors, a local 
Kazakh “cowboy” Kaisyn and a visiting Russian photographer Maksim. Once her father dies and 
Dina, as a psychoanalytical reading would suggest, becomes ready to “replace” him with a more 
appropriate object for her love, the girl opts for the Russian suitor Maksim. 
The love story, however, comes with a twist. The film’s characters, it appears, live near 
Semipalatinsk, the site of the first Soviet nuclear test bomb; the year, we may surmise, is 1949. 
Separated from the rest of the empire by a fence, the characters are not simply cut off from the rest 
of the empire; they are included only by virtue of being excluded. Kott establishes early in the film 
that Tolgat and his daughter’s lives are confined to the sphere of the oikos, “home” (distinct from 
the polis, the locus of bíos politikos), characterized by “familial relations with the father as head 
of the household, a subsistence economy, and mere living” (Arnold 13). In the sequence following 
the title card Tolgat is shot in close-up enjoying an afternoon nap; instead of a pillow, he uses a 
sleeping sheep. Although Tolgat and his daughter’s proximity to the natural world will be 
emphasized throughout the film, their lives are by no means pure zoē. After a series of cuts, the 






Kott’s characters are bearers of bare life, caught in the zone of indistinction between zoē 
and bios. Once awake, Tolgat drives the truck to his home, takes the sheep off of the truck bed and 
picks up a knife. Despite our fears, he uses the knife to untie the sheep’s legs, not to kill it. The 
brief moment of uncertainty, however, introduces one of the film’s central themes: the 
precariousness of all life. The sheep is spared by Tolgat but neither of them will be spared by the 
empire. 
Throughout the film the Soviet empire manifests itself almost exclusively through 
technological means: the truck, the plane, the radio, the Geiger counter. Even Maksim, equipped 
with a camera and a projector, appears as a “civilizer.” He astounds Dina by projecting a black-
and-white image of hers on the house wall. One of the rare exceptions in the film only proves the 
rule: the Moscow Kremlin in Dina’s herbarium book is made of dry leaves. The empire’s 
connection with nature is thus established only through the mediation of its internal Other. It is 
also notable that it is only in this form that the empire proves vulnerable and perishable. 
The film arguably reproduces what Madina Tlostanova describes as “the Soviet 
modernity’s grand narrative of the backward people civilized by the Socialist Russians” (8). Kott 
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insists, however, that the Soviet mission to assimilate and accept Russia’s Others “into the only 
correct form of modernity” (Tlostanova 8) ultimately failed. His characters are included in the 
polis by virtue of being excluded. In one of the film’s most eloquent shots, Dina appears as a 
shadow on a geopolitical map41 hanging on the wall in her room. Dina as well as her father and 
the two suitors are figures par excellence of this (inclusive) exclusion of bare life. Textbook 
examples of homines sacri, the characters are killed with impunity at the end of the film. Tolgat 
dies from exposure to radiation even before the explosion. The others perish when the bomb is 
detonated, turning the bodies on the screen as well as their belongings into dust. Dina and Maksim 
face the calamity holding hands, silent. 
2.2 Escaping the Apparatus of Language? 
What is at stake in Kott’s and Mamuliia’s decisions to leave their characters “speechless,” 
even when faced with death? 
In his volume Language and Death, Agamben takes issue with the inclination of the 
Western metaphysical thought, from Aristotle onwards, to define man as a mortal speaking 
being.42 What troubles Agamben most about the Aristotelean definition of man as zōon lógon 
échon, man endowed with language, is that it relies on a separation between animal phonē and 
human logos. Aristotle’s passage reads: 
 
41 This is a recurrent image in Kott’s filmography. Characters are shot against geopolitical maps in three of his shorts: 
The Scarecrow (Pugalo) (2000), The Giant (Velikan) (2003), and The Fish (Ryba) (2008). 
42 For Heidegger, the human has the “faculty” for death precisely because he has the “faculty” for language because 
death is a condition that needs to be uttered (or thought) in advance of its arrival: “Die Sterblichen sind jene, die den 
Tod als Tod erfahren können. Das Tier vermag dies nicht. Das Tier kann aber auch nicht sprechen. Das 
Wesensverhältnis zwischen Tod und Sprache blitzt auf” (qtd. in Agamben, Language and Death xi). 
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Man alone of the animals possesses language (logos). The mere voice (phonē), it is 
true, can indicate pain or pleasure, and therefore it is possessed by the other animals 
as well [...] but language (logos) is designed to indicate the advantageous and the 
harmful, and therefore also the right and wrong; for it is the special property of man 
in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad 
and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these 
things that makes a household and a city-state. (qtd. in Agamben, Language and 
Death 87) 
The transition from animal voice to human language implies, according to Agamben, a 
caesura in the human being that becomes, as Daniel McLoughlin points out, the model in Western 
culture for thinking the difference between nature and culture, the living being and language. 
Human Voice (Agamben capitalizes it to differentiate it from phonē], stripped from signification, 
is qualitatively different from phonē, animal voice: when confronted with a foreign language, we 
are aware that what we hear has meaning even though we do not understand the words. The human 
Voice thus always already implies the potentiality for language: “For the metaphysical tradition, 
then, to have logos is to have the immediacy of the voice negated and replaced by the potentiality 
for language; as such, while the animal voice is placed at the origin of language, ‘it is also true that 
this voice is, from the beginning, conceived of as removed’ ([Language and Death], 39)” 
(McLoughlin, 197-8). 
The metaphysical tendency to posit Voice as the negative foundation of language thus has 
political implications as well. The exclusion of what Aristotle calls nutritive (or vegetative) life 
(characterized by an absolute separation from logos) is the foundation on which the definition of 
man as zōon lógon échon rests. Life according to logos is actualized, for Aristotle, in the polis 
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from which natural life is banished: “The political, as the work of man as man, is drawn out of the 
living being through the exclusion—as unpolitical—of a part of its vital activity” (Agamben, “The 
Work of Man” 6). In Homo Sacer Agamben articulates the structural parallels between the 
metaphysical tradition and contemporary biopolitics implicit in his early work and demonstrates 
that the metaphysical view of language as an added capacity, as characterized by a split between 
phonē and logos, replicates the structural logic of the sovereign practice of isolating bare life: “The 
question ‘In what way does the living being have language?’ corresponds exactly to the question 
‘In what way does bare life dwell in the polis?’ The living being has logos by taking away and 
conserving its own voice in it, even as it dwells in the polis by letting its own bare life be excluded, 
as an exception, within it” (Homo Sacer 8). 
Modern sovereign power, according to Agamben, does not only produce homines sacri but 
can also deprive them of what Western thought considers to be human “essence,” their capacity to 
speak. For Agamben, an extreme manifestation of the plight of homo sacer today is the figure of 
a ‘Muselmann.’43 The term was used in Nazi concentration camps to describe those inhabitants 
who, starved and exhausted, could no longer respond to their environment: “Muselmänner […] 
though surviving as a biological organism, could no longer be recognised as human – not only by 
the Nazis, but by fellow camp inmates themselves. What the death camps [...] revealed is that 
‘man’ (the mortal speaking being) can really be separated from his ‘essence’ (speech) […]. [I]t 
would be impossible for a Muselmann to say ‘I am a Muselmann’” (Clemens 118-9; emphasis in 
original). 
Do Mamuliia and Kott, by leaving their protagonists speechless in the face of imperial 
violence, replicate the sovereign gesture? In other words, are the two films’ quiet homines sacri 
 
43 For a critique of Agamben’s use of the term, see Schueller, 243-246. 
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separated from their “essence” like Muselmänner? The short answer is no. Neither Mamuliia’s nor 
Kott’s characters qualify as Muselmänner. Mamuliia’s reticent protagonist Ali can and does 
occasionally speak but often chooses to remain silent. The silence in Kott’s film, as Elena Stishova 
suggests, may be interpreted as a metaphor for the informational vacuum [“informatsionnyi 
vakuum”] imposed on the Semipalatinsk residents by the Soviet empire (72).44 As a metaphor, the 
silence has meaning and function; in other words, it is an alternative form of communication, rather 
than a lack of capacity to speak. In pursuit of the longer answer, the remainder of this chapter 
explores the nuances of the two directors’ silencing approaches and their ideological implications. 
In Mamuliia’s Another Sky the “silence” is, to some degree, motivated diegetically: Ali 
does not speak Russian. In those rare moments when he does speak, he relies on the help of an 
interpreter. If logos is indeed what distinguishes the human from the animal, then Ali’s forced 
silence may be seen as further evidence that, as an immigrant, he has been reduced to bare life.  
Yet unlike Agamben’s Muselmann, he says his name loud and clear at the police department. 
While all the other questions and answers require the mediation of an interpreter, Ali’s name is 
self-sufficient. 
That Ali is otherwise reliant on interpretation is telling: Mamuliia is suspicious of language 
as such and its mediating function, in particular. As Agamben puts it, “To adopt an image from 
Wittgenstein, man exists in language like a fly trapped in a bottle: that which it cannot see is 
precisely that through which it sees the world” (“Un’idea” 33). Unlike animals, who communicate 
without the mediation of a sign system, human beings must first learn the language as infants 
 
44 The 1949 anatomic test was the most devastating for human exposure of all the tests conducted in Semipalatinsk, 
in part, because the military had neither much experience nor much concern about protecting local populations. The 
public could not be informed of any details associated with the testing, and unlike the test personnel who were sheltered 
in special rooms, the ordinary citizens were asked to stay outside with no explanation provided as to why they were 
supposed to leave their households (Werner and Purvis-Roberts 281-7). 
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which allows us to “achieve an inestimable gain in sophistication of communication, but at the 
price of immediacy” (Durantaye 93). 
In Another Sky language functions as an apparatus of capture, finalizing,45 in the Bakhtinian 
sense of the word, that which it captures—claiming to know its essence without, in fact, being able 
even to approximate it. The insufficiency and the inadequacy of language are emphasized by 
Mamuliia early in the film, even before father and son move to Moscow. In a first brief dialogue, 
Ali’s son asks his father in Tajik whether his mother is beautiful. Ali is driving his truck on a 
highway. Mamuliia emphatically refuses to use conventional shot-reverse shot technique; the 
camera is fixed on the road and on the cars in front of the windshield. Ali responds to his son with 
a single word: “Beautiful.” The boy asks about the color of her eyes. Ali’s answer is “black.” What 
color is her hair, the off-screen voice wonders. Ali sticks to one-word responses: “Black.” The boy 
finally asks: “Why did she leave?” After a long pause, Ali says: “I don’t know.” The screen cuts 
to black. The conversation is over. 
Mamuliia’s refusal to rely on traditional continuity editing underscores the insufficiency 
of language. Words prove ineffective, at least in part because they are not paired with the images 
of those speaking and listening. By refusing to pair language with affect, Mamuliia destabilizes 
the link between language and knowledge. Language does not get to the essence of things, but 
emerges here as an apparatus of biopolitical capture, categorizing its referent only by hair and eye 
color. Mamuliia stresses this point later when Ali goes to the police department in hopes that the 
 
45 As Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan points out, Bakhtin uses the Russian verb zavershit' “both in the sense of ‘consummate,’ 
i.e. an operation of loving containment (as translated in “Author and Hero”), and in the sense of “finalize,” a violent 
act of closure (as translated in Dostoevsky’s Poetics)” (13). If in the 1920s essay “Author and Hero” zavershenie was 
the desired outcome of aesthetic activity, in his 1930s piece “Discourse in the Novel” zavershenie is interpreted as a 
violent and destructive act. See Ken Hirschkop’s chapter “Dialogue with History” in Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic 
for Democracy for a discussion of the transformations that link the two essays. 
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police would help him find his wife. Among the questions are those his son had asked: What is the 
color of her eyes? And what is the color of her hair? 
If language is an apparatus of biopolitical capture, then Ali’s silence bears the potential to 
be liberating. His refusal to use language even when there is no language barrier suggests that he 
is not so much deprived of the ability to speak as wary of language and its limitations. For 
Agamben, it is “in man’s moments of silence […] that he at once draws close to animality at the 
same time as he offers the opportunity to think human potentiality, precisely when that potentiality 
is not actualized” (Colebrook 23). In other words, to overcome metaphysics and, by extension, the 
logic of the sovereign ban, it is necessary to rethink the human “capacity” for language as 
“potentiality” in its double appearance as “potentiality to and potentiality not to”46 (Agamben, 
Homo Sacer 46). Even though human beings, according to Agamben, cannot call into question 
their entry into language, “the simple acquisition of speech in no way obliges one to speak. The 
pure pre-existence of language as the instrument of communication—the fact that, for speaking 
beings, language already exists—in itself contains no obligation to communicate” (Remnants of 
Auschwitz 65). 
Mamuliia’s protagonist Ali exercises potentiality in its double appearance as “the 
potentiality to and the potentiality not to” speak. The connection between silence and potentiality 
manifests itself with particular clarity at the end of Another Sky, when Ali finally finds his wife 
but, much to the spectator’s frustration, does not say a word to her. She asks him to stop the car at 
one point but otherwise remains silent as well. Mamuliia draws out the closing sequence and 
refuses to break the silence. When nothing is said, all the things that could have been said remain 
 
46 See Mills for an in-depth analysis of the role of potentiality in Agamben’s theory of language and the conclusions 
that Agamben draws from his retheorization of potentiality in the fields of aesthetics, politics, and ethics. 
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present as potentialities. Silence serves here as an antidote to the finalizing ambition of language, 
as it includes simultaneously what could have been said and what could have been left unsaid. 
Unlike Mamuliia, who limits the use of dialogue in his film and explains this choice by 
intradiegetic reasons, Aleksandr Kott eliminates dialogue altogether, providing no immediate 
explanation for the characters’ silence. The silence in Kott’s drama is a formal device that has led 
many critics to go as far as describe the film as silent. The film, however, is not silent per se: the 
characters do not speak but their silence, in many ways, foregrounds the sounds of nature 
permeating the soundtrack. Occasionally, solemn music fades in and grows louder, only to dissolve 
into the whisper of wind, the buzz of flies, and the chirping of birds. The film concludes by 
breaking its own rule—by matching a human body with its voice. Seconds before his death, Dina’s 
suitor Kaisyn unleashes a powerful scream. The exception, however, only proves the rule as it 
maintains the Aristotelean caesura between animal phonē that expresses pleasure and pain and 
human logos that is uniquely positioned to articulate the distinction between the just and the unjust. 
An expression of pain, Kaisyn’s scream maintains the characters’ separation from logos as well as 
bíos. 
Logos, however, is not entirely banished from the film but rather restricted to a specific 
user, the empire. The only few instances in which language is used point to the empire’s 
inseparability from logos. In the first, the state radio in the background informs its listeners about 
the beginning of yet another successful harvesting season in the north of the Rostov region. In the 
second, the newspaper Izvestiia is happy to report a surge of inflation levels in capitalist countries. 
Since language is not entirely absent then the characters’ silence could indeed, as Stishova 
suggests, be understood as a metaphor for the violence inflicted by the empire on its homines sacri, 
the residents of Semipalatinsk who lived in an informational vacuum and had no say in the matter. 
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If this is indeed Kott’s intention, however, then the silence does not allow us to speak about 
potentiality. As a metaphor, the silence insists on making a point. The point would be Kott’s, who 
incorporates the silence as a device into the logos of the film and thus reinforces the distinction 
between phonē and logos, zoē and bios. Notably, in the third and perhaps the most revealing use 
of language in the film the empire emerges as the mediator but not the subject of speech. Early in 
the film Dina is listening to Colombina’s aria from Pagliacci on the radio. It is unlikely that Dina 
understands the Italian words but that is precisely the point for Kott who contends that the 
meaning-making capacity of art (be it music or cinema) has little to do with words per se. Thus 
logos, in Kott’s argument, problematically appears as the prerogative of both the empire and art. 
Even if the characters’ voicelessness may have been indeed intended by Kott as a critique of the 
imperial biopolitical project, in its attempt to render inoperative the apparatus of language, the film 
inadvertently risks becoming complicit in the same project that it seeks to critique. 
If in Mamuliia’s Another Sky, silence leaves the spectator with myriad options—none of 
which is realized—then in Kott’s film the options are often limited. In a telling scene, for example, 
Dina summons Kaisyn to fetch a doctor for her ill father. Once Kaisyn arrives, the camera cuts to 
a shot of Dina. She turns to look and, we assume, sees Kaisyn. The horse makes a noise that ensures 
continuity between the two shots. Another cut; Kaisyn looks into the hut, at Dina, and immediately 
rides away: he understood. The camera then cuts to a shot of Dina by the window: she is waiting 
for the doctor to arrive. The doctor makes an appearance in the following shot. The spectator is 
left with a clear idea of what it was that was left unsaid (“My father is ill. Go get a doctor”). 
Does Kott, in an Orientalizing gesture, suggest that the characters, simple creatures as they 
are, do not need language to communicate? The film’s Kazakh characters, however, are not the 
only ones limited to simple wordless communication. It would be disingenuous to ignore the fact 
 90 
that Dina’s Russian suitor Maksim does not speak either. In the face of imperial violence, he proves 
to be just as voiceless and helpless as Dina. The two of them die together, holding hands, silent. 
Maksim’s silence at first glance attenuates the film’s Orientalizing impulse; it suggests that he is 
just as dispensable for the state as Dina, Tolgat, and Kaisyn. They are all homines sacri. This 
narrative choice, however, shifts the focus of what appears to be Kott’s argument away from issues 
of ethnicity and race to issues of class, suggesting that any ordinary citizen (as opposed to a 
member of the privileged nomenklatura), who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong 
time, could have become a nuclear test victim, a homo sacer in the Soviet empire. The film thus 
inadvertently mimics the hypocritical attitude of the Soviet state, which, as Tlostanova 
demonstrates, substituted race for class in its official discourse (while practicing racism all along) 
(15). 
Equally problematic is the fact that the film takes it upon itself to “speak” for the characters. 
That the characters can communicate with each other without language is conveyed by the film’s 
editing choices. Thus, if Mamuliia avoids traditional shot-reverse-shot sequences, then Kott relies 
on such conventional sequences to make legible that which would otherwise remain unclear. Kott’s 
silencing of the characters may free them from the language of the empire—one particular 
language—but it does not dismantle the apparatus of language altogether, nor does it question its 
own language. 
In his review of The Test, Robert Bird captures the articulacy of Levan Kapanadze’s 
cinematography and the film’s belief in its own capacity for logos: “The compositions, like the 
film’s construction, are perfectly centered and relentlessly symmetrical; for all their poignancy, 
they are almost painfully legible.” Further in the review, Bird aptly describes the film as a “drama 
of scale.” Kott alternates throughout the film between shots of different lengths: “bird’s-eye shots 
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[…] render the human world as toy-like or map-like, before zooming in for texture-rich close-ups 
of sheep’s wool, tree bark, or the characters’ faces” (Bird). Kott’s cinematic language, in other 
words, is all-powerful; the camera may replicate the imperial gaze when it surveys the vastness 
and the greatness of the imperial domain; or it may come close and position us near the characters. 
The switching itself carries meaning. When Dina first discovers the fence separating her home 
from the rest of the empire, we are at first positioned behind her, discovering it with her as she 
stops in front of what is revealed to be barbed wire. The back of her head is shot in close-up, and 
we see only a tiny segment of the wire. [Figure 23] The camera cuts and we find ourselves on the 
opposite side of the wire; Dina’s perplexed face is shot in close-up en face. [Figure 24] Another 
cut, and we are behind Dina’s back again, now several meters away from the fence, able to 
“appreciate” for the first time its height—about twice Dina’s height. [Figure 25] Another cut, and 
we are now even further back, yet still unable to see where the fence begins or ends. [Figure 26] 
Finally, the camera captures Dina and the infinite fence from above: she is just a tiny dot on the 
screen. [Figure 27] She is powerless in her “encounter” with the fence. The camera, on the 
contrary, can decide which side of the fence to position itself, finally choosing to stay above the 



















Mamuliia’s cinematographic choices are strikingly different. The film relies predominantly 
on medium shots, occasionally zooming in slightly and showing the characters in medium close-
ups. It does not assume omniscience, for the most part showing things from one single position 
and angle. Moreover, it constantly questions its own ability to stabilize meaning. In those rare 
moments when characters are engaged in dialogue, the camera either shoots the interlocutors from 
their backs, or focuses on something else entirely. Even immediate proximity does not guarantee 
access to knowledge. When Ali, for example, leans against the truck after loading the bodies of 
dead sheep onto it, we are positioned behind his back and can only guess but not read his affect. 
On numerous occasions, the camera gets claustrophobically close to Ali, yet we are still left with 
little information. Dark lighting, an inconvenient angle, as well as Ali’s tendency to look down 
and the general inexpressivity of his face, do not allow the spectator to “read” him, to make him 
legible (Kott, on the contrary, almost always captures his characters’ faces en face). The ending of 
Mamuliia’s film is particularly telling in this sense. The spectator’s hopes to finally get some 
answers are frustrated in part because Ali remains silent and in part because Mamuliia does not 
give us access to Ali’s emotional world. Shown in profile, Ali stares at the road ahead of him, his 
expression impenetrable to his wife’s and (by extension, our) gaze. [Figure 28] In stark contrast to 
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the authorities who strip Ali of his privacy, the film refuses to violate the border between the public 





In Lübecker’s terms, Mamuliia’s drama is a feel-bad film while Kott’s Test is decidedly 
not. As discussed in Chapter One, Lübecker identifies “feel-bad” films as those that make the 
spectator uncomfortable through their narrative and cinematographic choices. These “micro” feel-
bad moments feed into “larger structures of spectatorial manipulation” (2), while refusing to 
provide the spectator with a cathartic ending or any kind of closure (3). 
Kott’s wordless drama may at first glance seem to be a perfect candidate for Lübecker’s 
category; after all, contemporary audiences have been taught to rely on dialogue as a key source 
of narrative development and meaning. Moreover, as Mary Ann Doane points out, it is the 
separation of the voice from the body that makes silent cinema intimidating to the modern 
spectator. She writes: “The silent film is certainly understood, at least retrospectively and even (it 
is arguable) in its time, as incomplete, as lacking speech. […] The uncanny effect of the silent film 
in the era of sound is in part linked to the separation, by means of intertitles, of an actor’s speech 
from the image of his/her body” (33). While Kott’s “wordless” rather than silent film does not 
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make up for its speechlessness with exaggerated acting or intertitles, it does separate the body from 
the voice. The whispers and noises of the natural world make the characters’ voicelessness all the 
more conspicuous. In his review of Kott’s drama, critic Anton Dolin suggests that the wordlessness 
of the film may be a “test” in and of itself for the audiences (a “test” that is well worth taking, 
according to Dolin) (“‘Ispytanie’”). While there is no way to establish what exactly scared away 
the distributors and the viewers, it would not be unreasonable to posit a correlation between the 
film’s “silence” and its dismal box office numbers. The film that cost two million dollars to make 
played on a total of 18 commercial screens domestically and earned a little more than $10 000.47 
The experience of watching Kott’s drama, however, is hardly taxing as the film’s 
cinematographic and narrative choices are designed to (over)compensate for any discomfort that 
the lack of dialogue may cause. As Lübecker points out, the frustration generated by feel-bad films 
“originates in their disrespect for the conventions of storytelling. This is why many of the films 
have been accused of being incoherent, boring, mystifying or otherwise lacking in narrative” (14). 
Neither of these characteristics apply to Kott’s film that offers the viewers a love triangle story 
that may be all too predictable but is easy and entertaining to follow. Kapanadze’s “crisply poetic 
cinematography” (Young) is not only “legible” (although it does play an important role in filling 
the gaps that may have been left by the missing dialogue) but also spectacularly beautiful. Praised 
by numerous critics and recognized at the Kinotavr Film Festival, the cinematography alone 
provides for a most pleasant viewing experience. 
 
47 That is not to say that the film’s wordlessness is the only culprit. Michel Hazanavicius’s The Artist, a 2011 throwback 
to the early days of Hollywood (with a production budget of 15 million dollars), made more than 134 million dollars 
in international box office. The film was admittedly boosted by its Oscar sweep (five wins including awards for Best 
Picture and for Best Director) but could be considered an economic success regardless. 
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The film’s tragic ending may come as a surprise to the unsuspecting spectator but even 
here Kott takes an array of measures to alleviate the blow. First, the images of the nuclear 
mushroom and the destruction caused by it are shot in slow motion and aestheticized to a 
subliminal degree. In his interview with Larisa Maliukova, Kott admits that the aestheticization is 
intentional: “Мне хотелось воссоздать бодлеровское настроение. Помните? ‘Пейзаж 
чудовищно-картинный. Мой дух сегодня взволновал’ […] Есть и у жути завораживающая 
магнетичная красота.” [I wanted to recreate the Baudelairian mood. Do you remeber how it goes? 
“De ce terrible paysage, / Tel que jamais mortel n’en vit, / Ce matin encore l’image, / Vague et 
lointaine, me ravit.’ […] Even the dreadful has a captivating magnetic beauty to it.] 
Second, the negative in Kott’s film is contained within a tightly controlled narrative. In his 
discussion of the role of the ending in deciding whether a film qualifies for the feel-bad category, 
Lübecker notes:  
In the Poetics Aristotle writes that the end is ‘everything’ (Aristotle 1965: 40). […] 
Many Hollywood dramas go far into negative emotions, but most will make sure 
that such emotions are diffused at the end of the film; occasionally they will stay 
with the unpleasant emotions, but the films will then at least contain them within a 
fully closed-off narrative. It is precisely this form of satisfaction and negative 
containment that the feel-bad film does not deliver. (2-3) 
In his study of narration and closure in cinema, Richard Neupert echoes Barbara Herrnstein 
Smith and David Richter who, in their analyses of endings in poems and fables, respectively, come 
to the conclusion that a strong closure requires the achievement of a sense of completeness both at 
the level of story and at the level of narrative discourse (13-15). Kott does not only bring the story 
to a definitive conclusion—what else is there to tell if all of the characters and their belongings 
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have been crumbled into dust—but also brackets the narrative by showing at the very beginning 
of the film what is supposed to come at the very end. The film opens with a sequence of the 
destruction caused by the nuclear explosion. There is no indication in these introductory scenes of 
what caused the (highly aestheticized and neatly organized) destruction. The slow and steady 
gliding movement of the camera, the splendor and the peacefulness of these shots, as well as the 
sound of the blowing wind produce a soothing effect and ensure that the spectator is neither 
disturbed nor haunted by these images and recalls them only at the very end of the journey when 
their meaning is finally revealed. By returning to the starting point, the film signals an end to the 
narration and releases the spectator. Unlike a feel-bad film, however, it captivated rather than 
captured. 
Mamuliia’s film, by contrast, establishes an antagonistic relationship with the spectator. 
The inconvenient angles and dark lighting do not only hamper our vision but constantly implicate 
us in questionable actions. We invade the patients’ privacy as we follow Ali on his visit to the 
hospital and share the camera’s indifferent gaze when confronted with the naked bodies at the 
brothel and the corpses at the hospital morgue. The use of the hand-held camera produces a 
claustrophobic effect—it aligns the spectator’s perspective with that of the protagonist and leaves 
her no room for escape. Numerous narrative ellipses, subdued acting styles, and the brevity of 
dialogues leave us with questions that the film refuses to answer. If Kott goes out of his way to 
make up for the lack of words, Mamuliia keeps pulling the rug from under the spectator’s feet. If 
the feel-bad characteristics of “being incoherent, boring, mystifying or otherwise lacking in 
narrative” do not fit The Test at all, all of them can be used to describe Mamuliia’s film with at 
least a certain degree of accuracy. 
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Another Sky poses at times as a road movie but insists on subverting every convention of 
the genre that it invokes. In their introduction to The Road Movie Book, Steven Cohan and Ina Rae 
Hark list, via Timothy Corrigan, the four defining features of a road movie. First, a road movie 
responds to the breakdown of a family unit. Second, the characters of a road narrative are acted 
upon by the world around them that often proves to be menacing. Third, the protagonist is 
associated with the mechanical means of transportation that he uses to cover distance. And fourth, 
the road movie “promotes a male escapist fantasy linking masculinity to technology and defining 
the road as a space that is at once resistant to while ultimately contained by the responsibilities of 
domesticity: home life, marriage, employment” (2-3). 
The protagonist of Another Sky is always in motion; we see Ali driving a truck and a car, 
taking the train and the bus, walking. While the motion is motivated by the breakdown of a family 
unit (as in a classical road movie narrative), its ultimate goal is its reconstitution. Mamuliia teases 
the spectator with the promise that Ali will achieve his goal only to question the goal itself at the 
very end. Ali does find what he is looking for—his wife, but loses another family member along 
the way—his son. The journey continues. Where it is that Ali and his wife are headed is not clear. 
The world around Ali is indeed menacing but Mamuliia carefully balances between Ali as 
the subject and the object of the on-screen world. Ali constantly switches between different modes 
of transportation oscillating between the roles of the driver and the passenger. Notably, in all of 
the driving sequences of the Moscow segment of the film, Ali drives someone else’s vehicle. If in 
a classical road movie narrative the identity of the protagonist is displaced onto the mechanized 
vehicle (Corrigan 145) and the vehicle serves as “the only promise of self in a culture of 
mechanical reproduction” (146), then in Mamuliia’s narrative the rapidly changing modes of 
transportation testify to the protagonist’s displacement but do not capture or lay claim to his 
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identity suggesting rather that it is in flux. If in road movies the camera assumes the perspective 
of the vehicle itself (that in its turn merges with the protagonist), in Mamuliia’s film the camera 
watches Ali from a distance insisting on its inability to align itself with his perspective. Finally, if 
the road movie posits the road and the journey as a temporary authorized escape from domesticity, 
Mamuliia uses these familiar tropes to challenge the meaning of domesticity in a globalized world 
characterized by displacement. Another Sky, often criticized for its undisguised festival ambitions, 
is indeed an art house film at its core but its flirtation with the conventions of the road movie place 
it alongside feel-bad films that offer generic subversions and thus position themselves between the 
art film and mainstream cinema (Lübecker 3). 
The defining characteristic of the feel-bad experience, however, is that it “produces a 
spectatorial desire, but then blocks its satisfaction; it creates, and then deadlocks, our desire for 
catharsis” (Lübecker 2; emphasis in original). Another Sky does precisely that. Even though Ali 
finds his wife, the film refuses to provide a cathartic ending. The death of a child is too expensive 
a price to pay for Ali’s reunion with his wife and leaves a lasting bitter aftertaste. The wordlessness 
of the encounter between Ali and his wife exacerbates the spectator’s frustration even further as it 
teases her with the promise of closure but refuses to provide her with it. The question is what is it 
exactly that Mamuliia is trying to achieve by vexing the spectator? And what are the ethical 
implications of Kott’s refusal to do the same in his wordless drama? 
For Lübecker, the provocation of feel-bad films can be of value.48 “[T]he destabilization 
of the spectatorial contract,” he writes, “is precisely the point, for this is how the films raise 
political and ethical questions” (Lübecker 3). The sparing use of dialogue and the general distrust 
 
48 Lübecker adds, however, that some feel-bad films go too far in their assaults on the spectator. Among the films that 
he considers excessively manipulative are Lucile Hadžihalilović’s Innocence (2005), Brian de Palma’s Redacted 
(2007), and Harmony Korine’s Trash Humpers (2009). 
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of language including the language of cinema itself in Mamuliia’s Another Sky appear to be part 
of a larger strategy that is best described in Bakhtinian terms: Mamuliia challenges his own and 
the spectator’s desire to finalize the Other. The finalization of the Other is predicated on what 
Bakhtin terms ‘transgredience,’ the author’s ability to “collect the hero and his life and to complete 
him to the point where he forms a whole by supplying all those moments which are inaccessible 
to the hero himself from within himself” (“Author and Hero” 14). By refusing to tighten the 
episodes into a coherent narrative with a clear resolution (a form of finalization in and of itself) 
and by challenging the camera’s omniscience, Mamuliia draws attention to the act of “authoring,” 
to its finalizing ambition, and ultimately implicates the spectator in this attempt at finalization, an 
essentially violent and destructive act. 
Kott’s film that offers a very different viewing experience from the feel-bad mode of 
Mamuliia’s drama may at first glance appear to be even more explicitly political than Another 
Sky—that is, if we interpret the film’s wordlessness, via Stishova, as a metaphor for the 
informational vacuum imposed on the Semipalatinsk residents by the Soviet empire. But is the 
“silence” indeed meant as a metaphor? Stishova, notably, is wary to commit to this interpretation, 
suggesting that it might be reading “too much” into it [“perebor”] (72). Kott’s passion for silent, 
or more accurately, wordless cinema justifies the critic’s caution. Nancy Condee writes: “Since 
his first arrival in the mid-1990s at VGIK, [...] Kott had been interested in wordless cinema. […] 
[H]is wordless script […] Zav'ialov and Iula (2012) was awarded a prize at the 2012 Tekstura 
Festival […]. Kott has described the genre of wordless cinema as ‘my format […] where I scramble 
at the first opportunity; my parallel world’” (“History”).49 The majority of Kott’s short films have 
 
49 Kott has discussed his lifelong fascination with silent, or rather wordless cinema, in numerous interviews. See, for 
example, his interviews with Mariia Tokmasheva and Dariko Tsulaia. 
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been wordless: The Photographer (Fotograf, 1998), a black-and-white ode to silent cinema and 
the camera’s capacity to play with time; The Scarecrow [(Pugalo, 2000), a black-and-white short 
about a boy’s unlikely attachment to a scarecrow; The Giant (Velikan, 2003), the story of an 
equally unlikely friendship between a girl and a giant mime; The Fish (Ryba, 2008), a stepping-
stone to The Test that tells the story of a boy and his sick mother. What these shorts have in 
common (besides the characters’ silence) is a fascination with the aesthetic of silent cinema. The 
silence of Kott’s characters, in other words, appears to be an homage to the early days of cinema 
rather than a decision dictated by the content of the films. About a third of the way through The 
Test, Maksim projects the photo he took of Dina earlier as a film strip onto a house wall. The next 
morning Dina is daydreaming, a faint smile on her lips hinting that the interplay of light and 
shadow has worked its magic. 
Even though Kott’s script Zav'ialov and Iula has never been made into a film, the director’s 
remarks about it are telling: “Это история вне времени и вне пространства, она могла 
произойти сейчас, могла произойти сегодня, может произойти завтра. И неважно где. 
Как это ни банально, она о вечных ценностях, о первых чувствах” [“It is a story outside of 
time and space; it could happen now, it could happen today, it could happen tomorrow. And it does 
not matter where. However banal it may be, it is a story about eternal values, about first feelings”] 
(Tsulaia). This sense of timelessness is characteristic of Kott’s shorts but is tangible in The Test as 
well. What can be more universal than a coming-of-age love story? It eliminates, at least in Kott’s 
telling of it, the need for names, words, or any other specifics. For Agamben, notably, the human 
becomes a historical being when he leaves behind the wordless experience of infancy. Unlike 
animals, human beings do not enter language immediately upon birth but need to learn it first. 
Agamben writes: “Only because of this is there history, only because of this is man as a historical 
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being—only because there is a human infancy, only because language is not the same as the 
human” (Infancy and History 52). The silence of Kott’s characters is instrumental in obfuscating 
the historical details. That the characters are near Semipalatinsk and the year is 1949 is an educated 
guess but nonetheless a guess. The nuclear explosion is relegated here almost to an afterthought. 
The sublime images of the mushroom cloud in the closing sequences bring to mind an earlier 
scene, in which the lighting strikes and burns down a lonely tree in the steppe. The scene 
foreshadows the explosion but simultaneously dissociates it from its immediate historical context 
by positing destruction as natural. The choice of Semipalatinsk as the Soviet nuclear testing site 
was a political decision that had to do with race, geography, and colonial power.50 The film, 
however, chooses to subsume imperial thanatopolitics under the tired message about the transience 
and beauty of life and love and thus replicates the imperial logic by enacting a double erasure of 
more than a million Semipalatinsk nuclear victims. 
Mamuliia, who on one hand refuses to “speak” for the Other and challenges cinema’s 
capacity to “finalize,” in the ultimate analysis pursues a project similar to Kott’s—a metaphysical 
rather than a political one. We do not know where exactly Ali comes from and can only guess that 
he relocates to Moscow. We do not know the names of his son and wife. And while the sudden 
death of Ali’s son comes as a result of his unlawful employment as an immigrant child laborer, the 
pervasiveness of death in the film makes us wonder whether the sawmill foreman is right and 
indeed “[n]o one is to blame.” Sheep, dogs, people die (today as likely from unnatural as natural 
causes), and even an all-inclusive law would not be able to change that. Is Agamben right to 
 
50 As Gabrielle Hecht argues in her volume Being Nuclear, despite the widespread view that “splitting the atom 
promulgated a new world order that replaced imperialism with ‘the bomb,’ [i]t was clear that colonialism remained 
central to the nuclear order’s technological and geopolitical success. Even a short list of atomic test sites makes the 
point: Bikini Atoll, Semipalatinsk, Australian Aboriginal lands, the Sahara, French Polynesia” (ix). 
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suggest that “[w]hat confronts us today is a life that as such is exposed to a violence without 
precedent precisely in the most profane and banal ways” (Homo Sacer 114)? Are we “all virtually 
homines sacri” (115)? 
Both Kott and Mamuliia—despite the striking differences in their approaches—ultimately 
fall into the same trap as Agamben himself, who, despite being perfectly aware of Said’s argument, 
participates in the discourse of Orientalism, as Malini Johar Schueller suggests, by refusing to 
address the “otherness” of bare life: “We might all be ‘virtually’ homines sacri, but only some of 
us are marked to be in the permanent state of exception” (243). 
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3.0 (De-)Framing the Other: Vulnerable and Resilient Bodies in the Cinema of Ivan 
Tverdovskii and Aleksei Fedorchenko 
In this chapter, I analyze the work of Ivan Tverdosvksii and Aleksei Fedorchenko, who, in 
their engagement with biopolitical issues, foreground the role of the cinematic medium and visual 
culture, more broadly, in decisions on political exclusion. Tverdovskii and Fedorchenko may, 
admittedly, strike one as unlikely companions. While the former focuses in his cinematic worlds 
on those who are marginalized in the contemporary moment, the latter comments on the present 
by revisiting the past. If Fedorchenko perceives “both himself and the viewer as homo ludens” 
(Prokhorov, “Aleksei Fedorchenko”) and gives the audience an opportunity to figure out the rules 
of the game and decide whether they want to play it, Tverdovskii, a self-proclaimed Lars von Trier 
aficionado, is frequently antagonistic towards the spectator and exploitative in his choice of subject 
matter. Despite the stark differences in their directorial choices, however, Fedorchenko and 
Tverdovskii have more in common than it may seem. Both began their careers by experimenting 
with the documentary form and directed pseudo- and mockumentaries before crossing over into 
fiction film. Both continued their explorations of the cinematic medium and its relation to mimesis 
and representation in their (now formally) fictional films. Thematically, both Tverdovskii and 
Fedorchenko have repeatedly engaged in their work with the relationship between human life and 
political power, focusing, in particular, on the workings of discursive and institutional strategies 
of othering and probing in the process the role of visual culture (including their own cinematic 
efforts) in both shaping/perpetuating as well as challenging/destabilizing narratives and practices 
of what Agamben terms “inclusive exclusion.” 
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While in the two previous chapters I zeroed in on two specific films most relevant for the 
given case study, in this chapter I take a slightly different approach and explore a larger body of 
work by each of the two filmmakers in an attempt to bring into relief the political implications of 
both thematic and stylistic shifts in Tverdovskii’s and Fedorchenko’s respective oeuvres. This 
approach illuminates, among other things, a gradual departure in the work of both filmmakers from 
epistemological uncertainty created by a muddling of the distinction between reality and fiction; 
movement towards and away from abstracted categories of otherness; and an increased interest in 
renegotiating the caesura between humanity and animality, i.e. what Agamben refers to as bíos 
and zoē. 
I will begin the first part of this chapter with a brief discussion of Tverdovskii’s 2007 
documentary short The Holy Groove. I then proceed to analyze the internal conflict between 
humanist and anti-humanist impulses in his first feature film Corrections Class (2014). I conclude 
my investigation of Tverdovskii’s work by looking at his 2016 surreal drama Zoology that exposes 
the workings of what Agamben calls the “anthropological machine” and challenges the spectator 
to rethink our relationship to animality. I will argue, among other things, that Tverdovskii, 
seemingly unflinching in his attempt to “deframe” visual culture and challenge preconceptions 
about normativity, eventually “flinches” and lets the spectator off the hook at the end of both 
Corrections Class and Zoology, which end in gestures reminiscent of the one that Tverdoskii set 
out to criticize—the banishment of what is presumed to be non-normative. 
In the second part of this chapter I provide an overview of Fedorchenko’s earlier work, 
focusing, in particular, on his 2002 documentary short David and 2005 mockumentary First on the 
Moon. I discuss how Fedorchenko’s postmodernist authorial stance mirrors his predilection for 
narratives in which, despite power’s attempts to establish total control, “bare life” finds a way to 
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escape it. I contend that, unlike in Tverdovskii’s cinematic worlds, in which power is dispersed 
across a multiplicity of networks (which form in his pessimistic and somewhat anti-Foucauldian 
view an inescapable web), Fedorchenko’s films renegotiate or rather deconstruct the caesura 
(hyperbolized in Agamben’s theoretical universe) “between meaningful life and mere animality, 
between power and the absolute powerlessness of ‘bare life’” (Elmer 30). In the concluding section 
of the chapter I analyze Fedorchenko’s 2018 war film Anna’s War, in which the filmmaker departs 
from his playful deployment of the cinematic medium. 
I analyze Fedorchenko’s oeuvre through the prism of what Marcia Landy terms “counter-
history” and defines as “an escape from formal history to a world of affect, invention, memory, 
art, reflection, and action” (xi). I argue that Fedorchenko’s work has been consistently counter-
historical. My contention, however, is that the specific choice of his directorial strategies depends 
on what specifically his counter-cinema has been “counter” to—hence the dramatic departure in 
Anna’s War from his signature postmodernist playfulness, produced at a time when the state’s 
discursive attempts to introduce new chimerical ideological content into Russian politics have been 
widely and mistakenly (as Mark Lipovetsky shows)51 understood as postmodernist. 
3.1 Tverdovskii’s De-Othering Cinema 
Ivan I. Tverdovskii, son and namesake of documentary filmmaker Ivan Tverdovskii and a 
graduate of the Russian Institute of Cinematography, began his directorial career by making a 
 
51 See Mark Lipovetsky’s essay “Psevdomorfoza: Reaktsionnyi postmodernizm kak problema” (“Pseudomorphosis: 
Reactionary Postmodernism as a Problem”) in Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie. Lipovetsky contends that the discursive 
practices of the Putin administration are cynical (in Peter Sloterdijk’s definition of the word) rather than postmodernist. 
I will discuss Lipovetsky’s argument in more detail in the concluding chapter. 
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series of documentary shorts, several of which garnered international awards. The first of these 
shorts, his student film Holy Groove, offers a distilled version of Tverdovskii’s principles and 
preoccupations as a filmmaker. The short features a six-minute long sequence of a girl and a 
middle-aged man talking while strolling down a paved path. The handheld camera moves along 
with the two but focuses almost entirely on the girl. The camera briefly moves up only once, about 
halfway through the short, to capture the man’s face (which otherwise remains outside the frame). 
The seven-year old Kristina enthusiastically tells her companion about a cat she saw in the 
bathroom earlier that day and a performance that she recently attended, which featured Baba Yaga 
and a handful of other fairy tale characters. As good a storyteller as most children her age, the girl 
is charming but ordinary. The equally unremarkable landscape, the other people walking down the 
path, as well as the cinematic language make the spectator wonder why exactly we are watching 
this most quotidian of scenes. 
A judgmental (and slightly bored) viewer watching the film might be inclined to reproach 
Tverdovskii for his all-too-obvious (and hence amateurish) attempt to challenge the very idea of 
documentary by pushing the observational mode of documentary filmmaking to the point where it 
cracks at the seams and mutates into the reflexive mode.52 This judgmental spectator knows all too 
well what Tverdovskii is up to: the fact that nothing is happening is supposed to make us aware of 
our narrative desire; the lack of a voice-over and other formal directorial guidance is intended to 
encourage us to discern some cinematic truth from the images; the fact that there is nothing of 
 
52 I am referring here to Bill Nichols’s classification of documentary modes delineated in his 2001 volume Introduction 
to Documentary. Nichols differentiates between six different modes that “function something like sub-genres of the 
documentary film genre itself: poetic, expository, participatory, observational, reflexive, performative” (99). For a 
critique of Nichols’ schema, see Carl Plantinga’s piece “Blurry Boundaries, Troubling Typologies, and the Unruly 
Fiction Film” and Stella Bruzzi’s book New Documentary: A Critical Introduction. 
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particular interest to discern from the images, however, is designed to make us question the 
documentary mode of filmmaking and its ability to capture “truth.” 
Our judgmental viewer, however, would have to reconsider these easy conclusions at the 
end of the film when Tverdovskii, with the help of two text cards, reveals crucial information that 
he has strategically withheld up to this point. The first card informs us that the film title refers to 
the holy path on the territory of the Holy Trinity Seraphim-Diveevo Monastery; the second—that 
Kristina was born blind and is a resident of the boarding school for the blind and deaf in Sergiev 
Posad. The revelations at the end of the film do not change the fact that Holy Groove is an example 
of a reflexive documentary, but they do substantively alter the relationship between the film and 
the viewer and articulate a set of additional questions about cinematic representation. 
Tverdovskii’s maneuvers are explicitly manipulative: by “hiding” the fact that Kristina is visually 
impaired, Tverdovskii sets us up to feel duped so that we ask ourselves why it is that we feel duped 
and what preconceptions lie behind our perception of Tverdovskii’s refusal to foreground the girl’s 
disability as if it were the director’s act of concealment. Our judgmental spectator would be 
misguided to accuse Tverdovskii of exploitativeness—at this point it is not Kristina, but the 
spectator who is the object of the director’s “gaze.” 
The revelation about the holy nature of the path walked by Kristina and her companion 
comes as less of a surprise: the brief opening sequence features the Russian Orthodox ritual of 
thrice-repeated dipping into icy water to celebrate epiphany; in the film’s equally succinct closing 
sequence Kristina says a prayer before going to bed. Both sequences have an element of coercion 
to them: both feature children whose behavior is directed by women who instruct them to perform 
religious rituals, the meaning of which is arguably not clear to the children. The path itself—
straight and contained on each side by a short metal fence—could be viewed as a spatial apparatus, 
 109 
controlling the movement of the human body. The revelation that the strollers are walking down a 
holy path encourages a problematic metaphorical reading of the film—is Tverdovskii “playfully” 
conflating here the literal and the figurative meanings of the word “blind” by invoking, however 
subtly, the expression “слепая вера” (“blind faith”)? The filmmaker’s later work and his remarks 
in interviews suggest that Tverdovskii might be a religious man himself and is, akin to 
Serebrennikov and Zviagintsev, making an anti-clericalist rather than an anti-Christian argument. 
Yet the sincerity of his own religious views are not a guarantee that Tverdovskii, a “baby von 
Trier” (“крошка-Триер”) as Olga Kas'ianova has dubbed him, is not playing enfant terrible and 
provoking the spectator to “read” the film as a metaphor for religious “blind faith” and make her 
terrified of her own interpretation? The film’s self-reflexive mode prompts an equally problematic 
and equally plausible reading of the film as a challenge to the spectator’s “blind faith” in the 
mimetic potential of cinematic images. Yet, paradoxical as it may seem, the only certain 
conclusion we can draw is that the images did not in fact “dupe” us—the images showed nothing 
but the truth; it just was not what we expected the “truth” to look like. 
The imagery, directorial strategies, and thematic concerns of Tverdovskii’s first short are 
easily discernible in his later work. Tverdovskii returns time again to discursive and institutional 
“normalizing” practices, turning his attention to different categories of those who are 
disenfranchised through exclusionary processes of “othering” (teenage prostitutes, people 
suffering from substance abuse disorders, persons with disabilities, etc.). Tverdovskii consistently 
employs religious imagery and narratives in his work, simultaneously encouraging religious 
readings of his films and inviting the spectator to ponder the role of institutionalized religion in 
producing “normative” docile bodies. Both his short (pseudo-) documentaries and his feature films 
persistently attempt to “de-frame” visual culture and its representations of “otherness” and 
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challenge preconceptions about (in)authenticity of cinematic images. While the intensity of his 
“assaultive” mode of spectatorial address varies from film to film, Tverdovskii is relentless in his 
efforts to provoke the spectator. His first feature film, a coming-of-age drama Corrections Class, 
is his most emotionally manipulative and challenging film to date. 
Tverdovskii’s debut feature Corrections Class won the best debut prize at the Kinotavr 
Film Festival and received the East of the West Award at the Karlovy Vary International Film 
Festival. The film tells the story of a teenage girl Lena Chekhova (Mariia Poezzhaeva), who, after 
years of being home-schooled, is admitted to high school. Lena, who suffers from myopathy and 
is bound to a wheelchair, is assigned to a special “corrections class” for students with a range of 
physical and cognitive disabilities. The class students will be assessed at the end of the school year 
by a special commission, and Lena hopes that she will be allowed to join a regular class and thus 
get access to better job opportunities in the future. Lena shows a strong academic performance and 
seems to be getting along with her new classmates. Yet things go awry when she starts a romance 
with one of her peers, Anton (Filipp Avdeev).53 The couple’s tender relationship upsets some of 
their classmates (in particular, Misha and Vit'ka who nurture crushes on Lena and Anton, 
respectively), Anton’s mother, as well as the school staff (most appallingly, the janitor who claims 
that the two are perverse and should not be allowed to procreate because their disabilities are 
contagious and will harm the national gene pool). While Anton manages to escape the wrath of his 
classmates, the newcomer Lena quickly becomes persona non grata. At this point, the film takes 
a brutal turn. Misha vandalizes Lena’s wheelchair; Lena is gang-raped by her classmates; the 
much-anticipated commission rules that Lena does not belong in a “normal” classroom; Anton, 
 
53 Both Poezzhaeva and Avdeev (as well as Nikita Kukushkin who, in Corrections Class, plays the antagonist Misha) 
trained at Kirill Serebrennikov’s Gogol Center. 
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however, makes the cut and, without any explanation, stops talking to Lena. Heartbroken but not 
defeated, Lena—in the film’s “magical-realist ending” (Alaniz)—miraculously gets up and walks 
towards the school exit. 
Nominally a feature film, Corrections Class, like many of Tverdovskii’s earlier shorts, 
masquerades at times as a documentary. Director of photography Fedor Struchev shot most of the 
film’s footage on a handheld camera to imitate the aesthetics of a documentary film. Moreover, 
some of the young actors cast in the film are non-professionals with real disabilities. In their 
discussion of what they term “cultural locations of disability,”54 Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell 
include documentary film representations of disability among those sites that are created 
exclusively on behalf of people with disabilities and “in which disabled people find themselves 
deposited, often against their will” (3). These locales, which also include nineteenth-century 
charity networks, institutions for the feeble-minded during the eugenics period, workshops for the 
“multi-handicapped,” and academic research on disability, represent, according to Snyder and 
Mitchell, “saturation point[s] of content about disability,” which, even in their most benign 
manifestations, have resulted in treatment, both in the medical and cultural senses, that proved 
detrimental for the disabled (3). Snyder and Mitchell differentiate these cultural locations of 
disability from more acceptable, experiential forms of comprehending disabled bodies, which 
include personal narratives, performance art, as well as narrative film (4). 
Tverdovskii, who made a few documentary shorts at the beginning of his career, seems to 
have developed an awareness of the objectifying potential of the documentary form and began 
experimenting with hybrid forms that imitated the documentary genre in content and style, but 
 
54 The term alludes to Homi Bhabha’s collection of essays The Location of Culture, in which Bhabha posits as such 
locations of culture spaces and narratives of resistance of the colonized peoples. 
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were not, by any definition, documentaries. Moreover, most of the shorts explicitly signaled their 
non-documentary status to the spectator, for example, by featuring a moderately well-known actor 
in one of the roles. In his 2011 short Snow (Sneg), for example, Tverdovskii cast Natal'ia 
Pavlenkova55 in the lead role of a schoolteacher who buys cocaine for her daughter suffering from 
a substance use disorder. 
That Tverdovskii did not fully abandon experimentation with the documentary format is 
notable for our discussion here. Tverdovskii’s hybrids (fiction films with elements of the 
documentary form) have a twofold agenda. On one hand, Tverdovskii’s explicitly fictionalized 
worlds allows the filmmaker to dissociate his work from the kind of documentary cinema that 
claims to produce “objective” discourse about a particular category of people and thus participates 
in their othering. On the other hand, Tverdovskii’s use of documentary strategies minimizes the 
gap between the fictionalized and the real worlds, which disallows the spectator to distance herself 
from the social commentary attempted by the film. To put it bluntly, Tverdovskii’s hybrid cinema 
does lay a claim to “truth” and takes it upon itself to inform the spectator but the “knowledge” it 
seeks to communicate is not “knowledge” about a certain category of people traditionally 
“othered” by a society but about the institutional and discursive practices of “othering.” 
The infusion of documentary elements into the fictional universe of Corrections Class is 
motivated precisely by this twofold agenda. The film relinquishes any claims to truth about a 
particular set of disabled bodies early in the film when he introduces us to the students from the 
“corrections class.” We meet Lena first and follow her and her mother as they find their way, for 
the first time, to the “corrections class.” We are encouraged to share Lena’s perspective—the one 
 
55 Pavlenkova will become a regular in Tverdovskii’s films. In Corrections Class, she plays the mother of the 
protagonist Lena. In Zoology, she is cast in the leading role. 
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of a newcomer, stranger—and “meet” her classmates as if we, too, have been accepted into the 
“corrections class.” This is, of course, a set up: we are encouraged to look for “otherness” so that 
we become aware of the inadequacy of the criteria we use in this operation. We will find out at 
various points later in the film why some of the students found themselves in this “corrections 
class”: Anton suffers from epilepsy, Mitia has a stutter, Masha has dwarfism, Vitia in turn suffers 
from “extreme fatiguability.” It will remain unclear on what basis the other students were assigned 
to this class. Tverdovskii uses dramatic license granted to him by the narrative form to put together 
a “corrections class” with a seemingly implausible range of cognitive and physical [dis]abilities. 
The factual distortion both serves as a disclaimer, a reminder that this is a work of fiction, and 
simultaneously allows Tverdovskii to articulate the question that is at the very heart of his social 
critique: who and on what (arbitrary) grounds decides what needs to be “corrected”? 
While there is a certain degree of universality to Tverdovskii’s inquiry, Corrections Class 
makes it clear from the very beginning that its social commentary pertains, first and foremost, to 
contemporary Russia. When Lena and her mother report to school on September 1 (the official 
start of the academic year in Russia, also known as “The Day of Knowledge”), we witness a brief 
episode of the festivities dedicated to the beginning of the new school year—the raising of the 
Russian flag to the sounds of the national anthem. Lena and her mother, however, are not welcome 
at this celebration of knowledge—they are promptly rushed into the school by a member of the 
teaching staff. Unlike the “normal” students, the students of the “corrections class” are scheduled 
to be in class during the festivities. The symbolism of the gesture is all too legible: people with 
disabilities in contemporary Russia are not only refused equal access to education but are included 
in the imagined political community only by virtue of being excluded. 
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Tverdovskii’s critique of the ways in which state institutions treat people with disabilities 
reiterates the deep entanglement of disciplinary power and biopower. The teacher, who rushes 
Lena and her mother into the school, harangues them about the importance of complying with the 
rules of the special education system designed specifically to help and take care of people like 
Lena. Lena in the meantime is trying to keep up with the teacher who is walking too fast in an 
attempt to get the new student and her mother as quickly as possible away from the “normal” part 
of the school and into the special corner on the second floor where the “corrections class” is 
located. There is no elevator or wheelchair ramp so Lena has to pull herself up the stairs by holding 
onto the railing, all while listening to the “caring” teacher impatiently nudge her to hurry up. The 
special education system designed “to help people like Lena” does not only refuse to help Lena 
get to the classroom; it turns out that it is not really designed to educate either. The teachers do not 
have the training (nor do they really care enough) to provide the special education that they claim 
the students in the “corrections class” require. Special education instead becomes a synonym to 
low-level education as the students are constantly asked to do assignments that are too easy for the 
ability levels of the students in the class. 
In Tverdovskii’s view, the special education system serves a different purpose altogether: 
it is designed not to educate but to police the public space. It partakes in a sort of “positive 
eugenics” project where “disability is supplanted from public visibility” (Snyder and Mitchell 30). 
Tverdovskii puts a lot of emphasis on the extreme lengths taken by the school to keep the students 
of the “corrections class” away from the “normal” part of the school. They are not welcome at the 
public celebrations of the “Day of Knowledge”; the other students do not seem to know that there 
is a special “corrections class” in their school; they are taught in their own corner that is separated 
from the rest of the school by a metal gate, which establishes a visual connection between the 
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“corrections class” and a carceral institution. As Foucault makes it clear in his discussion of 
biopower, the identification of subjects to be cared for entails the identification of those who are 
to be excluded from care, and it is disciplinary power that ensures the exclusion and stigmatization 
of those who “threaten” the ones deemed worthy of protection. The special education class, in 
short, emerges in Tverdovskii’s argument as part of Foucault’s “carceral continuum that covers 
the whole social body, linked by the pervasive concern to identify deviance, anomalies, and 
departures from the relevant norm” and as an element of the “framework of surveillance and 
correction [that] stretches from the least irregularity to the greatest crime and brings the same 
principles to bear on each” (Garland 864). 
In Corrections Class, visual culture itself is implicitly posited as an element of this 
“carceral continuum,” as complicit in the identification of “normal” and “abnormal” components 
of populations.56 In her discussion of the politics of visual representation, Butler distinguishes 
between social norms and what she calls “frames”; the latter are part of the so-called “staging 
apparatus” and determine what can be shown and how. Lübecker summarizes Butler’s position: 
“We can say that the norms determine the frames, but we must straight away add that the repetition 
of particular forms of framing helps to consolidate and/or produce the norms that govern the 
criteria that determine which lives are deemed worthy of recognition” (81). As Butler suggests, a 
critical task facing visual culture today is “to learn to see the frame that blinds us, [...] to thematise 
the forcible frame, the one that conducts the dehumanizing norm, that restricts what is perceivable 
and, indeed, what can be” (Butler 100). In Corrections Class, Tverdovskii stages precisely such a 
“meta-framing,” an attempt to “frame the frame” (Butler 8). 
 
56 On the use of visual media as a method of political governance, see Allen Meek’s Biopolitical Media: Catastrophe, 
Immunity and Bare Life. 
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Tverdovskii alerts the spectator to his preoccupation with the ethical and cultural 
dimensions of vision already in the film’s opening sequence. On their way to school, Lena and her 
mother are held up at the railway tracks because a teenage boy has been hit by a train. Lena’s 
mother tells her daughter not to look but Lena does, as we will find out later, when she will describe 
in gruesome detail what she saw to Anton. José Alaniz interprets the scene at the railway tracks as 
Tverdovskii’s challenge to the spectator: “I will show you things you will not want to see.” While 
Tverdovskii indeed establishes a confrontational relationship with the spectator (which I will 
discuss further in the chapter), he does not really show us what we supposedly (do not) want to see 
in this episode. I would argue that Tverdovskii has a somewhat different agenda here: to draw the 
spectator’s attention to the ways in which culture mediates our vision. In his seminal essay “Death 
in Cinema,” Mikhail Yampolsky writes: “On the one hand, contemporary man attempts to banish 
death from his consciousness; the entire evolution of contemporary ritualization of dying and 
burial is connected to this. [...] On the other hand, the tendency to exhibit death as a necessary 
feature of contemporary spectacle is also very strong” (272). While these two tendencies—to  
conceal and to exhibit—may seem contradictory, the latter, in fact, serves the same purpose as the 
former: the spectacularization of death turns it into a fiction (272). 
The meta-framing attempted by Tverdovskii in Corrections Class consists in subverting 
the ways in which disability—on one hand, concealed by the “carceral continuum”—has been 
fictionalized in visual culture. The film tackles, in particular, the stereotypical portrayal of people 
with disabilities as “pitiable and pathetic victims” or “evil monsters.”57 The key mechanism of 
meta-framing employed by Tverdovskii is the use of genre conventions—this is, first and foremost, 
 
57 See Jack Nelson’s The Disabled, the Media, and the Information Age for a discussion of common stereotypes about 
disability shaped/perpetuated by visual culture. 
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a school film58 and it prioritizes the common topics of the school film: first love, friendship, sex, 
bullying, difficulty fitting in and finding connection. There are certainly “victims” and “monsters” 
here but not victims of disability or people considered “monsters” because of their disability. Lena, 
a victim of betrayal, bullying, and rape, joins the long list of teenagers bullied and violated in 
Russo-Soviet school films, from Rolan Bykov’s Scarecrow (Chuchelo, 1984), the classic 
Stagnation-era school film, to Valeriia Gai Germanika’s 2008 drama Everybody Dies but Me (Vse 
umrut, a ia ostanus'). The perpetrators59 similarly find numerous “like-minded” teenagers in the 
school film tradition. The school in Corrections Class in turn serves as a microcosm for society at 
large, and Tverdovskii diagnoses it with the same condition as Zviagintsev in his 2017 feature 
film—the condition of “lovelessness.” For Tverdovskii, Corrections Class is, to a lesser degree, a 
film about how we as a society treat people with disabilities, but rather a film about how we all as 
human beings treat one another. 
Tverdovskii’s humanist agenda, however, appears to be in conflict with the antagonistic 
relationship he establishes with the spectator. Among the films discussed in this project, 
Corrections Class is the best and easiest fit for Lübecker’s category of the feel-bad film. 
Tverdovskii, who has frequently cited Lars von Trier’s cinema as an influence on his work, spares 
no efforts to antagonize the spectator. The rapid and often chaotic movement of the handheld 
camera, emotionally manipulative narrative developments, moments of “acrid, cringing comedy” 
(Alaniz) immediately following the most uncomfortable of sequences make Corrections Class a 
 
58 For a discussion of Soviet school films of the Stagnation period, see Olga Klimova’s Soviet Youth Films under 
Brezhnev: Watching between the Lines. 
59 As far as the “monster” stereotype is concerned, Tverdovskii treads with extra caution so as not to perpetuate it: 
Misha and Vitia, the two main instigators of the gang rape, are not “marked” by any specific disability. Early in the 
film Vitia says she is not sick at all and cites “extreme fatiguability” as the reason why she was assigned to the 
“corrections class.” It is not revealed how Misha ended up in the class. 
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very difficult film to watch, and it becomes increasingly more so as the film progresses.60 The 
form here is in alignment with the content. The film’s tonal shifts are a match for the emotional 
turbulence of adolescence; the film’s formal choices predictably become particularly challenging 
during the film’s most uncomfortable sequences—as, for example, is the case with the gang rape 
sequence in which Lena’s agony is communicated through an exhausting combination of swift 
jerky camera motions (as if the camera, too, is in pain), disturbing close-ups of Lena’s bleeding 
gagged face, and a cacophony of Lena’s muffled screams and her classmates’ callous remarks 
about who is going to go next. The camera’s incessant shifting of perspective forces us to assume, 
alternately, the position of the victim and that of the perpetrator, a classmate waiting for their turn. 
In his analysis of von Trier’s 2003 drama Dogville, Lübecker redeems the filmmaker’s 
“assault” on the spectator by insisting on the importance of distinguishing between ethics inside 
and outside the movie theater. Drawing on the work of Claire Bishop, Lübecker suggests that we 
consider art “an experimental activity” that has different ethical norms than the ones we expect to 
see outside the experiential venue that is the movie theatre. Thus, even though Dogville puts the 
spectator through an experience that would be considered unethical outside the movie theatre, it is 
not anti-humanistic but rather an example of “feel-bad humanism”—the film reveals our “inner 
 
60 Olga Kas'ianova captures her experience of watching Tverdovskii’s drama in her review of the film for Seans: 
 
Как и подавляющее большинство зрителей, по ходу истории о детях из «нестандартного» 
класса, я послушно совершала запланированные эмоциональные скачки. Меня кидало из 
крайности в крайность: от сладкого физиологического ужаса на люмьеровской сцене с 
поездом […] до гомерического смеха на сцене с бананом — она еще хитро оставлена на 
финал, когда смеяться совсем не хочется. Это чистое насилие — твой смех волею 
заэкранного человека выплескивается вопреки твоему собственному настроению. 
 
As I followed the story of the children from the “corrections class,” I obediently, like the vast 
majority of the spectators, performed the built-in emotional leaps. I was catapulted from one extreme 
to the other: from the sweet physiological horror during the Lumière train scene [...] to the Homeric 
laughter during the banana scene, which was treacherously put off until the finale, when you don’t 
feel like laughing at all. It’s pure violence –your laughter pours out of you against your own will by 
the volition of the person behind the screen. 
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bastard” to us in an attempt to initiate a “discussion of what we might call the ethics of a human 
subject who only partly understands herself” (169). 
While I am in agreement with Lübecker’s point about the distinction between the ethical 
standards inside and outside the movie theatre, I contend that in Corrections Class Tverdovskii’s 
efforts to antagonize the spectator ultimately undermine the film’s attempt at a “meta-framing.” 
Most narrative choices of the film in the last thirty minutes of its duration appear to be a dare to 
the spectator: How much more can you take? How much longer are you going to watch Lena’s 
suffering and humiliation? For those who stick around even after the disturbing sequences of 
Misha’s vandalization of Lena’s chair and the vicious gang rape, Tverdovskii has more “surprises” 
up his sleeve. The first comes in the form of Anton’s unmotivated betrayal of Lena.61 Up to this 
point the film has gone to great lengths to convince us of the sincerity of Anton and Lena’s feelings 
for each other, only to have Anton inexplicably turn his back on her—the same Anton who (only 
a few minutes earlier, i.e. a day or two within the diegetic world) got into a fight with Misha when 
the latter insulted Lena. There are, of course, dozens of plausible explanations for Anton’s behavior 
that we as spectators could divine, but it is less the narrative gap itself that is of interest here than 
the fact that, by refusing to explain the inconsistency in Anton’s behavior and asking us to do it 
ourselves, Tverdovskii abruptly changes the terms of the spectatorial contract: “You thought you 
knew the rules of the game but I just changed them!” 
The filmmaker changes the terms of agreement yet again at the very end of the film when 
Lena, whom the special commission has deemed unfit for “normal” classrooms, miraculously finds 
herself able to walk again. The film’s conclusion has been interpreted by critics either as “as a final 
 
61 Leviathan also gets progressively darker as it unfolds, yet the narrative developments in Zviagintsev’s feel-bad film 
do not seem inconsistent. In an interview with Viktor Matizen, Zviagintsev has said that he, too, found Anton’s sudden 
change of disposition at the end of Tverdovskii’s Corrections Class inconsistent with the rest of the film. 
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stab in the eye to the viewer, a Larsian foiling of preconceptions” (Alaniz) or as an “apologetic 
compensation” (Kas'ianova) for the emotional manipulation that the film has asked the spectator 
to endure. I lean towards Kas'ianova’s reading of the conclusion, yet, regardless of whether the 
“miracle” was meant as a quasi-catharsis62 or a real attempt at compensatory catharsis, the common 
denominator in both readings is the correlation of the miracle cure ending to the film’s antagonistic 
relation to its spectator. Whether designed to appease or to anger the viewer even further, the 
miracle ending is problematic because it “participates in an age-old quasi-eugenicist ‘wishing 
away’ of disability” (Alaniz). Beyond offering the pessimistic view that we cannot fight or change 
the disciplinary institutions masquerading as institutions of care, the film’s ending places it on the 
long list of “stories about disability [that] conclude with solutions that result in the erasure of 
impairments either through death or cure” (Mitchell and Snyder 1383). In the case of Corrections 
Class, Aristotle’s dictum that “the end is everything” (qtd. in Lübecker, 2) holds true as the film’s 
settling of scores with the spectator undermines its attempt to de-frame visual culture and 
perpetuates, rather than displaces, what Butler calls “the forcible frame, the one that conducts the 
dehumanizing norm” (100). 
Zoology, Tverdovskii’s second feature film and the recipient of the Kinotavr festival’s 
cinema critics award, is, like the filmmaker’s debut feature, a coming-of-age story—despite the 
age of its protagonist, a middle-aged zoo-worker Natasha (portrayed by Natal'ia Pavlenkova). 
Natasha acts like a teenager, still lives with her mother and hides cigarettes from her and is 
 
62 In his discussion of Dogville, Lübecker suggests that von Trier provides a catharsis but then puts a ‘deadlock’ on it: 
“The manipulative director seems to tease the spectator in accordance with a formula that could be summed up like 
this: ‘So you want catharsis? So you want catharsis? Here you have it! . . .  Was that really what you wanted?’” (27). 
If Alaniz is right and the “magical-realist ending” of Tverdovskii’s film is supposed to serve as “a final stab in the eye 
to the viewer,” then Lübecker’s formula for von Trier’s quasi-catharsis could apply to Corrections Class as well (with 
a slight modification): “You want catharsis? Here you have it! I’ll give you a miracle! Remember those don’t happen 
in real life!” 
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mercilessly bullied by her co-workers. Her life is suddenly transformed, however, when she grows 
a tail—“thick, fleshy, the kind that would make David Cronenberg proud” (Prokhorova). The 
healthcare system at large proves unable and unwilling to help her. Natasha, however, strikes up a 
friendship (which quickly develops into a romantic relationship) with the young X-ray technician 
Petia (Dmitrii Groshev). As Natasha begins to come to terms with her phallic appendage, she gets 
a makeover, starts flaunting short skirts and sequined dresses, and generally becomes more 
confident and assertive. In the meantime, rumors start spreading across town of a devil-possessed 
woman with three tails, an encounter with whom will inevitably give you cancer. Natasha’s own 
mother paints the entire living room with dozens of red crosses in an effort to protect herself and 
her daughter from the caudate monstrosity that threatens their town. [Figures 29-30] Natasha is 
not too bothered at first, but everything changes when her budding romance with Petia comes to 
an abrupt halt. When the two consummate their relationship in a zoo cage, she is disappointed to 
discover that Petia has a particular appreciation for her tail and breaks things off. Natasha hopes 
to find another compassionate human being who would not consider her a “freak,” but people in 
the streets bolt off at the sight of her appendage. In a final blow, Natasha’s mother rejects her own 
daughter as she responds to Natasha’s confession with a cruel “You’re drunk. Go sleep it off.” 









Zoology pursues many of the same issues addressed by Tverdovskii in Corrections Class 
and, arguably, remedies, in its exploration of these issues, some of the shortcomings of the 
filmmaker’s first stab at the subject matter. The stumbling block of Tverdovskii’s 
conceptualization of the relationship between the self and the other in Corrections Class is a 
conflation of two different notions of otherness: singular and collective otherness. In an attempt to 
kill two birds with one stone—to address how we as a society treat people with disabilities and 
how we treat one another as human beings—Tverdovskii mixes politics with ethics in a such way 
that they threaten to cancel each other out. What appears to be the problem is, perhaps, meant as a 
solution: the film’s focus on a universally applicable message (how we treat one another) is 
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supposed to be part of a “meta-framing” project, a deconstruction of the othering practices that 
assign a set of stereotypical features to a particular group of people. The issue with this quest 
toward universality, however, is its implicit disavowal of a condition which the film 
simultaneously attempts to foreground—the condition of precarity, which Butler defines as “the 
politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from failing social and economic 
networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence and death” and which 
should be distinguished from precariousness, a generalized “shared condition of human life,” “a 
condition that links human and non-human animals” (Butler, 25; 13). 
In Zoology, Tverdovskii also employs the notion of the other that could simultaneously be 
read as singular and collective but absolves himself from the responsibility to account for the 
“differential allocation of precarity” (Butler, 3) through the use of Natasha’s tail as an abstracted 
notion of otherness. Perhaps even more importantly, in Zoology, Tverdovskii challenges his 
protagonist and the spectator to encounter the other within the self—our own animality—and thus 
attempts a dismantling of the boundary between the self and other altogether. The figure of the 
animal, after all, as Cary Wolfe points out, “has always been especially, frightfully nearby, always 
lying in wait at the very heart of the constitutive disavowals and self-constructing narratives 
enacted by that fantasy figure called ‘the human’” (6). As long as we think the human not as part 
of us but “as the primitive and pure other that we rush to embrace as a way to cure our own 
existential malaise,” the humanist speciesist discourse “will always be available for use by some 
humans against other humans as well, to countenance violence against the social other of whatever 
species— or gender, or race, or class, or sexual difference” (Wolfe 17; 8; emphasis in original). 
While Tverdovskii’s project does not perhaps match the ambition of Wolfe’s radical post-
humanism, Zoology persistently encourages us to rethink our ideas about (our own) animality. The 
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film’s interest in the workings of what Agamben terms the “anthropological machine”63 manifests 
itself early on when it is revealed that Natasha works at the zoo—the site par excellence of human 
desire to establish a boundary between man and animal. The zoo “position[s] ‘them’ (animals) 
relative to ‘us’ (humans) in a fashion that links a conceptual ‘othering’ (setting them apart from us 
in terms of character traits) to a geographical ‘othering’ (fixing them in worldly places and spaces 
different from those that we humans tend to occupy)” (Philo and Wilbert 10). In a telling moment, 
Tverdovskii satirizes the illusion of man’s radical alterity from animal when he uses a match cut 
to establish a likeness between the chewing animals in the zoo and Natasha’s coworkers enjoying 
lunch. At the press-conference at the Kinotavr film festival, Tverdovskii pointed out that each of 
Natasha’s co-workers was supposed to resemble a particular animal: a toad, a giraffe… (“Press-
konferentsiia”). Compared to their slurping human counterparts, nonhuman animals appear 
significantly more dignified (Zoology is consistently unkind to its numerous middle-aged female 
characters; Natasha seems to be the exception that proves the rule).64 The comparison illuminates 
an important dimension of Tverdovskii’s agenda—while the film points to what we share with 
nonhuman animals, it simultaneously attempts to negotiate an appropriate degree of animality that 
we should embrace. What is in view in the case of Natasha’s co-workers is insufficient humanity; 
the issue with Natasha, at least initially, is repressed animality. 
While several critics have noted that it is not clear when exactly Natasha begins to grow a 
tail, I would argue that this moment coincides with the film’s opening sequence. Beyond the 
 
63 The anthropological machine, according to Agamben is what separates man from his animality. He writes: “In so 
far as the production of man through the opposition man/animal, human/inhuman, is at stake here, the machine 
necessarily functions by means of an exclusion (which is also already a capturing) and an inclusion (which is also 
always already an exclusion)” (The Open 37). 
64 As Natal'ia Sirivlia writes in her review of the film for Iskusstvo kino, most of the residents of Natasha’s town are 
“почему-то раскормленные бабцы неопределенного возраста, прекрасные настолько, что заставляют 
заподозрить режиссера в мизогинии” [“for some reason rotund hags of an uncertain age, who are so ‘fine’ that you 
might suspect the director of misogyny.”] 
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unreliable hypothesis of narrative symmetry—that a film that ends by cutting off the tail could 
begin when the said tail starts to grow—I would cite as evidence the fact that Natasha briefly loses 
consciousness and then vomits at the beginning of the film. The abject expulsion could be read, 
via Kristeva, as a reaction to the breakdown of the distinction between self and other; as a response 
to what threatens the boundaries of identity. As Kristeva writes: “The abject confronts us [...] with 
those fragile states where man strays on the territories of animal. Thus, by way of abjection, 
primitive societies have marked out a precise area of their culture in order to remove it from the 
threatening worlds of animals and animalism, which were imagined as representatives of sex and 
murder” (Powers of Horror 12-13). The abject expulsion, in other words, is a manifestation of and 
response to the return of repressed animality (the appearance of the tail). 
The most significant challenge offered by Tverdovskii’s film to our conceptions about our 
animality comes in the form of the transformation that Natasha undergoes after she sprouts a tail. 
Previously timid and forbearing, Natasha becomes more assertive and playful, speaks up at work 
and starts breaking social norms and expectations (as, for example, in the scene where she and 
Petia get drunk and disrupt a self-help meeting). In his critique of Agamben’s rigid distinction 
between zoē and bíos, Laurent Dubreuil insists that we cannot really separate the two: “We live 
politics, which is not only the far horizon of shared existence, an inventory of techniques, a subject 
of discussion between scholars. We live it in our gestures, words, experiences, feelings, and 
attitudes. Life, politics, are bound to each other” (83). Tverdovskii’s conceptualization of the 
relationship between life and politics is in some ways similar to Dubreuil’s position but has a 
somewhat different inflection. The abstracted notion of otherness embodied in Natasha’s tail has 
been read by critics as a stand-in for all kinds of difference, including political, yet even without 
reading the tail as a metaphor for political difference specifically, the tail challenges the view that 
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politics is coextensive with the human domain. One could derive from Zoology a vision of politics 
that is in some ways similar to the one developed by Brian Massumi in What Animals Teach Us 
about Politics. Massumi, who grounds his animal politics in the playfulness and self-expressivity 
of animality, suggests that animality can help us rethink the “all-too-human ways of working the 
political” (3). “Massumi’s most powerful claim,” as David Craig contends, is that “animality 
already lies at the core of our political lives and relationships” (Craig 27). 
Natasha’s newly-gained self-belief, however, could also be seen not as an effect of her new 
appendage but as a result of Petia’s interest in her. While it is impossible to say definitively what 
exactly brings about the protagonist’s transformation, the fact that Natasha loses her newly-found 
passion for life when things with Petia go awry, suggests that it may have been the attention of a 
handsome man that motivated her to change. While this could be read, as critic Wendy Ide 
suggests, as a “depressingly prosaic conclusion to a pleasingly unconventional story,” a closer look 
at Petia’s character offers an alternative and less regressive (albeit equally pessimistic) 
interpretation. 
Petia, the X-ray technician, proves to be the only professional and compassionate 
healthcare worker of the several featured in the film (like Tverdovskii’s debut film Corrections 
Class, Zoology offers a biting critique of the state institutions of “care”). The fact that the film’s 
only character not appalled by Natasha’s tail is an imaging technician seems far from incidental. I 
would even argue that the film draws a parallel between Petia’s use of imaging apparatus and the 
cinematic apparatus employed by Tverdovskii. My contention is in part based on a small but 










The detail is unusual in and of itself—most radiographic imaging is processed digitally 
these days (notably, the transition from film to digital was accompanied by the same deliberations 
on the part of radiologists and cinema practitioners alike: the cost of film and the inherent 
malleability of the digital image). What is particularly remarkable, however, about the images on 
display in Petia’s office is how they are positioned on the window ledges and vis-a-vis each other. 
In their arrangement, they resemble photos of family and loved ones one might display on a 
mantelpiece at home or on the desk in an office. 
On one hand, the x-ray images could be interpreted as a product of the objectifying medical 
gaze, in Foucault’s understanding of it, as enacting a separation between the patient’s body from 
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the patient’s identity (The Birth of the Clinic 89). In that sense, the arrangement of the x-ray images 
in Petia’s office could be seen as a warning that Petia might have more of an appreciation of 
Natasha’s phallic appendage than Natasha herself—in that sense, Petia’s concentration in his 
sexual encounter with Natasha on her phallic appendage should not come as a surprise.65 This 
conclusion, however, is undermined by the fact that, in Zoology, the medical gaze is not 
dehumanizing—it is the refusal to see (and not only on the part of medical professionals)—that is 
presented as problematic. Two encounters are particularly illuminating in this respect: Natasha’s 
appointment with the surgeon and her “coming out” to her mother. The surgeon, after staring at 
the x-ray clearly showing the vertebrae of a tail, declares that he cannot see anything and tells 
Natasha to get another x-ray; after the same thing happens the second time, Natasha realizes the 
healthcare system will be of no help to her. Natasha’s mother similarly refuses to see. Even though 
she has been diligently relating to Natasha the rumors of a three-tailed devil-possessed woman 
roaming the streets of their town, she tells Natasha to go “sleep it off” when her daughter shows 
her the tail. 
The connection between the x-ray images, photographs of loved ones, and cinematic 
images leads to a conception of the gaze of other as finalizing, but not in the negative sense 
proposed by Bakhtin in his later work as “deadening,” “a second-hand definition” and “reifying” 
(Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 59-62) but in the positive sense of his earlier work. In his early 
theorization of the author-hero relationship, Bakhtin views the aesthetic act (gaze of the other) as 
infused with “the organizing power of love” (“Author and Hero” 171): “Words of love and acts of 
genuine concern come to meet the dark chaos of my inner sensation of myself: they name, direct, 
 
65 This reading, however, is based on a view that the tail is separate from Natasha’s identity, in other words, on the 
assumption of a rigidly separated zoē and bíos, animality and humanity. I will return to this point shortly. 
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satisfy, and connect it with the outside world...” (“Author and Hero” 50). Aesthetic seeing, to 
which Bakhtin also refers as “empathizing” is inevitably fragmentary but has the ability to see the 
hidden inner truth (like an x-ray), to give a unity to the other who cannot see self as a whole: “In 
this sense, one can speak of a human being’s absolute need for the other, for the other’s seeing, 
remembering, gathering, and unifying self-activity...” (“Author and Hero” 35-36). In this sense, 
the two readings I have offered are complementary rather than contradictory: whether through a 
rethinking of the relationship with our animality or our need for the empathizing other, the film 
de-frames the opposition inherent in the self-other dichotomy. 
Yet if Petia is the empathizing other who, unlike the numerous indifferent others, offers 
Natasha a compassionate finalizing view, then what makes her reject Petia after they consummate 
their relationship in the cage? An answer to this question requires a consideration of the mode of 
spectatorial address employed by Tverdovskii throughout the film and in this scene, in particular. 
Unlike Corrections Class, Zoology does not antagonize the spectator. Aleksandr Mikeladze’s 
handheld camera strives to imitate the authentic feel of an observational documentary but its 
movements are not too abrupt or chaotic. There are no jarring tonal shifts or unanticipated changes 
in the terms of the spectatorial contract. Yet Daria Ezerova, in her overview of the films shown at 
the 27th edition of the Kinotavr film festival, lists Zoology as an example of “cinematic 
discomfort.” If the film is to a certain extent discomforting, its discomfort stems from its insistence 
on our encounter with Natasha’s fleshy tail that, through a combination of CGI and prosthetics, is 
made to look rather repugnant. The sequence featuring Natasha’s and Petia’s sexual encounter in 
a zoo cage brings the level of discomfort to the maximum when the camera lingers on Petia in 
close-up fellating Natasha’s tail. A viewer’s interpretation of the film’s conclusion is likely going 
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to depend on what we do with this discomfort and whether we perceive it as discomfort at all—
hence the multiplicity of competing interpretations.66 
The numerous readings of the film offered by critics vary based on how the author 
interprets Petia’s “way-too-into-it sexual enthusiasm” (Kiang) for Natasha’s tail and Natasha’s 
reaction to this discovery. The question that Tverdovskii poses to us here is whether we can offer 
the same empathizing gaze to Petia with which the film has encouraged us to view Natasha? In her 
review of the film Alena Solntseva suggests that for Petia the tail is ultimately an attraction (like 
sliding in a tin tray down a concrete slope, which we witnessed earlier); this leads her to the 
conclusion that Petia is, like everyone else, unable to understand Natasha (“Khvost”). Petia’s gaze, 
in this reading, emerges as the objectifying dehumanizing gaze that separates Natasha’s body from 
her identity. This reading, however, is based on the presupposition of a caesura between the two, 
which is not necessarily a given, if we read the film, as I have attempted above, as an effort to 
destabilize the divide between our humanity and animality. In his review of the film, Dolin argues 
that Petia’s encounter with Natasha gives him an opportunity to let his own tail grow: 
“почувствовать себя диковинным животным среди других зверей — и обрадоваться этому” 
[“to feel like a curious beast among other animals—and rejoice”] (“‘Zoologiia’”). Petia indeed 
seems to have embraced his animality (or perhaps has been in touch with it all along?)—he feels 
quite at home in the zoo cage and playfully describes to Natasha how he would arrange things in 
the cage when he “moves in.” Natasha, on the contrary—and this is where the film is at its most 
pessimistic—is unable to accept neither her own nor Petia’s animality and is, by extension, unable 
to return his empathizing finalizing gaze. For her, there remains an unbridgeable caesura between 
her humanity and animality—the latter is included, in Agamben’s terms, only by virtue of being 
 
66 See, for example, Solntseva (“Khvost”), Dolin (“‘Zoologiia’”), Kiang. 
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excluded. The question is, whether the film itself sets Natasha up for failure by imagining animality 
as an appendage—as separated by a caesura? A further question that remains open is why the film 
chooses to become an accomplice in the cutting off of the tail? The film cuts to black at the very 
moment when Natasha’s appendage is about to hit the blade. Should this conclusion be read as a 
commentary on the ways in which the cinematic medium itself has been instrumental in 
perpetuating and shaping notions of normativity and banishing what does not fit those constructs? 
Zoology does indeed, as I have tried to show, set out to challenge preconceptions about 
normativity. It appears, however, to have little faith in its own success from the very beginning: it 
would be logical for a film that begins with the sudden appearance of a tail to end with its removal. 
Tverdovskii thus offers pessimistic conclusions to both Corrections Class and Zoology as 
he suggests that what entraps us within the norm is that we are responsible for producing it through 
engaging in self-discipline and self-surveillance. Aleksei Fedorchenko, who returns to the 
workings of disciplinary power time and again in his oeuvre, arguably offers a more hopeful 
outlook—in his playful cinema, despite the seeming omnipresence of power, there is always a 
possibility to escape. It is to his work that I will now turn my attention: I will first provide an 
overview of the key strategies and themes across Fedorchenko’s oeuvre and then discuss his 2018 
film Anna’s War, which marks an important stylistic and narrative rupture in the filmmaker’s 
work. 
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3.2 Fedorchenko’s Counter-Histories: Beyond the Bareness of Bare Life 
In his review of Aleksei Fedorchenko’s 2005 “documentary fantasy” First on the Moon,67 
Oleg Kovalov writes: 
The characters of the film are under the control of the CheKa, who secretly film 
every one of their steps with a hand-held camera. [...] Supposedly this footage was 
shot using a portable camera, but on the screen we see very effective images shot 
in wide-angle, so beloved by avant-garde filmmakers. Shot in shallow-focus, the 
“Stalinist Empire-style” buildings appear like cyclopean armaments and the 
squares in Russian cities appear boundless and deserted. Human forms likewise 
seem lost in these expanses―lonely figures that cast lengthy shadows as in Giorgio 
de Chirico’s “metaphysical” paintings. It even seems that the “fish-eye lens” in this 
film has an “organic,” rather than technological ancestry. This is the eye of an 
unimaginable monster that breathes off-screen, the incarnation of a sinister, 
invisible, and anonymous power. The images themselves declare that the 
mechanism of surveillance and control of individuals in Russia has never died and 
has no intention of dying, and that its very indestructibility contains something 
metaphysical, as in de Chirico’s paintings. 
First on the Moon, a mockumentary about the Soviet space program and its first successful 
mission to the moon in 1938, does indeed have a preoccupation with the ubiquity of state 
surveillance mechanisms and the complicity of the cinematic apparatus in the exercise of power. 
 
67 For a discussion of the interplay of the post-Soviet and the postmodern in First on the Moon, see Daria Kabanova’s 
“Mourning the Mimesis: Aleksei Fedorchenko’s First on the Moon and the Post-Soviet Practice of Writing History.” 
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As Birgit Menzel points out, the film’s narrative strategies are meant to resemble those of secret 
services: “Geheimhaltung, Manipulation, Betrug und Verschwörung gehören zu den zentralen 
politischen Strategien aller Geheimdienste, besonders zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges, sind aber 
zugleich auch die wirksamsten Faszinationsthemen in der Populärkultur” (236). [“Secrecy, 
manipulation, fraud and conspiracy are among the central political strategies of all secret services, 
especially during the Cold War, but are simultaneously the most effective appeal strategies in 
popular culture.”] 
Yet what Kovalov’s eloquent description of the “unimaginable monster” of power and its 
methods of surveillance does not capture is how frequently Fedorchenko’s characters succeed in 
escaping the “monster.” In a particularly telling sequence in First on the Moon, the handheld 
surveillance camera follows engineer Fedor Suprun, the “general constructor” of the spacecraft 
that the Soviets sent to the moon. The footage produced by the surveillance camera betrays the 
presence of its all-too-human operator. The camera movement is shaky, and we hear the quickened 
breathing and the footsteps of the cameraman trying to keep up with its object of surveillance, 
while maintaining a certain distance so that Suprun does not notice that he is being followed. 
Suprun’s quick stride, however, disrupts the illusion of the “total one way-ness” of the gaze of the 
surveillance camera (Koskela 175)—he is not walking, he is running away. Suprun leads his 
follower onto a viewing platform (the irony!), lulls him into a false sense of security by putting his 
satchel onto the railing, and disappears down a flight of stairs. We hear the man behind the camera 
curse; the quickly changing images in the frame suggest that he is now running too. When the 
camera reaches the most advantageous viewing spot on the platform, it is only to capture through 
its lens an empty viewing platform (identical to the first one—a postmodernist trick typical of 
Fedorchenko’s cinematic worlds) and Suprun’s satchel sitting on the railing. The surveillance 
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Suprun, we will soon find out, will reappear only thirty years later. Despite power’s attempt 
to assert total control and the alleged “anonymity” of disciplinary power,68 power is, as the film 
posits, neither total, nor anonymous—it is negotiated in specific interactions. By putting the 
spectator in the position of the person behind the surveillance camera and making us complicit in 
its operation, Fedorchenko suggests that we too are participants in the negotiations of power. 
In his critique of Agamben’s theorization of bare life (i.e. what remains when bíos is 
forcefully removed from zoē), Jonathan Elmer writes: “Agamben remains so fascinated by the 
hyperbolic opposition between meaningful life and mere animality, between power and the 
absolute powerlessness of ‘bare life,’ that a trace of contempt edges into his description of those 
who have been reduced to the latter condition” (30). Fedorchenko’s films continuously return to 
the sites of production of bare life, but they do not find “the absolute powerlessness of ‘bare life’” 
 
68 For Foucault’s discussion of the “anonymity” of disciplinary power, see Discipline and Punish, p. 176 and p. 193. 
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there. In First on the Moon, the astronauts of the Soviet space program, whose bodies are, on one 
hand, molded by the state for its purposes, are, on the other hand, voluntary participants in the 
project. They are victims and heroes at the same time.69 Once the state decides to cover up the 
whole project (after the spacecraft crashes on its way back to earth), the project participants, 
including the surviving astronaut Ivan Kharlamov, time and again miraculously escape the NKVD 
that is out to get them. 
The “absolute powerlessness of ‘bare life’”70 is not to be found even in those films on 
Fedorchenko’s filmography where you would most expect to see it. Fedorchenko’s directorial 
debut, a 2002 documentary short David, about a Jewish man from Minsk who survived both Nazi 
and Gulag camps, features only one voice—the voice of the survivor. In his account of his 
experience in the Nazi camps, David Levin talks about the days when he was subjected to painful 
medical experiments and forced to copulate with Jewish girls, as well as the days when he played 
soccer with the other boys and knocked apples and pears off of a tree when no one was looking. 
He talks about the children who were “put to sleep, like animals” for disobedience; about a German 
soldier who would kick the children, as well as about the time when he kicked her back. He talks 
about the day when he was supposed to be “liquidated” and the German nurse (who, he notes, 
looked a little bit like Zykina)71 who saved his life by saying that he was contagious (a testimony 
to the power of the abjected body). 
 
69 As Fedorchenko himself has said in an interview: “The element of irony is very small, perhaps around five percent. 
The rest is something of an homage to the generation of our fathers and grandfathers, including their honesty, their 
genuine belief in an ideal” (qtd. in Prokhorov, “Aleksei Fedorchenko”). 
70 For a critique of Agamben’s concepts of homo sacer and bare life, see Antonio Negri’s piece “Giorgio Agamben: 
The Discreet Taste of the Dialectic” in Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life; Ernesto Laclau’s contribution to the 
same volume titled “Bare Life or Social Indeterminacy?”; Thomas Lemke’s article “’A Zone of Indistinction’: A 
Critique of Giorgio Agamben’s Concept of Biopolitics” in Critical Practice Studies; and Paul Patton’s piece 
“Agamben and Foucault on Biopower and Biopolitics.” 
71 Liudmila Zykina (1929-2009) was a Russian folk singer. She was decorated as a People’s Artist of the Soviet Union, 
as well as a Hero of Socialist Labor. She was also awarded the Lenin prize in 1970. 
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The footage that Fedorchenko uses in his short was shot by volunteers from the Shoah 
Visual History Foundation, founded by Steven Spielberg—the Foundation recorded more than 
50000 testimonies of Holocaust survivors and witnesses between 1994 and 1999. The pieces of 
footage that Fedorchenko chooses to include suggest that, unlike Agamben, who, as Thomas 
Lemke puts it, is “less interested in life than in its ‘bareness’” (“‘A Zone of Indistinction’” 4), 
Fedorchenko offers a corrective to Agamben’s conception that “does not comprehend ‘camp’ as 
an internally differentiated continuum, but only as a ‘line’ that separates more or less clearly 
between bare life and political existence” (Lemke, “‘A Zone of Indistinction’” 8). As Lemke points 
out, “[Agamben’s] attention is fixed on the establishment of a border – a border that he does not 
comprehend as a staggered zone but as a line without extension that reduces the question to an 
either-or” (Lemke, “‘A Zone of Indistinction’” 8). That is not to say that Fedorchenko downplays 
the brutal facts of the Holocaust or obscures the vulnerability of precarious life; what is at stake 
here is rather a refusal to make helplessness the defining characteristic of David’s humanity.72 As 
Thomas Elsaesser notes, “victims” and “survivors” appearing on television are frequently reduced 
to specific roles: they are supposed to produce affect and emotion and have a certain negative 
agency: “that of righteousness and subjective truth, but only on condition of consenting to being a 
victim, testifying to powerlessness and pure need” (114; emphasis in original). 
Fedorchenko’s numerous survivors—the filmmaker has a predilection for survival 
narratives73—are not reducible to absolute powerlessness; neither do they produce easily 
 
72 It should be noted that, although Fedorchenko certainly plays an editorial role in shaping the narrative, David’s 
testimony itself resists the equation of bare life and powerlessness, no matter how you “cut” it. The abject is 
inseparable here from hope and resilience. 
73 His trilogy on the fraught relationship between the state and the individual features three stories of survival: David, 
First on the Moon, and a 2003 documentary Children of the White Grave, about the survival of ethnic groups exiled 
by Stalin to Kazakhstan. Angels of Revolution, a 2014 drama loosely based on the 1934 Kazym rebellion against 
forceful Sovietization, leaves behind numerous casualties but is also framed as a survival story. In the finale, the film 
switches to the documentary form and shows an old Khanty woman, a survivor of the events, in present-day Kazym. 
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“readable” affect. David Levin delivers his testimony without showing any outward sign of 
emotion. The short alternates between medium shots and close-ups but even the close-ups, “the 
magnifying glass of the cinematograph” (38), as Béla Balázs described the close-up, do not give 
us access to “the mysterious inner workings of the soul” (Renov 3). In his analysis of the use of 
the close-up in audio-visual testimony, Michael Renov argues that “the close-up can offer 
something more than the mere spectacle of suffering. It can afford ‘proximity’ to the other, a 
visceral and enduring (if archived) vehicle for understanding and ethical encounter” (5). 
Fedorchenko’s short, however, is resistant to making a spectacle of suffering and questions its 
ability to serve as a “vehicle for understanding” or offer “‘proximity’ to the other.” 
While the reticence of the close-up cannot be attributed directly to Fedorchenko since he 
was working with found footage (although he may have contributed to the overall effect during 
the process of footage selection), the ways in which he pairs David’s words with archival footage 
betray an intentional blocking of affect and reveal a larger skepticism about the capacity of the 
audio-visual to render sensible the traumatic experience of the other. At the beginning, the film 
anticipates David’s words. We see, for example, footage of Minsk in the 1930s before David 
begins his story and tells us about his family. A title card added to the shot of people walking down 
Minsk streets reads: “1934. USSR. / Minsk. / David is born.” As the film progresses, we see 
numerous pairings like this: David’s voice off-screen, a short inscription with the indication of 
 
She is wearing a national dress and singing a song by a Soviet songwriter Aleksandra Pakhmutova. In his review of 
the film for KinoKultura, Frederick Corney writes that the film concludes that “only one of the cultures still survives, 
at least in fragments.” The closing sequence, however, testifies to the persistence of both. For an in-depth analysis of 
Fedorchenko’s Angels, see a cluster of articles on the film in The Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema (Volume 13, 
Issue 3): Alexander Prokhorov’s “Images of ‘posthumous subjectivity’ in Fedorchenko’s Angels of Revolution”; “The 
violence of antiquated forms: Aleksei Fedorchenko’s Angels of Revolution” by Tom Roberts; and Tatiana 
Mikhailova’s “The Myth of Two Goddesses.” Notably, Fedorchenko’s most recent survival narrative, his 2018 film 
Anna’s War, does not definitively end in survival. I will discuss this point in more detail in the concluding section of 
this chapter. 
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year and place, and archival footage from that particular location where David found himself at 
the time (most often, although not always, against his will). This footage often features numerous 
people, as if encouraging us to try and fail to find David among them—his conspicuous absence 
serves as the film’s acknowledgement that it has only tenuous access to David’s experience. The 
heterogeneous quality of the images and sound and the mixed “genres” of the featured archival 
footage (everyday scenes, footage from Nazi camps, recordings of spectacles designed for 
entertainment) alternately increase and shorten the distance between David’s testimony and the 
visual accompaniment that the short offers, bringing into relief the fact that the distance between 
the two cannot be bridged. 
In some cases, the film that has conceded its inability to “illustrate,” attempts to comment 
instead. About ten minutes into the short, David talks about his time in a clinic in Spain where he 
was put on display for medical students “in his birthday suit” (“в чем мать родила”) and used as 
a teaching aid. As a preamble, the film shows footage of a corrida that alternates between shots of 
the bullfight itself and shots of the spectators cheering at the violent spectacle. The footage is 
accompanied by a soundtrack featuring the inappropriately high-spirited Georges Bizet’s Overture 
to Carmen, a melody so familiar and cheerful that it inevitably disrupts the affective response 
shaped by David’s narration preceding it and blocks an “appropriate” affective response to what 
David is about to disclose. The subtitle reads: “1944. Spain. La Coruña. / Medical Institute. / David 
is 10.” The point of the arrangement is, on one hand, painfully legible. Yet there is something 
about this combination of the aural, the visual, and the verbal that resists signification. Designed 
as a meaningfully inappropriate counterpoint to David’s story, it simultaneously testifies to the 
absolute inadequacy of any audio-visual “accompaniment” to it. 
 139 
The establishment of a distance between the viewer and the diegetic world, as well as a 
persistent foregrounding of the mediating role of the cinematic apparatus are characteristic of 
Fedorchenko’s oeuvre at large (his 2018 Anna’s War is in some ways an exception, a point to 
which I will return shortly). His films that persistently investigate the relationship between power 
and the individual thematize and challenge their own authorship. With rare exceptions, 
Fedorchenko’s cinematic efforts feature “willfully abstruse” non-linear narratives (Marshall), do 
not have an investment in a central protagonist or set of characters and hence disallow 
psychological identification, and are generally more interested in representation itself rather than 
the object of representation.74 Unlike feel-bad films that, as Lübecker puts it, “sit somewhere 
between establishing a fictional universe and deliberately wanting to get on the nerves of the 
spectator” (2), Fedorchenko’s films create lavishly aestheticized fictional universes that bring to 
relief their constructed nature. Moreover, they have no desire to antagonize the spectator—heavily 
aestheticized, Fedorchenko’s cinematic images offer a most pleasant visual experience. Unlike 
Tverdovskii, who has said in an interview that the spectator has to play by his rules (Smirnov), 
Fedorchenko has asserted that his “[v]iewers should have to figure out for themselves the rules of 
the game and decide whether they want to play according to them or not” (qtd. in Prokhorov, 
“Aleksei Fedorchenko”). As Prokhorov writes, Fedorchenko views both himself and the spectator 
as homo ludens: as an author, “he is not a modernist heroic figure, but rather a playful craftsman, 
aware of the postmodern moment and engaging the viewer in an intellectual game” (“Images” 
263). 
 
74 For a discussion of the discursive ruptures in Fedorchenko’s work, see Vlad Strukov’s chapter on Silent Souls in his 
volume Contemporary Russian Cinema. See also Prokhorov’s essay on ruptured narration in Angels of Revolution, 
“Images of ‘posthumous subjectivity’ in Fedorchenko’s Angels of Revolution.” 
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Fedorchenko’s mode of spectatorial address, however, undergoes a radical transformation 
in his 2018 film, Anna’s War, in which Fedorchenko, on one hand, explores the issues that featured 
prominently in his earlier work (the power of the powerless; survival narratives) but on the other, 
departs from his playful authorial strategies—the film offers an easily accessible narrative with a 
central character, encourages an emotional investment on the part of the spectator and has a clearly 
articulated authorial stance. 
Anna’s War, recipient of the 2018 White Elephant, Golden Eagles, and Nika awards for 
best film, tells the story of a six-year old Jewish girl who miraculously survives a Nazi mass 
execution and continues her struggle for survival while hiding in a disused chimney in a Nazi 
headquarters. The film begins with a dark screen and a cacophonous soundscape of gunshots, 
screaming, barking, footsteps and car noises, as well as snippets of dialogue in Ukrainian and 
Russian. When the voices die down, the first images appear on the screen—the camera captures 
from above fragments of what we soon realize is a mass grave. An on-screen text informs us that 
it is November 1941, and we are in the Nazi occupied zone. Moving haphazardly from one body 
part to another, the camera eventually finds what it was looking for—the surviving child Anna. 
What we witness next is, as Sonia Lupher puts it, “a birth of sorts: Anna must fight her way out of 
her mother’s body, now as an orphan, in order to survive.” Anna quickly finds out that she is 
entirely on her own—a peasant couple give her some food and wash her clothes only to drop her 
off at the Nazi headquarters. The rest of the film takes place within the school building 
requisitioned by the Nazis. Anna hides on a ledge in the chimney flue of a disused fireplace during 
the day and ventures out of her hiding spot at night in hopes to find something to eat and drink. 
Anna does not have much to get by on at first: she eats crumbs from the mousetraps and drinks 
water from flowerpots and paintbrush jars. As the film progresses, however, she becomes more 
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and more ingenious in her survival strategies—like a primordial human, she evolves from 
scavenger to hunter and eventually learns to harness fire (finds matches). At one point, she roasts 
a pigeon that she has trapped in the rafters and shares her feast with the stray cat, who has become 
her companion and whom she eventually has to sacrifice. She lets go of the cat when a Nazi guard 
dog starts barking at the fireplace. Anna avenges the loss of her friend at the end of the film by 
poisoning the dog, an action that signals the replacement of survival as the single telos of the film. 
In the film’s final sequence, Anna moves back the pin flags scattered across Europe and the Soviet 
Union on a military map back to the German territory. It remains unclear whether Anna will 
survive or not, but she has won her war. 
Unlike Fedorchenko’s earlier films that frequently shifted between different perspectives, 
Anna’s War has a single focal point, its protagonist Anna. The film features very little dialogue—
Anna’s survival depends on her silence—but in those few cases when we do hear scraps of 
conversations in different languages, there are no subtitles to help us. Our understanding of what 
is going on is limited to that of Anna. Almost the entirety of the film is shot in tight, claustrophobic 
frames, and when Anna is stuck in her hiding place during the day, we observe what is happening 
on the outside from her point of view—our vision is limited just like Anna’s, who is watching the 









In contrast with Fedorchenko’s earlier work, the film appears to have a linear albeit 
fragmented narrative, yet the film gives us no clues as to how much time has passed from the 
moment Anna found her hiding spot and the day she poisoned the dog. The narrative is shaped as 
a series of episodes, each of which fades to black. Our perception of time is aligned with Anna’s 
as well: we too have no way to keep track of hours, days, weeks that pass between the episodes. 
Despite its minimalist style, the film encourages psychological identification with its 
protagonist. While Fedorchenko’s focus is still on resilience of bare life rather than suffering and 
absolute powerlessness, the choice of a child—one of the most vulnerable figures of 
precariousness—as its central character demands empathy from the spectator. Moreover, the film 
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creates and nurtures a strong narrative desire for a particular outcome, Anna’s survival. 
Fedorchenko’s earlier survival narratives never posited survival (or anything else for that matter) 
as their telos. They either “accidentally” stumbled upon survivors (as, for example, First on the 
Moon, stylized as an investigative documentary) or assumed survival as their starting point (as was 
the case in David where the fact that we are witnessing his testimony posits survival as already 
accomplished, rather than as telos). 
If in his earlier work Fedorchenko kept “us purposely suspended between various 
interpretations of what he shows on screen” (Prokhorov, “Images” 266), there are no traces of this 
ambiguity in Anna’s War; nor are there any remnants of Fedorchenko’s signature playfulness. In 
the remainder of this chapter I situate the film in its context and attempt to articulate why 
Fedorchenko chose a more straightforward approach for the task he has set for himself. 
When Oleg Kovalov reviewed Fedorchenko’s First on the Moon back in 2006, he wrote: 
“The worse a government’s state of affairs, the more fantastical the legends of its former victories 
become.” He also noted that blockbusters were often tasked with propagating these legends. 
Blockbusters have since acquired an even more prominent role as a vehicle for myth.75 As Alena 
Solntseva points out, however, if in the 2000s the proliferation of patriotic narratives was a product 
of audience demand (viewers wanted Hollywood-like heroic and uplifting legends), from 2012 on, 
the year when Vladimir Medinskii was appointed Minister of Culture, the state has taken it upon 
itself to ensure that filmmakers, especially those who are funded by the state, deliver the “correct” 
version of history. Solntseva writes: “Уверенность в том, что увиденное на экране как бы само 
собой становится реальностью, заменяя собой любые архивные и личные документы, — 
 
75 See Stephen Norris’ monograph Blockbuster History in the New Russia: Movies, Memory, and Patriotism for a 
discussion of the revival of patriotic and nationalist sentiments in Russian cinema of the 2000s. 
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наивна, но небезосновательна: увиденное действительно может быть убедительней 
сказанного.” [“The belief that what you see on the screen becomes reality and replaces all archival 
and personal documents is naive but not unfounded: seeing can indeed be more convincing than 
hearing.”] (“Mif”). 
Three periods of Russo-Soviet history have been revisited particularly often in recent 
Russian cinema: Ancient Rus', the pre-revolutionary period, and the Great Patriotic War. 
Fedorchenko’s Anna’s War is in many ways a response to a series of films about the latter, 
beginning with Fedor Bondarchuk’s Stalingrad (Stalingrad, 2007), Sergei Mokritskii’s Battle for 
Sevastopol (Bitva za Sevastopol', 2015), Kirill Belevich’s Woman Alone (Edinichka, 2015), Renat 
Davlet'iarov’s The Dawns Here Are Quiet (A zori zdes' tikhie, 2015), Sergei Popov’s Road to 
Berlin (Doroga na Berlin, 2015),76 and Kim Druzhinin and Andrei Shal’opa Panfilov’s 28 (28 
panfilovtsev, 2016). 
While there have certainly been exceptions to the rule, many of the recent state-subsidized 
war films77 have reinstated elements of the victory myth that dominated the screens in the late 
Stalinist period. Stephen Norris summarizes the simple storyline of the original myth as follows: 
“when the beastly Nazis invaded, the Soviet people suffered at their hands, but guided by Stalin 
they responded patriotically and ultimately triumphed” (119). In his study of the Stalinist war 
myth,78 Amir Weiner contends that, in its classical form, the victory narrative had two key 
 
76 2015, the year of the 70th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War, saw, predictably, a particularly high number of 
war film releases. The 60th anniversary had been similarly greeted with a series of war films, including Aleksandr 
Rogozhkin’s The Cuckoo (Kukushka, 2002), Nikolai Lebedev’s The Star (Zvezda, 2002), Dmitrii Meskhiev’s Our 
Own (Svoi, 2004), Aleksei A. German’s The Last Train (Poslednii poezd, 2003). 
77 Anna’s War, by contrast, did not use any state funding and was sponsored by a group of independent producers, as 
well as the Genesis Philanthropy Group. Before the film premiered at the International Film Festival in Rotterdam, 
the producers raised money for the post-production work on CGI, color correction, and sound through a crowdfunding 
campaign. 
78 See Amir Weiner, “When Memory Counts: War, Genocide, and Postwar Soviet Jewry,” in Omer Bartov, Atina 
Grossmann, and Mary Nolan, eds., Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century. For more on this myth, 
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components: “hierarchical heroism” and “universal suffering” (“When Memory Counts” 192). 
According to the principle of “hierarchical heroism,” the Russians made the most meaningful 
contribution to the victory and were the most heroic of the Soviet nations. The “universal 
suffering” component in turn manifested itself in the representations of collective suffering of all 
Soviet citizens. 
Anna’s War challenges the components of the victory myth that made a comeback in the 
2000s and gained particular traction in the 2010s: universal suffering, the trope of the enemy, and 
heroic narratives (and the trope of heroic death, in particular). On one hand, Fedorchenko’s 
decision to show war through the perspective of a child, makes a universal anti-war statement as 
it attests to the automatized and instantaneous transformation of precariousness into precarity 
during war (in the face of which we are all children). On the other, however, it is a film about the 
Holocaust; in other words, the film acknowledges what has been consistently omitted from Russo-
Soviet war narratives with their focus on “universal suffering”—the uneven distribution of 
precarity. As Anton Dolin points out, Anna’s diegetically motivated silence both refers to the 
silence of the millions of children and adults who were not allowed to have a voice, as well as the 
silence of Russo-Soviet cinema on the Holocaust, which has been treated as an “unspoken taboo” 
in Russo-Soviet cinema (“‘Voina Anny’”). Fedorchenko had broken the taboo already in his little-
known debut documentary short David, which I discussed above; Anna’s War, however—perhaps 
together with Konstantin Khabenskii’s Sobibor, released the same year—became one of the first 
Russian feature-length Holocaust films.79 
 
see Weiner’s volume, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution) and 
Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia (New York: Basic 
Books, 1995). 
79 Whether or not Sobibor qualifies as a Holocaust film is a matter of interpretation. Dolin, for example, notes that the 
film touched upon the Holocaust but intentionally deemphasized it (“Shkola” 136). Dolin also notes that Andrei 
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By positing survival as the single telos of the film, Fedorchenko disrupts both the enemy 
and the hero tropes of the war myth. While some commentators have accused Fedorchenko of a 
stereotypical portrayal of Nazi soldiers (“cruel even to their dogs,” as Weissberg writes), Anna’s 
war is not against the Nazis—her sole purpose is to survive, her sole enemy is Death. Everyone 
who is on the other side of the cracked mirror through which Anna observes the world is a potential 
agent of death—be they Russian, Ukrainian, German, French, Hungarian or Romanian (these are 
the languages we hear in the film). In his discussion of the power of the abject, Elsaesser notes that 
“the abject is beyond victimhood, because he or she has no claims to make, which means that the 
abject commands a particular kind of freedom that probes the limits of both freedom and the law” 
(140; emphasis in original). This freedom consists in the indifference of the abject to the 
“community constituted as a nation or a state” (140). In Anna’s war against death, there is no 
community and hence there can be no Heroes. One of the key targets of Fedorchenko’s critique is 
the return of the trope of heroic death in recent Russian war films. In the war films of the late 
Stalinist period and socialist realist narratives at large death was imagined as “sublated,” to borrow 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s term, as “reabsorbed […] in a community, yet to come, that would attain 
immanence” (13). In the words of Sergei Dobrotvorksii: “for decades our cinematic heroes 
embraced their deaths with a proud smile on their faces and a ready-made meaningful speech. 
They died for a cause and never bored the spectators with any unnecessary details” (51). 
Fedorchenko, who has avoided definitive conclusions in his earlier work, articulates a 
simple unambiguous position in Anna’s War: he posits human life as an absolute value and takes 
a clear stance against narratives based on imaginary allegiances to imagined communities that 
 
Konchalovskii’s film Paradise (Rai, 2016] similarly relegates the Holocaust to a secondary role (136). Konchalovskii 
himself has explicitly said in an interview that for him, Paradise is not a Holocaust film (see Nechayev). 
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make human life dispensable. In this light, the fact that the film is set on the occupied Ukrainian 
territory acquires additional weight. Some commentators have interpreted Fedorchenko’s decision 
to set the film in Ukraine and depict Ukrainians as Nazi collaborators as an expression of an anti-
Ukrainian sentiment.80 At the risk of being speculative, I would argue that Fedorchenko, like Anna, 
does not have an allegiance to any particular community. I read Anna’s gesture of putting the 
German pin flags back onto the German territory as an anti-war and an anti-imperialist one and 
hence, among other things, as a commentary on the persistence of Russia’s imperialist ambitions 
that have been recast into narratives about the preservation of an imagined community. 
Fedorchenko’s oeuvre—from David to Anna’s War—has been consistently counter-
historical, to borrow Marcia Landy’s term. Landy defines counter-history as “an escape from 
formal history to a world of affect, invention, memory, art, reflection, and action” (xi). One of the 
key elements of counter-history, for Landy, is “its decentering of narrativity through discontinuity 
or fragmentation in the interests of a different relation to bodies and movement” (xiv). 
Fedorchenko’s counter-historical cinema renegotiates, as I have attempted to show, the caesura 
(hyperbolized in Agamben’s theoretical universe) “between meaningful life and mere animality, 
between power and the absolute powerlessness of ‘bare life’” (Elmer 30). The different directorial 
approaches adopted by Fedorchenko in Anna’s War and some of his more playful earlier films are 
perhaps motivated by what specifically his counter-cinema has been “counter” to. My contention 
is that Fedorchenko’s earlier encounters with history have targeted primarily trauma, memory, and 
modes of representation. One of the central questions posited by Fedorchenko in First on the Moon 
 
80 Fedorchenko has countered this critique in an interview by saying that the original story (the film is loosely based 
on real events) took place in Ukraine, that he attempted to create on-screen a village in the Poltava Oblast where his 
father grew up and where Fedorchenko himself used to spend his summers as a child. Finally, he has pointed out that 
these events could have just as easily taken place in Russia, Belarus, or Poland (“#Kinotavr2018”). 
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and Angels of Revolution, for example, was, “how do we relate to the image and, through the 
image, to the history that it presumably indexes?” (Prokhorov, “Images” 262). The counter-
historical impulse of Anna’s War is, in my view, directed at the present. It attempts a de-framing 
of visual culture and acknowledges the limits of its own vision too (by foregrounding the act of 
subjective viewing through Anna’s obstructed view) but it is less interested in representation per 
se than its complicity in a much larger set of discursive practices that, through the construction of 
the other (“the enemy”), legitimize thanatopolitics. 
In his discussion of Fedorchenko’s “postmodernist mystification” First on the Moon, 
Alexander Prokhorov has argued that the film reinstated “the utopian dimension in Russian 
cinema, thereby distancing it from the Soviet-era monopoly on discourse” (“Aleksei 
Fedorchenko”). Fedorchenko’s departure in Anna’s War from his signature postmodernist 
playfulness can then perhaps be read as a logical response to the state’s attempts to introduce a 
new ideological dimension (chimerical as it may be) into Russian politics; attempts that have been 
widely and mistakenly (as Lipovetsky has argued) understood as postmodernist. 
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Conclusion 
In this study I have examined a selection of recent Russian films that thematize the fraught 
relationship between human life and political power. The limited corpus was not intended to be 
exhaustive—if power, as Foucault suggests, permeates the entire social body, then the list of films 
that could be considered as offering a commentary on the distribution of power relations in 
contemporary Russia would be endless. Each of the individual case studies was instead meant to 
showcase the different ways in which filmmakers, who are interested in the workings of power, 
negotiate their own position of authority. In Leviathan and The Student, Zviagintsev and 
Serebrennikov, respectively, embrace the role of “masters.” Kott in The Test and Mamuliia in 
Another Sky, on the contrary, refrain from articulating distinct authorial positions, albeit their 
approaches to establishing distance, as well as their motivations for doing so, vary greatly. 
Fedorchenko and Tverdovskii, in turn, experiment with different degrees of authorial presence but, 
more often than not, foreground in their self-reflexive cinema the constructed nature of their 
cinematic universes. 
A relevant conclusion derived from this study—or rather a useful reminder—is that there 
is no guaranteed correlation between a particular form and a particular political stance. While the 
relationship between a film’s formal choices and its politics is worth pondering, the categorization 
of films into “genuinely and only apparently progressive films” (O’Shaughnessy 26) based on their 
formal properties is now a thing of the past. As Martin O’Shaughnessy points out, classifications 
of films akin to the one devised by critics at Cahiers du Cinéma may have had their relevance back 
in the late 1960s, but the questions that these critics posed about the relation between a progressive 
film politics and film form, production, and reception belonged to a specific historical moment 
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and should receive different answers today (27). In her analysis of what she calls “authoritarian 
fictions,” Susan Suleiman approaches the issue from a different angle but reaches a consonant 
conclusion. Even the most authoritarian of fictions, she writes, “if questioned a certain way, ends 
up contesting its own authority” (243). 
A proximity of the discursive practices and political gestures used by the state and its critics 
in contemporary Russia is nonetheless worth exploring. Numerous oppositional artist figures have 
in recent years imitated the gestures of the current administration in their protest art. Petr 
Pavlenskii, for example, known for his performances of the vulnerable body (such as a cut off 
earlobe or a scrotum nailed to Red Square), reduces himself in his protest actions to bare life thus 
reclaiming from the state the object of politics par excellence, the privilege to draw the boundary 
between bare and political life. A similar assimilation of an antagonistic gesture is at work in the 
Pussy Riot “punk prayer,” as Daniil Leiderman suggests: “Instead of critiquing the collusion 
between state and church from a secular vantage point, Pussy Riot critiques from a religious 
vantage point – seemingly trying to harness religion to effect political change, the exact type of 
manipulation that they are denouncing in the first place” (174). Such oscillation between two 
incompatible positions, or “shimmering,” as Leiderman terms it, is an inherently postmodernist 
gesture. 
Notably, however, the practices of the Putin administration itself have been frequently 
described as postmodernist. Among the cultural and political figures who have noted parallels 
between the discursive practices of the state and the postmodernist movement are Evgenii 
Bunimovich, Dmitrii Prigov, Lev Rubinshtein, Aleksandr Dugin, Petr Pomerantsev... Yet in his 
essay “Pseudomorphosis: Reactionary Postmodernism as a Problem,” Mark Lipovetsky shows that 
the attribute “postmodernist” has been mistakenly applied to the discursive practices of the state. 
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What lies behind the fallacy is an erroneous association of postmodernism with eclecticism, 
amoralism, absurdism, and the proliferation of simulacra. The first three features, Lipovetsky 
argues, are more characteristic of modernism and avant-garde than postmodernism.81 As for the 
Baudrillardian “hyperreality of the simulacrum,” it is characteristic of postmodernism as a 
historical period rather than postmodernism as a discursive system—the latter simply unveiled the 
key operating principles of this hyperreality. What is usually omitted from accounts of the 
allegedly postmodernist rhetorical strategies of the Putin administration, Lipovetsky suggests, are 
the most important qualities of postmodernism as a discursive system: “incredulity toward 
metanarratives” (Lyotard), deconstruction of binary oppositions (Derrida), and postmodern 
constructivism (i.e. anti-essentialism). Lipovetsky concludes that “то, что современные 
комментаторы называют постмодернизмом неоконсервативной политики, по существу, не 
имеет ничего общего с важнейшими характеристиками постмодернизма.” [“what 
contemporary commentators call the postmodernism of neoconservative politics has nothing in 
common with the key characteristics of postmodernism.”] (“Psevdomorfoza”). What we are 
dealing with is rather “messianic cynicism,” as Ilya Kukulin has argued. 
I shall return to Kukulin’s point shortly but would like to first point out that the films that 
I have discussed in this study, while not necessarily postmodernist per se,82 do rely at least to some 
degree on postmodernist gestures. Tverdovskii, Kott, Mamuliia, and Fedorchenko attempt, albeit 
with varying degrees of success, a dismantling of the binary opposition between self and other. 
 
81 Lipovetsky adds that these features were present in early Russian postmodernism as well and cites two reasons for 
this: 1. the fact that Russian postmodernism attempted to compensate for the interrupted evolution of avant-garde; 2. 
the fact that postmodernism developed in Russia in the underground scene, which was generally countercultural 
(“Psevdomorfoza”). 
82 Fedorchenko is a single “definitively” postmodernist auteur on the list, even though he departs from his signature 
style in Anna’s War, as I discussed in Chapter Three. 
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Zviagintsev, Serebrennikov, Fedorchenko, and—implicitly—Tverdovskii challenge the boundary 
between the “dominators” and the “dominated.” Zviagintsev, Serebrennikov, Tverdovskii and 
Fedorchenko bring to relief the constructed nature of certain “truths,” discourses, and practices: be 
it religious discourse, the Russian version of the “great again” narrative, or what has become its 
essential component, the myth of the Great Patriotic War—“hystorical mythomania,” as Kukulin 
describes it (231). It is another matter (and an important one) that many of these filmmakers (with 
the exception, perhaps, of Kott) simultaneously return to a form of realism and offer their own 
version of truths (as, for example Zviagintsev and Tverdovskii, with their apophatic theologies). 
This oxymoronic combination of postmodernism and realism, I would argue, may be a logical 
response to the “messianic cynicism” practiced by the state. 
So what exactly is understood by “messianic cynicism”? Drawing on Peter Sloterdijk’s 
conceptualization of “cynical reason,” Lipovetsky argues that the key distinction between 
postmodernism and cynicism is that the former juxtaposes conflicting discourses in order to lay 
bare and exacerbate what makes them incompatible, while the latter ignores and smooths over 
these incompatibilities for pragmatic (or selfish) purposes (“Psevdomorfoza”). “Cynicism,” 
Lipovetsky writes, “only pretends to be ideological; it offers the modern subject a strategy of 
pseudo-socialization that reconciles the individual’s interests with the requirements of society and 
its ideology by dissolving subjectivity into unstable, alternatively authentic and false masks 
(personas) through which the cynical subject can realize itself” (“Intelligentsia” 3). In his 
discussion of cynicism in contemporary Russia, Kukulin offers two reasons for the prevalence of 
“cynical reasoning”: 1. the ideological vacuum created by the emptying out of Soviet ideology and 
the resulting perception of morality as a discursive phenomenon; and 2. the need to defend oneself 
against and legitimize the undeclared state of exception. He writes: “One of the main goals of 
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Russia’s current propaganda is to make extraordinary situations seem routine and, moreover, 
centuries-old” (231). What makes the cynicism of Russian propaganda “messianic” is that it 
simultaneously and paradoxically discredits idealistic motivation for political actions and presents 
this discrediting as a way to defend Russia’s unique historical mission to preserve the moral values 
abandoned by the West (Kukulin 231). 
A key characteristic of this “messianic cynicism” is its aggressive anti-communicative 
position: “it blocks differentiated, complicated communication. It is an anti-communicative 
attitude, which does not acknowledge the Other as an interlocutor (Other in this context can only 
mean Alien) and denies the presence of otherness in individual or social consciousness” (Kukulin 
231). In this light, the fact that the films that I have examined in this dissertation all in one way or 
another thematize communication and its failures acquires additional weight. The filmmakers 
whose work I have discussed both register the crisis of communication and challenge, at least to 
some extent, the anti-communicative stance of the state, asking (and in some cases demanding) to 
be recognized as interlocutors. These efforts are certainly perceived by the adopters of the anti-
communicative stance as a threat that needs to be neutralized—as evidenced by a whole array of 
neutralization measures that have been taken over the last few years: the 2013 anti-gay propaganda 
law, the 2014 ban on swearing in the arts, numerous manipulations with screening licenses,83 and 
a refusal to fund “inconvenient” films. Leviathan, tellingly, proved to be the last film by 
Zviagintsev funded by the Ministry of Culture; his 2017 drama on the failure of communication, 
 
83 The Russian Ministry of Culture notoriously withdrew the screening license issued to Armando Iannucci’s black 
comedy The Death of Stalin, which, in the words of Pavel Pozhigailo, a member of the advisory council of the Ministry 
of Culture, “insults our historic symbols – the Soviet anthem, orders and medals” (qtd. in Bennetts). Earlier in 2018 
The Russian Ministry of Culture postponed the release of Paul King’s live-action animated comedy film Paddington 
2 in order to prioritize two domestic productions, Anton Megerdichev’s patriotic basketball drama Three Seconds 
[Dvizhenie vverkh] and Rustam Mosafir’s The Scythian [Skif]. Denis Saltykov argues that the latter, despite 
appearances, is not “another patriotic history flick” but delivers an unconventional political message. See his review 
of the film in KinoKultura. 
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Loveless, was funded by a group of independent Russian and international producers. Some critics 
might also add to the list of aggressive anti-communicative measures the arrest of and charges 
against Kirill Serebrennikov. 
I have discussed at length in this dissertation the ways in which filmmakers deconstruct in 
their cinematic universes the binary view of power that creates an artificial divide between those 
who have it and those who do not. The cinematic medium itself, however, as an apparatus counters 
the binary view of power as each film—no matter the degree of its “authority”—is in a dynamic 
relationship with the viewer, who participates in the production of meaning (and, in the worst-case 
scenario, can simply walk out of the movie theater). Inherently dialogic, cinema presupposes an 
interlocutor—the spectator—and is thus by its very nature, opposed to the anti-communicative 
position of “messianic cynicism.” 
I would like to conclude by providing just a few examples of the ways in which the 
cinematic medium, through its attempts to find its spectator, has attempted to counter the anti-
communicative position of “messianic cynicism” in contemporary Russia. 
In 2015, shortly after the introduction of the ban on swearing, director Vasilli Sigarev was 
requested to bleep out the swear words before submitting a copy of his black comedy Land of Oz 
(Strana Oz) to the Kinotavr committee. Sigarev waited until the very last minute to submit the film 
and “accidentally” failed to bleep out all of the curse words (which make up a substantial portion 
of the film’s dialogue). Sigarev hosted a party at the same Kinotavr festival to bid farewell to 
swearing in cinema; in the finale of the celebrations, the film’s lead actors Iana Troianova and 
Gosha Kutsenko cut a cake featuring two of the juiciest Russian swear words (Korsakov). To 
prepare the film for a wider release, Sigarev and his team got to work on the remaining swear 
words in the film. In an interview, Sigarev said: “Ну, когда у тебя пищит почти все в каждой 
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реплике, это тоже о стране много говорит. Значит, в этой стране есть цензура… Мы сейчас 
весь фильм запикиваем. Даже когда люди молчат, мы туда пики вставляем” [“The fact that 
there is a bleep in every single remark says a lot about the country. It means that there is censorship 
in this country... We are now bleeping everything out. Even those parts where no one is saying 
anything.”] (Shakina). Zviagintsev in turn responded to the ban on swearing by having a non-
censored version of Leviathan leaked on the Internet so that as many people as possible could 
download the film and watch it as intended. 
Faced with a fierce backlash from federal lawmakers, director Aleksei Krasovskii released 
his film Holiday (Prazdnik, 2019), a black comedy about the Siege of Leningrad, exclusively on 
YouTube and for free. Willing audience members were given the option to thank the filmmakers 
by making a donation. During the first four days since the film’s release, audiences donated more 
than 2.5 million rubles (an impressive number, taking into account that the film was produced on 
a modest budget of 4 million rubles) (Grigor'eva). 
Unable to or unwilling84 to get funding from the Ministry of Culture, numerous filmmakers 
have found independent producers to sponsor their films. Aleksei Fedorchenko even launched a 
successful crowdfunding campaign to collect the missing funds for the post-production of Anna’s 
War. 
There have been, however, less optimistic developments. In January 2020, newspaper 
Kommersant published an article by Andrei Plakhov, in which the critic wrote that Zviagintsev 
had been unable to secure funding for his new projects. In 2018 Zviagintsev announced that he is 
working on a film about the Siege of Leningrad; the project for some reason fell through. His 
 
84 Serebrennikov, for example, did not ask the Ministry of Culture to support The Student. Neither did Fedorchenko 
when working on Anna’s War. 
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alliance with producer Aleksandr Rodnianskii (who produced Zviagintsev’s Elena (Elena, 2011), 
Leviathan, and Loveless) broke up too, shortly after the two finished work on Loveless. Zviagintsev 
then recruited Il'ia Stiuart as the producer for his new film and secured the support of Roman 
Abramovich’s private cinema fund Kinoprime, but yet again both the producer and the fund 
abruptly pulled out of the project. What is at work here, according to Plakhov, is self-censorship—
a testament to the fact that the “messianic cynicism” and its anti-communicative attitude are not 
“prerogatives” of the state. As Kukulin contends, the state has exploited and exacerbated the crisis 
of communication for its own purposes but its roots are much deeper and the crisis itself permeates 
the entire social fabric (as Tverdovskii, Serebrennikov, and Zviagintsev, among others, have 
intimated in their work). Plakhov ends his piece on a pessimistic note—by quoting Rainer Werner 
Fassbinder: “Fear eats the soul.” I would like to conclude with an (unjustifiably?) optimistic 
rejoinder. While under house arrest, Serebrennikov edited his film Summer, a tribute to the Soviet 
underground music scene and an ode to freedom. Zviagintsev’s inability to secure funding for his 
next project is a most worrying sign, but is it unreasonable to hope that a response will soon follow? 
 157 
Bibliography 
Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. 
Stanford: Stanford UP, 1998. Print. 
---. Idea of Prose. Trans. Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt. Albany: State U of New York, 1995. 
Print. 
---. Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience. Trans. Liz Heron. London, New York: 
Verso, 1993. Print. 
---. Language and Death: The Place of Negativity. Trans. Karen E. Pinkus and Michael Hardt. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1991. Print. 
---. Means without End. Notes on Politics. Trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino. 
Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 2000. Print. 
---. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. New 
York: Zone, 1999. Print. 
---. The Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004. Print. 
---. “The Work of Man.” Trans. Kevin Attell. Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life. Ed. 
Matthew Calarco and Steven Decaroli. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007. 1-10. Print. 
---. “Un’idea di Giorgio Agamben.” Interview by Adriano Sofri. Reporter 9-10 (1985): 32-33. 
Print. 
---. What Is an Apparatus?: And Other Essays. Trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 2009. Print. 
Alaniz, José. “Ivan Tverdovskii: Corrections Class.” KinoKultura 47 (2015). Web. 
 158 
Anemone, Anthony. “Cargo 200.” The Contemporary Russian Cinema Reader. By Rimgaila 
Salys. Boston: Academic Studies, 2019. 73-88. Print. 
Arnold, Kathleen R. America’s New Working Class: Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in a Biopolitical 
Age. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 2008. Print. 
Bakhtin, Mikhail. “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity.” Art and Answerability: Early 
Philosophical Essays. By Mikhail Bakhtin. Ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov. 
Trans. Vadim Liapunov. Austin: U of Texas, 1990. 4-231. Print. 
---. “Discourse in the Novel.” The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. By Mikhail M. Bakhtin 
and Michael Holquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: U of Texas, 
1981. 259-422. Print. 
---. Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics. Ed. Caryl Emerson. Trans. Caryl Emerson. Minneapolis: U 
of Minnesota, 1984. Print. 
Balázs, Béla. Béla Balázs: Early Film Theory. Visible Man and The Spirit of Film. Ed. Erica 
Carter. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. New York: Berghahn, 2010. Print. 
Barolsky, Paul. “The Genius of Michelangelo’s ‘Creation of Adam’ and the Blindness of Art 
History.” Source: Notes in the History of Art 33.1 (2013): 21-24. Print. 
Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 1994. Print. 
Bauman, Zygmunt. Memories of Class: The Pre-history and After-life of Class. Oxon: Routledge, 
2010. Print. 
Bennetts, Marc. “Russia Pulls ‘Despicable’ Death of Stalin from Cinemas.” The Guardian. 23 Jan. 
2018. Web. 
Bethea, David M. “Literature.” The Cambridge Companion to Modern Russian Culture. Ed. 
Nicholas Rzhevsky. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2015. 161-204. Print. 
 159 
Beumers, Birgit, and Mark Lipovetsky. Performing Violence: Literary and Theatrical 
Experiments of New Russian Drama. Bristol: Intellect, 2009. Print. 
Bhabha, Homi K. The Location of Culture. London and New York: Routledge, 1994. Print. 
Bird, Robert. “Aleksandr Kott: The Test (Ispytanie, 2014).” KinoKultura 47 (2015). Web. 
Boele, Otto. “Kirill Serebrennikov: The Student (Uchenik, 2016).” KinoKultura 55 (2017). Web. 
Bohm, Michael. “Why the Pussy Riot Judge Hid Her Face.” The Moscow Times. 23 Aug. 2012. 
Web. 
Borenstein, Eliot. Overkill: Sex and Violence in Contemporary Russian Popular Culture. Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 2008. Print. 
Bruzzi, Stella. New Documentary: A Critical Introduction. London: Routledge, 2011. Print. 
Bryanski, Gleb. “Russian Patriarch Calls Putin Era ‘Miracle of God’.” Reuters. 08 Feb. 2012. Web. 
Buder, Emily. “Why Director Kirill Serebrennikov Was ‘Not Afraid of Anything’ in Daring Film 
‘The Student’.” No Film School. 27 May 2016. Web. 
Butler, Judith. Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? London: Verso, 2010. Print. 
Chow, Rey. “Sacrifice, Mimesis, and the Theorizing of Victimhood.” Entanglements, or 
Transmedial Thinking about Capture (2012): 81-105. Print. 
Clemens, Justin. “Language.” The Agamben Dictionary. Ed. Alex Murray and Jessica Whyte. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2011. 116-19. Print. 
Coates, Ruth. Christianity in Bakhtin: God and the Exiled Author. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
2005. Print. 
Cohan, Steven, and Ina Rae Hark. The Road Movie Book. London: Routledge, 2005. Print. 
Colebrook, Claire. “Animal.” The Agamben Dictionary. Ed. Alex Murray and Jessica Whyte. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2011. 22-23. Print. 
 160 
Condee, Nancy. “Balaclavas and Incense: Remarks on Russian Cultural Politics.” 2015. 
Unpublished paper. 
---. “History in a Time of Premeditated Amnesia: The 25th Kinotavr Open Russian Film 
Festival.” KinoKultura 46 (2014). Web. 
---. “Imperial Ectoplasm.” KinoKultura 6 (2004). Web. 
---. “Knowledge (Imperfective): Andrei Zviagintsev and Contemporary Cinema.” A Companion 
to Russian Cinema. By Birgit Beumers. Malden: Wiley/Blackwell, 2016. 565-84. Print. 
---. The Imperial Trace: Recent Russian Cinema. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2009. Print. 
Corrigan, Timothy. “Genre, Gender, and Hysteria: The Road Movie in Outer Space.” A Cinema 
without Walls: Movies and Culture after Vietnam. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1991. 137-
60. Print. 
Coyer, Paul. “(Un)Holy Alliance: Vladimir Putin, The Russian Orthodox Church and Russian 
Exceptionalism.” Forbes. 31 May 2015. Web. 
Craig, David Alexander. “Review. What Animals Teach Us about Politics.” Contemporary 
Political Theory 14.4 (2015): 25-27. Print. 
Crane, Chip. “Program Notes: The Student.” Russian Film Symposium: “Kino-Ivory.” 2017. Web. 
Derrida, Jacques. The Beast and the Sovereign. Ed. Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet, and 
Ginette Michaud. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington. Chicago: U of Chicago, 2011. Print. 
Doane, Mary Ann. “The Voice in the Cinema: The Articulation of Body and Space.” Yale French 
Studies 60 (1980): 33-50. Print. 
Dobrotvorskii, Sergei. “Vesna na ulitse Morg.“ Iskusstvo kino 9 (1991): 46-52. Print. 
Dolin, Anton. “‘Ispytanie’: Iadernyi perimetr.” Afisha. 18 Sept. 2014. Web. 
---. “Shkola: ‘Voina Anny’.” Iskusstvo kino 11-12 (2018): 132-41. Print. 
 161 
---. “‘Uchenik’ Serebrennikova i ‘Slushaia Betkhovena’ Garri Bardina: Russkie v 
Kannakh.” Afisha. 20 Apr. 2017. Web. 
---. “‘Voina Anny’ Alekseia Fedorchenko: Pochemu novyi fil'm rezhissera ‘Ovsianok’ i ‘Angelov 
revoliutsii’ - odin iz luchshikh v novom godu.” Meduza. 30 Jan. 2018. Web. 
---. “‘Zoologiia’ Ivana Tverdovskogo: V mire zhivotnykh.” Afisha. 24 Nov. 2016. Web. 
Draskoczy, Julie. “Dmitrii Mamuliia: Another Sky (Drugoe nebo, 2010).” KinoKultura 30 (2010). 
Web. 
Dubreuil, Laurent. “Leaving Politics: Bios, Zōē, Life.” Trans. Clarissa C. Eagle. Diacritics 36.2 
(2006): 83-98. Print. 
Durantaye, Leland de la. Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2009. 
Print. 
Elmer, Jonathan. “Torture and Hyperbole.” Law, Culture and the Humanities 3.1 (2007): 18-34. 
Print. 
Elsaesser, Thomas. European Cinema and Continental Philosophy: Film as Thought Experiment. 
New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. Print. 
Emerson, Caryl. The First Hundred Years of Mikhail Bakhtin. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1997. 
Print. 
Erdinast-Vulcan, Daphna. “The I that Tells Itself: A Bakhtinian Perspective on Narrative Identity.” 
Narrative 16.1 (2008): 1-15. Print. 
Ezerova, Daria. “The Cinematic Discomfort of Kinotavr 2016.” KinoKultura 53 (2016). Web. 
Fanu, Mark le. Believing in Film: Christianity and Classic European Cinema. London, New York: 
I.B. Tauris, 2018. Print. 
 162 
Felperin, Leslie. “‘The Student’ (‘Uchenik’): Cannes Review.” The Hollywood Reporter. 13 May 
2016. Web.  
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage, 1995. Print. 
---. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. 
New York: Pantheon, 1980. Print. 
---. Religion and Culture. Michel Foucault. Ed. Jeremy R. Carrette. New York: Routledge, 1999. 
Print. 
---. Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège De France, 1977-78. Ed. Michel 
Senellart. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. Print. 
---. Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76. Ed. Mauro Bertani 
and Alessandro Fontana. Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003. Print. 
---. “Technologies of the Self.” Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. By Michel Foucault. Ed. Paul 
Rabinow. New York: New, 1997. 223-51. Print. 
---. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception. Trans. A.M. Sheridan. New 
York: Pantheon, 1973. Print. 
---. The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: 
Vintage, 1980. Print. 
Fukuyama, Francis. “Reflections on the End of History, Five Years Later.” History and Theory 
34.2 (1995): 27-43. Print. 
---. The End of History and the Last Man. London: Penguin, 1992. Print. 
Gabowitsch, Mischa. Protest in Putin’s Russia. Cambridge: Polity, 2017. Print. 
Garland, David. Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory. Chicago: U of 
Chicago, 1990. Print. 
 163 
Gessen, Masha. “Russia: Man vs. System.” The New York Review of Books. 26 Dec. 2014. Web. 
---. “Vladimir Putin’s Absence Proves Chaos Will Be His Only Successor.” Reuters. 17 Mar. 2015. 
Web. 
---. Words Will Break Cement: The Passion of Pussy Riot. London: Granta Publications, 2014. 
Print. 
Gladil'shchikov, Iurii. “Rozhdenie chernorubashechnika: Fil'm nedeli – ‘Uchenik’.” Forbes. 17 
Oct. 2016. Web.  
Gordiienko, Anastasiia. “The Paradoxical Role of the Shanson in Putin’s Russia.” The Soviet and 
Post-Soviet Review 45.3 (2018): 342-84. Print. 
Graffy, Julian. “Leviathan.” The Contemporary Russian Cinema Reader. Ed. Rimgaila Salys. 
Boston: Academic Studies, 2019. 305-27. Print. 
Grigor'eva, Nataliia. “‘Prazdnik’ ne vyshel v prokat, no sobral kassu.“ Nezavisimaia gazeta. 10 
Jan. 2019. Web. 
Halle, Randall. The Europeanization of Cinema: Interzones and Imaginative Communities. 
Urbana, Chicago, and Springfield: U of Illinois, 2014. Print. 
Hansen, Thomas Blom, and Finn Stepputat. Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in 
the Postcolonial World. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005. Print. 
Havas, Randall. “Raskolnikov Beyond Good and Evil.” Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment: 
Philosophical Perspectives. Ed. Robert Guay. New York: Oxford UP, 2019. 149-72. Print. 
Hecht, Gabrielle. Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade. Cambridge: MIT, 
2014. Print. 
Hirschkop, Ken. “Dialogue with History.” Mikhail Bakhtin: An Aesthetic for Democracy. Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2002. 51-108. Print. 
 164 
Hoad, Phil. “The Student Review – a Seductive Satire of Russian Orthodox Dogma.” The 
Guardian. 02 Mar. 2017. Web. 
Hubert, Henri, and Marcel Mauss. Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function. Chicago: U of Chicago, 
1964. Print. 
Human Rights Watch. “License to Harm.” Human Rights Watch. 15 Dec. 2014. Web. 
Ide, Wendy. “Zoology Review – Defiantly Weird.” The Guardian. 01 Oct. 2017. Web. 
Jones, Malcolm V. Dostoyevsky after Bakhtin: Readings in Dostoyevsky’s Fantastic Realism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. Print. 
Kabanova, Daria. “Mourning the Mimesis: Aleksei Fedorchenko’s First on the Moon and the Post-
Soviet Practice of Writing History.” Studies in Slavic Cultures 10 (2012): 75-93. Print. 
Kas'ianova, Ol'ga. “Kinotavr-2014: Detskii khor imeni Diany Arbus.” Seans. 6 June 2014. Web. 
Kaylan, Melik. “Kremlin Values: Putin’s Strategic Conservatism.” World Affairs 177.1 (2014): 9-
17. Web. 
Kelly, Mark G.E. “International Biopolitics: Foucault, Globalisation and Imperialism.” Theoria 
57.123 (2010): 1-26. Print. 
Khodarkovsky, Michael. “Putin’s Nightmare: The Ballot Box.” The New York Times. 03 Sept. 
2019. Web. 
Kiang, Jessica. “Film Review: ‘Zoology’.” Variety. 06 July 2016. Web. 
Kim, Olga. “Imperial Fatigue: Somnambulists, Ghosts, and Monsters.” Cinemasaurus: Russian 
Film in Contemporary Context. Ed. Nancy Condee, Alexander Prokhorov, and Elena 
Prokhorova. Boston: Academic Studies, 2020. 32-47. Print. 
“Kirill Serebrennikov: ‘Ekstremizm - ot pofigizma.’ Press-konferentsiia Po fil'mu 
‘Uchenik’.” Iskusstvo kino. June 2016. Web. 
 165 
Klimova, Olga. “Soviet Youth Films under Brezhnev: Watching Between the Lines.” Thesis. 2013. 
Web. 
Knight, Amy. Orders to Kill: The Putin Regime and Political Murder. New York: Thomas 
Dunne/St. Martin’s, 2018. Print. 
Kondyuk, Denys. “Sensing and Longing for God in Andrey Zvyagintsev’s The Return and 
Leviathan.” Religions 7.7 (2016): 82. Print. 
Korsakov, Denis. “Fil'm ‘Strana OZ’ zhestoko izdevaetsia nad glavnym otechestvennym 
prazdnikom.” Vedomosti. 09 Dec. 2015. Web. 
Koskela, Hille. “‘Cam Era’ — the Contemporary Urban Panopticon.” Surveillance & Society 1.3 
(2002): 292-313. Print. 
Kovalev, Oleg. “Aleksei Fedorchenko: First on the Moon (Pervye na lune), 2005.” KinoKultura 
11 (2006). Web. 
Kristeva, Julia. Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art. New York: 
Columbia UP, 1980. Print. 
---. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. New York: Columbia UP, 1982. Print. 
Kukulin, Ilya. “Cultural Shifts in Russia Since 2010: Messianic Cynicism and Paradigms of 
Artistic Resistance.” Russian Literature 96-98 (2018): 221-54. Print. 
Laclau, Ernesto. “Bare Life or Social Indeterminacy?” Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life. 
Ed. Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2007. 11-22. Print. 
Landy, Marcia. Cinema and Counter-history. Bloomington: Indiana U, 2015. Print. 
Leiderman, Daniil. “Dissensus and ‘shimmering’.” Russia - Art Resistance and the Conservative 
Authoritarian Zeitgeist. Ed. Lena Jonson and Andrei Erofeev. London, New York: 
Routledge, 2017. 165-81. Print. 
 166 
Lemke, Thomas. “‘A Zone of Indistinction’ – A Critique of Giorgio Agamben’s Concept of 
Biopolitics.” Outlines. Critical Social Studies 7 (2005): 3-13. Print. 
---. Biopolitik zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius, 2013. Print. 
---. “Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique.” Rethinking Marxism 14.3 (2002): 49-64. Print. 
Levchin, Serge. “The Paradoxes of ‘Leviathan’: A Discussion with Andrei Zvyagintsev: Features: 
Roger Ebert.” Roger Ebert. 24 Dec. 2014. Web. 
Lipovetsky, Mark. “Intelligentsia and Cynicism: Political Metamorphoses of 
Postmodernism.” Russian Journal of Communication 10.2-3 (2018): 233-50. Print. 
---. “Psevdomorfoza: Reaktsionnyi postmodernizm kak problema.” Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie 
3.151 (2018). Print. 
Liubakova, Anna. “Rossiiskii rezhisser Kirill Serebrennikov: My v chernykh spiskakh 
mrakobesov.” Belsat. 20 May 2016. Web. 
Luchko, Artem. “Zachem v ‘Leviafane’ nuzhna komp'iuternaia grafika.” Look at Me. 06 Apr. 
2015. Web. 
Lupher, Sonia. “Program Notes: Anna’s War.” Russian Film Symposium: “Shadow Empire.” 
2019. Web. 
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota, 1984. Print. 
Lübecker, Nikolaj D’Origny. The Feel-bad Film. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2015. Print. 
Makarychev, Andrey, and Alexandra Yatsyk. “A New Russian Conservatism: Domestic Roots and 
Repercussions for Europe.” Notes Internacionals CIDOB 93 (June 2014): 1-6. Print. 
---. “Biopower and Geopolitics as Russia’s Neighborhood Strategies: Reconnecting People or 
Reaggregating Lands?” Nationalities Papers 45.1 (2017): 25-40. Print. 
 167 
Makarychev, Andrey, and Sergei Medvedev. “Biopolitics and Power in Putin’s Russia.” Problems 
of Post-Communism 62.1 (2015): 45-54. Web. 
Maliukova, Larisa. “Aleksandr Kott: Kazhdaia smert' konets sveta.” Novaia gazeta. 20 May 2014. 
Web. 
March, Luke. “Nationalism for Export? The Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the New 
‘Russian Idea’.” Europe-Asia Studies 64.3 (2012): 401-25. Print. 
Marshall, Lee. “Angels of the Revolution.” Screen Daily. 24 Oct. 2014. Web. 
Maslova, Lidiia. “Kity nashi tiazhkie.” Kommersant. 4 Feb. 2015. Web. 
Massumi, Brian. What Animals Teach Us about Politics. Durham: Duke UP, 2014. Print. 
Matizen, Viktor. “Andrei Zviagintsev: ‘Chto za zhizn'...’” Iskusstvo kino 8 (2014). Iskusstvo Kino. 
Web. 
Matthews, Owen. “Putin to Russia: We Will Bury Ourselves.” Newsweek Magazine. 12 June 2014. 
Web. 
Mayenburg, Marius Von. Martyr. Trans. Maja Zade. London: Oberon, 2015. Print. 
McLoughlin, Daniel. “Voice.” The Agamben Dictionary. Ed. Alex Murray and Jessica Whyte. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2011. 197-98. Print. 
Medvedev, Sergei. “The State and the Human Body in Putin’s Russia: The Biopolitics of 
Authoritarian Revanche.” PonarsEuarasia. May 2019. Web. 
Meek, Allen. Biopolitical Media: Catastrophe, Immunity and Bare Life. New York and Oxon: 
Routledge, 2018. Print. 
Menzel, Birgit. “Der sowjetische Raumfahrtmythos als Parodie: Aleksei Fedorčenkos Film Die 
Ersten auf dem Mond als russisches Mockumentary.” Die Spur des Sputnik: 
 168 
Kulturhistorische Expeditionen ins Kosmische Zeitalter. Ed. Igor J. Polianski and Matthias 
Schwartz. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 2009. 229-48. Print. 
Mikhailova, Tatiana. “The Myth of Two Goddesses.” Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema 13.3 
(2019): 255-59. Web. 
Mills, Catherine. The Philosophy of Agamben. New York: Routledge, 2008. Print. 
Mitchell, David T., and Sharon L. Snyder. “Representations of Disability, History 
of.” Encyclopedia of Disability. Ed. Gary L. Albrecht. Vol. 5. Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 2006. 1382-394. Print. 
Mitchell, Jolyon. “Portraying Religion and Peace in Russian Film.” Studies in World Christianity 
14.2 (2008): 142-52. Web. 
Nair, Sheila. “Sovereignty, Security, and the Exception: Towards Situating Postcolonial Homo 
Sacer.” Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social and Political Theory. 
Ed. Gerard Delanty and Stephen P. Turner. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011. 386-94. Print. 
Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Inoperative Community. Trans. Peter Connor. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota, 2012. Print. 
Nechayev, Alexander. “Film Director Andrei Konchalovsky: I Have No Desire to Go Back to 
Hollywood.” Russia Beyond. 24 Jan. 2017. Web. 
Negri, Antonio. “Giorgio Agamben: The Discrete Taste of the Dialectic.” Giorgio Agamben: 
Sovereignty and Life. Ed. Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli. Stanford: Stanford UP, 
2007. 109-25. Print. 
Nelson, Jack A. The Disabled, the Media, and the Information Age. Westport: Greenwood, 1994. 
Print. 
 169 
Neupert, Richard John. The End: Narration and Closure in the Cinema. Detroit: Wayne State UP, 
1995. Print. 
Nichols, Bill. Introduction to Documentary. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2017. Print. 
Norris, Stephen M. Blockbuster History in the New Russia: Movies, Memory, and Patriotism. 
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2012. Print. 
Orlov, Pavel. “Supervaizer vizual'nykh effektov: Dmitrii Tokoiakov.” Tvkinoradio. 20 Jan. 2015. 
Web. 
O’Shaughnessy, Martin. The New Face of Political Cinema: Commitment in French Film since 
1995. New York: Berghahn, 2007. Print. 
Parsley, Connal. “Law.” The Agamben Dictionary. Ed. Alex Murray and Jessica Whyte. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2011. 119-22. Print. 
Patton, Paul. “Agamben and Foucault on Biopower and Biopolitics.” Giorgio Agamben: 
Sovereignty and Life. Ed. Matthew Calarco and Steven Decaroli. Stanford: Stanford UP, 
2007. 203-18. Print. 
Phelan, Peggy. “Yvonne Rainer: From Dance to Film.” A Woman Who ...: Essays, Interviews, 
Scripts. By Yvonne Rainer. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U, 1999. 3-17. Print. 
Philo, Chris, and Chris Wilbert. “Animal Spaces, Beastly Places. An Introduction.” Animal 
Spaces, Beastly Places: New Geographies of Human-animal Relations. Ed. Chris Philo and 
Chris Wilbert. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. 1-36. Print. 
Plakhov, Andrei. “Neliubovnye otnosheniia.” Kommersant. 22 Jan. 2020. Web. 
Plantinga, Carl. “Blurry Boundaries, Troubling Typologies, and the Unruly Fiction 
Film.” Semiotica 98.3-4 (1994): 387-96. Print. 
 170 
“Press-konferentsiia konkursnogo fil'ma ‘Zoologiia’,” YouTube uploaded by KinotavrTV, 11 June 
2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SyD7VH3xLN4.  
Prokhorov, Alexander. “Aleksei Fedorchenko: First on the Moon (Pervye na lune), 
2005.” KinoKultura 11 (2006). Web. 
---. “Images of ‘Posthumous Subjectivity’ in Fedorchenko’s Angels of Revolution.” Studies in 
Russian and Soviet Cinema 13.3 (2019): 260-67. Web. 
Prokhorova, Elena. “Ivan Tverdovskii: Zoology (Zoologiia, 2016).” KinoKultura 58 (2017). Web. 
Prozorov, Sergei. The Ethics of Postcommunism: History and Social Praxis in Russia. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print. 
---. “The Management of Anomie: The State of Exception in Postcommunist Russia.” Agamben 
and Colonialism. Ed. Marcelo Svirsky and Simone Bignall. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 
2012. 32-51. Print. 
Renov, Michael. “The Facial Closeup in Audio-Visual Testimony: The Power of Embodied 
Memory.” Preserving Survivors’ Memories. Web. 
Rhodes, John David. “Haneke, the Long Take, Realism.” Framework: The Journal of Cinema and 
Media 47.2 (2006): 17-21. Web. 
Richter, David H. Fable’s End: Completeness and Closure in Rhetorical Fiction. Chicago: U of 
Chicago, 1974. Print. 
Rizov, Vadim. “‘A Little Person Against the Government Machine’: Andrey Zvyagintsev on 
Leviathan.” Filmmaker Magazine. 25 Dec. 2014. Web. 
Roberts, Tom. “The Violence of Antiquated Forms: Aleksei Fedorchenko’s Angels of 
Revolution.” Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema 13.3 (2019): 247-54. Web. 
Said, Edward W. Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979. Print. 
 171 
Saltykov, Denis. “Rustam Mosafir: The Scythian (Skif, 2018).” KinoKultura 61 (2018). Web. 
Schueller, Malini Johar. “Decolonizing Global Theories Today.” Interventions 11.2 (2009): 235-
54. Print. 
Shakina, Olga. “‘My seichas ves' fil'm zapikivaem. Dazhe gde liudi molchat’.” Colta.ru. 16 Nov. 
2015. Web. 
Silver, Victoria. “A Matter of Interpretation.” Critical Inquiry 20.1 (1993): 160-71. Web. 
Sirivlia, Natal'ia. “O pol'ze provokatsii. ‘Zoologiia,’ rezhisser Ivan I. Tverdovskii.” Iskusstvo kino 
6 (2016). Print. 
Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Trans. Michael Eldred. Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota, 1987. Print. 
Smirnov, Nikita. “Ivan I. Tverdovskii: ‘Zritel' dolzhen igrat' po moim pravilam’.” Seans. 14 Nov. 
2018. Web. 
Smith, Barbara Herrnstein. Poetic Closure: A Study of How Poems End. Chicago: U of Chicago, 
1968. Print. 
Snyder, Sharon L., and David T. Mitchell. Cultural Locations of Disability. Chicago: U of 
Chicago, 2006. Print. 
Solntseva, Alena. “Khvost, spriatannyi v trusy.” The New Times. 5 Dec. 2016. Web. 
---. “Mif protiv istorii.” Peterburgskii teatral'nyi Zhurnal 2.96 (2019). Web. 
Stishova, Elena. “Melankholiia. Russkaia versiia. ‘Ispytanie,’ rezhisser Aleksandr Kott.” Iskusstvo 
kino 8 (2014): 71-76. Print. 
Strukov, Vlad. “Intentionality and Modelled Subjectivities.” Contemporary Russian Cinema: 
Symbols of a New Era. By Vlad Strukov. Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2016. 199-216. Print. 
 172 
Suleiman, Susan Rubin. Authoritarian Fictions: The Ideological Novel as a Literary Genre. 
Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992. Print. 
Surnacheva, Elizaveta. “Tianut idealy na sebia.” Kommersant. 9 Dec. 2013. Web. 
Szaniawski, Jeremi. “Cargo 200.” Senses of Cinema 85 (2017). Web. 
Timofeev, Iaroslav. “Andrei Zviagintsev: ‘Esli ia shpion, to tol'ko russkii’.” Izvestiia. 19 Feb. 
2015. Web. 
Tlostanova, Madina. “The Postcolonial and the Postsocialist: A Deferred Coalition? Brothers 
Forever?” Postcolonial Interventions: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Postcolonial Studies 
3.1 (2018): 1-37. Print. 
Todorov, Tzvetan. Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogic Principle. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1998. 
Print. 
Tokmasheva, Mariia. “Aleksandr Kott: ‘Kino bez slov - eto moi parallel'nyi mir’.” ProfiCinema. 
20 May 2014. Web. 
Trofimenkov, Mikhail. “Vodevil' o spushchennykh shtanakh.” Kommersant. 15 Oct. 2016. Web. 
Tsulaia, Dariko. “Aleksandr Kott: Ideal'noe kino – eto kino bez slov.” KinoPoisk. 21 Sept. 2012. 
Web. 
Tumarkin, Nina. The Living & the Dead : The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia. 
New York: Basic, 1994. Print. 
Volkov, Vadim. Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism. 
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2016. Print. 
Weiner, Amir. Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik 
Revolution. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2012. Print. 
 173 
---. “When Memory Counts: War, Genocide, and Postwar Soviet Jewry.” Crimes of War: Guilt 
and Denial in the Twentieth Century. Ed. Omer Bartov, Atina Grossmann, and Mary Nolan. 
New York: New Press, 2002. 191-216. Print. 
Weissberg, Jay. “Rotterdam Film Review: ‘Anna’s War’.” Variety. 06 Feb. 2018. Web. 
Werner, Cynthia, and Kathleen Purvis-Roberts. “Unraveling the Secrets of the Past: Contested 
Versions of Nuclear Testing in the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan.” Half-lives and Half-
truths: Confronting the Radioactive Legacies of the Cold War. Ed. Barbara Rose Johnston. 
Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research, 2007. 277-98. Print. 
White, Frederick H. “Cargo 200: A Bricolage of Cultural Citations.” Studies in Russian and Soviet 
Cinema 9.2 (2015): 94-109. Print. 
Wolfe, Cary. Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist 
Theory. Chicago: U of Chicago, 2003. Print. 
Yaffa, Joshua. Between Two Fires. Truth, Ambition, and Compromise in Putin’s Russia. New 
York: Tim Duggan, 2020. Print. 
Yampolsky, Mikhail. “Death in Cinema.” Re-entering the Sign: Articulating New Russian Culture. 
Ed. Ellen E. Berry and Anesa Miller-Pogacar. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan, 1995. 270-88. 
Print. 
Young, Neil. “‘Test’ (‘Ispytanie’): Antalya Review.” The Hollywood Reporter. 22 Oct. 2014. Web.  
Ziarek, Ewa Płonowska. “Bare Life on Strike: Notes on the Biopolitics of Race and Gender.” South 
Atlantic Quarterly 107.1 (2008): 89-105. Print. 
“#Kinotavr2018: Aleksei Fedorchenko (‘Voina Anny’) – interv'iu,” YouTube uploaded by 
Telekanal Kino TV, 4 June 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lJqIb56afYA. 
 
